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“O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even
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ABSTRACT
In 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (Nazaha) conducted a survey to assess
corruption in Saudi Arabia. From this survey, two main findings deserve to be highlighted. First,
the survey reveals that the practice of wasta was the most prevalent corrupt practice in Saudi
society, constituting about 62 percent of such practices. This finding shows that it is essential to
examine such a practice not only as a legal issue, but also as a social issue. Accordingly, the first
part of this dissertation is devoted to providing a legal and social analysis of the practice of
wasta. Another significant finding of the Nazaha survey is that around 81 percent of respondents
attributed the prevalence of corruption in Saudi Arabia to the complexity of procedures and the
outdated nature of the laws. In light of this finding, the latter part of this dissertation undertakes
an evaluation of the Anti-Bribery Law, which is one of the main legal instruments to fight
corruption, and other legal provisions that intersect with it in order to highlight issues which may
hinder the application of the Anti-Bribery Law and which consequently constitute legal factors
that promote corruption.
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INTRODUCTION
As the largest global supplier of oil, Saudi Arabia saw almost continuous economic
expansion in the last half of the twentieth century, an expansion which has continued in the
twenty-first. Since King Abdullah ascended the throne in 2005, Saudi Arabia has made
significant economic improvement. In that same year, it joined the World Trade Organization,
which has attracted a number of international and foreign investors to expand their business in
the Kingdom. Even before that, in 2001, the Saudi government began establishing a number of
industrial cities (modon) around the country. It can be said that Saudi Arabia has a new economic
strategy for the twenty-first century aimed at expanding and liberalizing the economy.
This seemed successful until 2009, when a flood struck Jeddah City and many other cities
in Makkah Province, leaving some 500 dead and thousands missing. Afterward, it was revealed
that the casualties, as well as the major financial losses, were due to unethical practices in the
awarding and execution of construction contracts. A similar but even worse disaster occurred in
2011. These two incidents brought the issue of corruption to the fore.
This has led the Saudi government to establish the National Anti-Corruption Commission
(Nazaha), which, along with other authorized governmental bodies, is charged with investigating
the source of the corruption and with preventing such corruption in the future. Though the
Commission and other authorities have had their achievements, this did not prevent the
disastrous flooding that hit Riyadh, the capital, in 2013. This series of events indicates that there
are still more difficulties and challenges facing the Nazaha and other authorized governmental
bodies that prevent them from getting to the heart of the issue.
Although there are articles and books that have addressed the issue of corruption in Saudi
Arabia, most of these works do not consider the issue more holistically. Instead, they tend to
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view corruption as the result of government practices, rather than examining the legal and
cultural system that allows such corruption to arise. Cultural and legal structures lie at the root of
this issue, and only by addressing these can the problem of corruption be reduced significantly.
Accordingly, this dissertation sheds light on wasta as a socially promoted corrupt
practice, in addition to examining the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law and related aspects within the
Saudi legal framework as legal issues. It seeks to argue that combating corruption may not be so
much an issue of enforcing anti-corruption laws as an issue of discovering the social and legal
factors that hinder the enforcement of the legal provisions in the first place—although this cannot
be understood as implying that enforcement issues are of no account.
In terms of the social factors that contribute to corruption, it needs to be said that Saudi
society does not promote bribery; it does, however, promote the practice of favoritism based on
tribal and familial relationships, or what is known broadly as wasta. Wasta constitutes a
sufficient reason for the increase of corruption. Generally, wasta can be categorized as
indigenous forms of informal influence processes which involve acts of favoritism, whether on
the basis of family, tribe, or region. The practice of wasta is widespread, not only in Saudi
society, but also in the Arab world at large, where individuals resort to the practice in order to
obtain certain advantages. Although Islamic jurisprudence clearly distinguishes between
permissible and forbidden forms of shafa’ah (intercession), wasta is frequently confused with
the Islamic concept of shafa’ah (intercession).
To understand wasta as a practice, it is necessary to understand the social, cultural, and
historical background within which this practice thrives. Social psychology plays a significant
role in providing the basic explanation for why individuals promote and participate in practicing
wasta instead of challenging and resisting it, despite their negative perception of the practice.
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From a legal perspective, wasta exists most frequently in a grey area of the law, which poses a
significant challenge for the existing legal provisions that aim to combat such practices.
The Saudi Anti-Bribery Law is one of the country’s main anti-corruption regulations. The
Law represents a significant advance in certain respects, in that it criminalizes a number of
corrupt practices, establishes the criminal liability of legal persons, rewards whistleblowers, and
gives the government partial jurisdiction over the private sector. Despite such advances,
however, the Law contains within it certain provisions that may hinder its effectiveness. Other
obstacles and disadvantages that arise from related provisions within the criminal justice system
generally and within the anti-corruption framework in particular may also neutralize the benefit
of such advances.
Since Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nation Convention against Corruption in 2013, the
Saudi Anti-Bribery Law should be examined in light of the Convention’s standards and
provisions, in addition to comparing it with other legal systems and with international
conventions and standards. Such an evaluation will highlight the disadvantages more vividly so
that the Saudi government and future researchers may consider them. Since the Anti-Bribery
Law does not exist by itself as a comprehensive legal instrument, the identification of its
disadvantages requires the examination of related provisions and aspects within the criminal
justice system generally and within the anti-corruption framework in particular.
Research Roadmap
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first three chapters lay the basic
foundation and explore the relevant background on corruption, Islamic criminal law, and the
Saudi legal system, while the remaining chapters focus specifically on the issues of concern to
this dissertation. The first chapter discusses the definition of corruption and related issues and
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briefly surveys the classification of corruption, problems in fighting corruption, and the causes
and consequences of corruption.
The second chapter provides background on Islamic criminal law as the source of the
Saudi legal system. In the first section, the sources of Islamic law are explained. The second
section explores the structure of the Islamic criminal law, including its classification of crimes
and its main principles. The last section sheds light on the position of Islamic criminal law on
certain corrupt practices.
The third chapter reviews the background of the Saudi legal system. This chapter focuses
mainly on the Saudi criminal justice system by identifying briefly and generally the structure of
the criminal justice system. It then surveys the historical development of the Saudi legal system
in general and the criminal justice system in particular, as well as the obstacles it faced during
that development. The chapter concludes by reviewing the current situation of corruption in
Saudi Arabia
After the essential foundations for the dissertation are laid, the focus turns toward the
specific issues to be examined. Chapter four makes a transition to the topic of corruption and
Saudi Arabian society. The first section surveys the debate as to whether corruption is an
individual phenomenon or a social phenomenon. Section two delves into Saudi Arabian society
to supply readers with the essential background on Saudi history, culture, and social
stratification. Finally, a brief review of the social psychological perspective is given in the last
section.
Chapter five places the practice of wasta under the microscope. The first section
describes the practice of wasta and compares it with a number of similar practices that involve
informal influence. The chapter then tracks the evolution and development of wasta in Saudi
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Arabia in light of the brief historical and cultural background provided in chapter four. The last
section investigates how the public perceives wasta and the legal position of the practice.
The Anti-Bribery Law is the sole focus of chapter six. Before analyzing the Anti-Bribery
Law, the first section reviews the Saudi anti-corruption legal system. The second section
explores the definition of bribery as an offense under the Law, the elements of the offense, the
scope of the Law’s application, and the punishments, defenses, and rewards for reporting the
offense under the Law. The third section further examines the corrupt practices included in the
Law and their elements.
Based on chapter six, chapter seven examines the strength and weaknesses of the AntiBribery Law in regard to four aspects: the liability of legal persons; the wasta provision,
immunity; penalties and rewards; the protection of whistleblower and witnesses; and the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law.
The dissertation concludes by offering potential legal, structural, and behavioral solutions
to fight corrupt practices generally and the practice of wasta specifically. The first section
proposes improving institutional structures by the implementation and development of egovernment. The second section suggests using the approach of nudges in order to discourage
corrupt practices generally and wasta specifically. The third section then considers the possibility
of expanding the jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. Finally, the dissertation concludes by
addressing the role of criminal law in fighting corruption.

5

CHAPTER ONE: CORRUPTION IN GENERAL
INTRODUCTION
Corruption concerns many individuals around the globe, whether in the so-called
developing nations or in developed nations. Corruption, as a subject, gains its complexity from
the fact that it is related to different disciplinary perspectives. This indicates that each factor has
a role in corruption. Consequently, each discipline argues and provides an explanation of the
causes and consequences that may overlap with other disciplinary perspectives.
In this chapter, a general examination of the issue of corruption will be provided. At the
outset, the definition of corruption will be discussed. The discussion will be extended to cover
the issues related to the definitions of corruption. This will lay a foundation for discussing the
classification of corruption and the forms of corrupt practices. After that, this chapter will shift to
examine the causes and consequences of corruption from the political, cultural, economic, and
legal perspectives. This chapter will conclude by highlighting the main problems that arise in
fighting corruption.
A. Definition and Related Issues
Corruption is not a new phenomenon, but rather one that has existed for thousands of
years.1 Since the 1990s it has received greater attention, but why was that not the case before? No
definite answers can be provided. Instead, a number of possible reasons have been offered.
Globalization, without doubt, has had a significant role in generating discussion about corruption
1

For example, in the period of Prophet Mohammad, there were incidents where he had to stand
against certain practices and acts that fall under the umbrella of corruption. See generally Vito
Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 98/63, 1998), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9863.pdf. Jacob van Klaveren, Corruption as a
Historical Phenomenon, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS 83, 83-94
(Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2002) (providing a historical review of
corruption).
6

and has given rise to a series of consequences. Not only has corruption become a universal
phenomenon, it is also no longer a taboo topic. This, it is certain, was a result of the growth of a
democratic environment that has facilitated the media’s advancement to a sufficient stage of
development. The media began to shift from traditional means to more advanced means that have
almost zero restrictions, which then eliminated the obstacles created by lack of information and
boundaries. Globalization and the idea of universality have encouraged the rise of
nongovernmental organizations whose missions focus wholly or partly on fighting corruption.2
Politically, corruption is often utilized as a political agenda. Allegations and charges are
now more obvious than they were before. The attention to seeking out and discussing corruption
can also be attributed to the end of the Cold War, since there has been no more need to cover up
corruption in attempts to gain allies. In fact, the United States and European countries have played
significant efforts in fighting corruption. Economically, countries have suffered and are still
suffering from corrupt practices. Again, due to globalization, the effects of corruption are not
limited within the borders of the nation where it occurs.3
When it comes to discussing corruption, a disagreement can be seen as regards the
definition. Corruption can be defined from different points of view. Consequently, quite broad
definitions exist, eliminating the idea of one single definition. The reason for the existence of
diverse definitions can be attributed generally to the idea that corruption is perceived differently
by different societies.
International organizations have adopted a number of definitions, and this is also true
when it to comes to different scholars. Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as “the

2
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See generally Tanzi, supra note 1.
Id.
7

abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”4 A similar definition to some extent is also adopted by
the World Bank (WB), which defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”5
The difference between these definitions is manifest in the idea of using the term “public office”
in the WB definition. Thus, a number of criticisms are brought against the WB definition, arguing
that such a definition is incomplete since it does not include the private sector.
Scholars have also gone further to define corruption starting from the very same point—
that is, corruption implies that there is an ideal model or condition and there is perversion or
deviation from it. Then they have seemed to suggest different propositions or concepts of what
the ideal condition or model is. At the outset, definitions have ranged across the classifications
found in Arnold. J. Heifenheimer’s analysis of corruption, which divided the analysis into three
main models: public-office-centered, public-interest-centered, and market-centered.6
The public-office-centered definition of corruption focuses mainly on the acts of public
officials that can be considered to deviate from a legal norm in favor of private gain. The
definition and concept of corruption in this category tends to be narrower than that of other
categories, since it is linked to legal norms. The most cited definition representing this category is
that of Nye, who defined corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence.”7
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TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption (last visited Nov. 14,
2016).
5
THE WORLD BANK GROUP,
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm#note1 (last visited Nov.
14, 2016).
6
ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, at
4-6 (1970).
7
Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967).
8

The critics of the public-office-centered definition argue that it is too narrow, since not all illegal
acts by public officials are corrupt practices, and vice versa. The second criticism focuses on the
fact that a number of countries do not provide explicit rules governing officials’ conduct.8
The public-interest-centered definition emphasizes the harm to the public interest or the
common good, i.e., corruption is an act that causes damage to the public interest. Rogow and
Laswell, for instance, argue that practice of corruption is inconsistent with public order that
elevates public interest over private interest. Other scholars, such as Friedrich9 and Morris,10
follow the same model in their concept of corruption. The public-interest-centered concept and
definition, however, has attracted criticism on the basis of its non-specificity, i.e., it fails to
specify whose interest has been violated. Moreover, a number of corrupt practices occur, in fact,
in accordance with public interest, such as so-called honest graft.11
The market-centered definition of corruption has been influenced to some extent by the
perspectives of economists. According to this model, thus, “[c]orruption is an extra-legal
institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As
such, the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the

8

John A. Gardiner, Defining Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS
25, 26 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2002); see also Thomas D.
Lancaster & Gabriella R. Montinola, Toward a Methodology for the Comparative Study of
Political Corruption, 27 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE. 185, 188 (1997) (citing C. Leys, What is the
Problem About Corruption?, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS,
31, 31–37 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed. 1970)).
9
Carl J. Friedrich, Political Pathology, 37 POL. Q. 70, 74 (1966) (Friedrich links a practice of
corruption and the damage that occurs to the organization or the group in general.).
10
See STEPHEN D. MORRIS, CORRUPTION & POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 6-7 (1991)
(Morris also noted that practice of corruption is not consistent with public interest, which he
refers to as the “state’s legitimizing ideology”.).
11
Lancaster & Montinola, supra note 8, at 188.
9

decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.”12 The marketcentered concept of corruption mainly focuses on bureaucrats or “civil servants” who use their
public office as a private business,13 which then results in a shift from a mandatory pricing model
to a semi-black-market model, where an individual is forced to pay higher than the mandated
price in order to receive a certain benefit.14 The main criticism of this concept is that it only
focuses on the practices of bureaucrats, while it excludes the practices of others, such as elected
officials.15
Attempting to eschew the difficulties related to defining corruption, a number of
international and regional conventions16 and domestic regulations opt not to provide a
comprehensive definition of corruption; instead, these conventions and regulations list certain acts
and practices of corruption and define them separately. This method was motivated by the fact
that attempts to define corruption, as noted in the U.N. Anti-Corruption Toolkit, “invariably
encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political problems.”17 Consequently,
corruption generally as a term refers to a wide collection of acts and practices including bribery,

12

Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAVE.
SCI. 8, 8 (1964).
13
ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER & MICHAEL JOHNSTON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND
CONTEXTS, at 8 (3d ed. 2002).
14
Robert O. Tilman, Emergence of Black-Market Bureaucracy: Administration, Development,
and Corruption in the New States, 28 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 437, 440-42 (1968).
15
Lancaster & Montinola, supra note 8, at 190.
16
This includes the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, the InterAmerican Convention against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption, the League of Arab States Anti-Corruption Convention, the Council of
Europe’s Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, and the European Union’s
Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials.
17
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE GLOBAL PROGRAM AGAINST CORRUPTION; U.N.
ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLKIT 10 (3d ed. 2004).
10

trade of influence, embezzlement, favoritism, abuse of power, extortion, fraud, and money
laundering.
From a legal perspective, defining corruption is a difficult task due to the potential
restrictions it may impose on individuals and the consequences of criminalization. To define a
crime too generally or using too broad a concept would jeopardize the freedom of individuals and
the stability of societies. Therefore, to be on the safe side, each corrupt act can be defined
separately in a way that describes both the act (actus reus) and the intention (mens rea), followed
by other elements, such as punishments and jurisdiction.
B. Classification of Corruption
Corruption is generally classified based on various features, and such classification mainly
depends on the perspective from which the analysis is undertaken. Economists classify corruption
based on its economic consequences or its sources; thus, for example, they have classified
corruption based on the frequency of incidence, how rare or widespread it is, or based on how
organized the corruption is, i.e., whether it is well organized or chaotic.18 The political scientists
follow the same pattern and focus on governmental structures and institutions, leading to a
classification of corruption as centralized or decentralized, and the same path is followed by legal
scholars and sociologists. Their form of classification aims no lower, but rather gains its
significance from the fact that it defines accurately the root causes of corruption, and,
accordingly, prescribes the appropriate measures to combat corruption and offers solutions.
1. Political Corruption v. Bureaucratic Corruption
It is not always possible to set forth a definition of corruption that clearly draws a line
between political corruption and bureaucratic corruption. This can be attributed to the
18

See, e.g., U Myint, Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures, 7 ASIA PAC. DEV. J. 33, 4042 (2000).
11

generalization that usually takes place in defining any concept. Political corruption, also known as
grand corruption,19 refers to corrupt practices committed by higher level officials or decisionmakers. Falling into this category are politicians and public representatives who deviate from
their main mission of making rules and enforcing them on behalf of the people, to protect them,
and do so in order to enhance their own power and wealth. While the previous type of corruption
focuses on the misconduct of higher level officials, bureaucratic corruption, also referred to as
petty corruption, focuses on the corrupt practices committed by lower level officials, i.e., the
administrative staff.20
This classification relies heavily on a clear separation, which practically speaking, does
not exist in most political systems, between high level or political officials and lower level or
administrative officials; without such a distinction, it will remain a vague system of classification.
This, however, does not deprive this classification of its own analytical and practical merits, since
the consequences of political corruption are not only more serious than those of petty corruption,
they also have a clear impact on the political system in general. In the real world, political
corruption exceeds the bounds of mere deviation or violation of legal rules or codes to encompass
the utilization of laws and rules to serve personal interests, which can be considered a deviation
from the principles and values of legal rationality.21

19

Id. at 40 (it can also be referred to as high-level corruption).
Id. at 40-41; see also JENS C. ANDVIG ET AL., CORRUPTION: A REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 10-12 (2001).
21
Inge Amundsen, Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues 3-4 (CHR. MICHELSEN
INST, Working Paper. 7, 1999) (political corruption though it occurs in both authoritarian and
democratic regimes, can be characterized as a norm in the former and as incidental in the latter);
see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND REFORM 113-26 (1999).
20
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2. Private Corruption v. Collective Corruption
Another type of classification depends on who would benefit from the corrupt act. In the
private corruption category, the benefit emerging from the corrupt act would be limited to the
perpetrator and his family or friends, meaning that the circle of beneficiaries is still within private
and individual limits.22 Once the circle of beneficiaries extends beyond that, the corruption can be
regarded as collective corruption. The benefits emerging from collective corruption are divided
among the group members.23 The group can be a certain class, organization, party, or even a gang
that can utilize the resources in their advantages. Here, corruption may shift to being a form of
organized crime.
The latter form is what most corrupt acts tend to be aimed at hiding. As a result, when a
corrupt act starts as a conspiracy between two or more individuals, it grows quickly to a larger
group being involved. This gradual development and spread of corruption from private
“individual” corruption to collective “aggregated” corruption may lead to greater social
acceptance of corruption. The ultimate dangerous and frustrating result is the belief among the
people that corruption is inevitable and expected.24
3. Redistributive Corruption v. Extractive Corruption
This classification aims at identifying the relationship between the state and society, as
the two main players in corruption problem, and the direction in which the resources flow, i.e.,
from the top downward, which is extractive corruption, or from the bottom upward, which is
redistributive corruption. Since the relationship between the society and the state in cases of
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corruption is usually not balanced, one party, either the state or the society, will benefit the most
from corruption.25
In redistributive corruption, the state is in the weaker position in the relationship, allowing
a number of individuals or social or economic groups to gain more benefit from the corruption
than the state. This results from these groups and individuals being powerful and organized,
which enables them to challenge the state and distribute state resources based not on fairness but
rather on how powerful the groups or individuals are. Appropriately, in this type of corruption, a
powerful ethnicity, region, or tribe will benefit the most as a group from the corruption. The mafia
is the quintessential example of this type of corruption. Ultimately, the state and the poor will be
affected the most.26
Extractive corruption, on the other hand, is a type of corruption in which the society is in
the weaker position in the relationship. Accordingly, the state will benefit more from corrupt
practices. Though they are passive players, the ruling elite benefit more from corruption by
extracting the resources from the society through using the state system and instruments to their
advantage. This category of corruption can be seen in authoritarian and neo-patrimonial states,
where the resources and the power are concentrated in the hands of the rulers.27
C. Forms of Corrupt Practices
Having identified a number of classifications of corruption, it will be helpful to list the
most significant forms of corrupt practices recognized in anti-corruption regulation and
conventions in order to identify more specifically what corruption is from a criminal law
perspective.
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1. Bribery
Bribery is “the corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official
action.”28 This definition appears similarly in both domestic laws and international conventions.29
The benefit from bribery is not limited to monetary benefits and need not be paid directly to the
bribed individual but rather can be anything that benefits the bribee directly or indirectly. The
criminalization of bribery can apply to the private sector and the public sector alike. It can also be
limited to public officials, in which case the definition of public officials would be extended
broadly to include individuals or corporate groups with a relationship to public functions. There
are many terms equivalent to bribery, such as kickback, gratuity, commercial arrangement,
sweetener, baksheesh, pay-off, and speed money or grease money.
2. Embezzlement and Fraud
Embezzlement is “the fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has been
entrusted.”30 Though it is considered generally a form of property crime, embezzlement can be
considered a form of corruption when applying broader definitions of corruption, since the act
affects the public interest and is committed by a public official. Fraud is the use of false or
deceptive information to “induce another to act to his or her detriment.”31 For instance, fraud can
be committed by an official who conveys false information about the distribution of supplies or
the number of beneficiaries.
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See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption art 8, 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004).
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3. Extortion
Extortion is “the offense committed by a public official who illegally obtains property
under the color of office.”32 The main element in the crime of extortion is the use of coercion,
which also affects, in addition to the public interest, the victim of the crime itself. The difference
between bribery and extortion is critical, since the individual who paid the benefit will be
criminally liable if the offense is bribery, but not if it is extortion.33 Between bribery and
extortion, however, there is not a clear, bright line.
If one other than the officer corruptly takes the initiative and offers what he knows is not
an authorized fee, it is bribery and not extortion. On the other hand, if the officer corruptly
makes an unlawful demand which is paid by one who does not realize it is not the fee
authorized for the service rendered, it is extortion and not bribery. In theory it would seem
possible for an officer to extort a bribe under such circumstances that he would be guilty
of either offense whereas the outraged citizen would be excused.34
4. Abuse of Power35
Abuse of power is a general and broad category that includes acts such as abuse of
discretionary powers and favoritism. Abuse of power refers to acts involving the use of power to
gain a personal benefit. Abuse of power is associated in most cases with bureaucracies where
there is a broad discretionary power and little supervision or accountability. Favoritism, as a form
of abuse of power, involves a high level of bias in the distribution of resources to family, friends,
or members of a group. Nepotism, as a specific form of favoritism, is defined as the “bestowal of
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official favors on one's relatives.”36 Other examples of favoritism are the acts of clientelism,
patronage, and cronyism.
D. Causes and Consequences of Corruption
When it comes to corruption, almost every aspect of it seems difficult to pin down,
starting with the definition of it. The same difficulties apply to the causes and consequences of
corruption, which seem to have a dynamic relationship. This dynamic relationship shifts some
elements from the side of causes to the side of consequences, and vice versa. The overlap between
the two sides not only arises because some factors that can be found in one place do not
necessarily exist in another, but also because some factors can be observed on one side in one
place and on the other side in another place.
Despite these difficulties, research has consistently advanced so that it can at least
determine the chain of corruption in a series. As a result, from each of the perspectives on
corruption, whether economic, political, legal, or social, scholars and researchers have identified a
number of causes and consequences. When it comes to the causes of corruption, however, most of
the research pivots around Klitgaard’s corruption equation. The equation is as follows:
Corruption = Economic Rent + Discretionary Power – Accountability.37
This equation indicates that the co-existence of three elements is required: economic rent
accompanying discretionary power and a low probability of accountability and penalization.
I am proposing that corruption is similar to a seesaw or teeter-totter where there are four
factors on each side, depending on the following cultural, economic, political, and legal factors on
the side of the causes. On the consequences side, the same factors are organized backward, i.e.,
the legal, political, economic, and cultural consequences. In the case of unbalanced weight
36
37

NEPOTISM, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
ROBERT E. KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 75 (1988).
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resulting in a collapse of the consequences, the most damage will be seen in the cultural and
economic aspects, since each consequence will affect both of those aspects, either directly or
indirectly. In a sense, the legal and political aspects are merely means to create corruption, while
the motivations and the explanations remain to be found in the cultural and economic aspects.
1. Political Explanation
The democratic system, adopted in most of the wealthy states, does not necessarily
succeed in reducing corruption. This is due to two main reasons: first, the term “democracy” is an
overarching rubric and includes several forms. Second, a government system that works
efficiently and effectively in one state may not work in the same way in another. History provides
a number of examples of corruption that have occurred in democratic states—consider Chicago,
for example. This is a clear indication that democratic systems do not succeed in fighting
corruption without efficient tools.38
Nevertheless, studies show that democracy gradually helps to lower the level of
corruption, as can be seen in a study testing the impact of grounded democracy in states with a
democratic tradition since 1950.39 The study found a significant impact of democracy on
corruption, which was derived from being exposed to democracy over time, rather than the
current level of democracy.40 Other studies have found that corruption in authoritarian systems is
slightly lower than in medium-democratic systems.41

38

ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 113.
Daniel Treisman, The causes of corruption: a cross-national study, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 399, 43335 (2000).
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The form of democracy also plays a significant role in determining the level of corruption
in a democracy. Empirical studies indicate that democratic systems with more powerful presidents
are more corrupt than the parliamentary system, in the absence of U.S.-style checks and balances,
as is the case in the majority of presidential systems. A study that compared parliamentary
systems with presidential systems provided evidence that the former were associated with lower
levels of corruption. 42 This can be attributed to an imbalanced distribution of powers; that is, in
presidential systems where presidents have semi-complete power over the resources, they can be
more easily utilized for the presidents’ personal profits. Presidents also tend to extend their power
to gain both legislative and non-legislative powers, taking advantage of the absence of checks and
balances.43
Describing the relationship between decentralization and corruption increases the
complexity and challenges of giving an adequate account of corruption. Studies are divided
between the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization, though a number of studies have
found no significant impacts of either on corruption.44 This division in the results is due to how
decentralization is measured.45 Decentralization and centralization are important, but they are not

Competition: Problems of Quantitative Analysis], in DIMENSIONEN POLITISCHER KORRUPTION
[Dimensions of Political Corruption] 249, 249-66 (Ulrich von Alemann ed., 2005)).
42
John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of
Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 295, 325-28 (2004) (the study also
compared unitarism with a federal system and found that unitarism tended to be associated with
less corruption. The ranking was as follows: 1. Federal and presidential systems are high
corruption. 2. Unitary presidential and federal parliamentary systems are intermediate corruption.
3. Unitary parliamentary systems are low corruption).
43
Jana Kunicová & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as
Constraints on Corruption, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 573, 586 (2005) (the authors also support the
results of the previously mentioned study. They also expand the study to examine plurality
voting in contrast to proportional representation and found that the latter is associated with more
corruption in the case of presidential systems).
44
Lambsdorff, supra note 41, at 16.
45
Id. at 17.
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the right basis on which to fight corruption, as there are other factors, mainly cultural, that are
likely confuse the issue.46
Finally, strong competition serves as dual function: it not only provides societies with the
option to change leaders who did not meet their expectations,47 it also decreases the likelihood of
corrupt practices in the political domain, since such acts hurt the reputation of candidates.48 In
general, an ideal democratic system would reduce corruption, since it limits politicians’ greed by
the device of elections and safeguards liberties and free speech, which ultimately enhance the
transparency and openness of governments.49 More specifically, democratic systems control the
level of corruption indirectly by imposing essentially two types of limitations on political power:
the first is the very structure of democratic government, which creates “veto points and
independent sources of political, administrative and judicial power”; the second type provides
citizens freedom of speech and assembly, a channel through which they can complain and have
their voice heard.50
When corruption is rife, it erodes the legitimacy of governments.51 The belief that
government is placing democratic values at the top of its agenda is undermined by corruption,
which leads the citizens to form an alternative belief that their “government is for sale to the
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highest bidder.”52 Once democratic rulers are accused of corruption, this provides a justification
for military takeover. In authoritarian governments, conversely, corruption is used to maintain
power. The placement of wealthy and powerful individuals inside the circle of corruption and
benefit maintains support for the regime and eliminates the chances of exposure.53
Moving a step back, corruption reduces the services provided by the government. This is
mainly because the evaluation of what should be provided is not based on efficiency or quality.
The shift from the basis of efficiency and quality to that of personal profit coupled with the
existence of a corrupt relationship between corrupt producers and the bureaucracy prevents
producers offering products or projects with adequate quality and efficiency from the start.54
Consequently, corruption affects decisions regarding budget expenditures.55 This may
explain the tendency of corrupt governments to have more military projects than those dealing
with, for example, education. The tendency toward “hard” public investments will be higher than
that toward “soft” investments such as health and education services; resources are likely to be
reallocated out of the borders of the country rather than inside it.56 The effects of corruption, then,
include lowering public revenue and increasing spending, which lead to fiscal deficits.57 This is
not to mention the processes of the appointment and promotion of officials, which come to be
based on nepotism or bribery, rather than on candidates’ merits.58 Such acts contribute
significantly to the inefficiency of bureaucracy and of the public sector in general.
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2. Cultural Explanation
The fact that the corruption is contextual in its nature suggests that cultural factors
influence the level of corruption in states, both directly and indirectly. The causal relationship can
be often described as unidirectional, i.e., the culture affects the level of corruption, rather than
vice versa, due to the stability of cultural variables over long periods of time.59 The influence of
culture on the level of corruption can be seen in the previously mentioned studies which
emphasize that mere exposure to democracy for a significant period of time lowers the level of
corruption.
In the 1950s, Edward Banfield examined the association between strong family bonds and
the high levels of corruption found in Sicily and southern Italy; he found that corruption was
linked to powerful familial values that included an intense feeling of obligation.60 A higher
loyalty to the family was related to a higher level of corruption, since familial interests and
broader social or official interests were in competition with each other.61 This description explains
primarily nepotistic practices and the influence of culture, especially when accompanied with
high levels of kinship or familial loyalty.62
Robert Merton also explained the relationship between cultural goals and institutional
norms, indicating that cultures establish the goals of cultures and societies and then pave certain
roads and means to reach them. He noted that there was unequal access, for a variety of reasons,
including race, religion, capital, and so on, to the opportunity structure, leading those who were
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excluded or had small chance of access not to follow the rules and to find another means of
access.63 The implication of this observation is that cultures set a number of economic goals, but
also create limited access to chances of achieving these goals, which ultimately increases the level
of corruption.64
There is a negative correlation between the level of trust and the level of corruption. A
high level of trust builds better cooperation among bureaucrats themselves and between
bureaucrats and citizens, which is ultimately a helpful factor in fighting corruption. Uslaner
argued that trust has a stronger impact on corruption than corruption has on trust.65
Another relevant study is one conducted by Husted that sought to measure different
variables related to cultural values. Husted relied on surveys that were made by Hoftede in 1997
to investigate the relationship between Hoftede’s cultural dimensions66 and corruption.67 The
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1. The power distance index (PDI): “the extent to which the less powerful members of
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power is distributed unequally.”
2. Individualism vs. collectivism (IDV): “Individualism pertains to societies in which the
ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself
and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which
throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning
loyalty.”
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study found a positive correlation between the level of corruption and power distance and
between the level of corruption and the level of masculinity, as well as a positive correlation
between uncertainty avoidance and the level of corruption. The variables related to individualism,
as Husted noted, were not significant.68 Harry Triandis et al., however, found a positive
correlation between cultural collectivism and the level of deception, which included the tendency
to bribe.69
Hufsted saw “traditionalism” as related to other cultural variables: “Societies that cultivate
secular-rational attitudes towards authority (that is, where impersonal values are more important
as opposed to particularistic or family values) are perceived to be less corrupt, unlike those where
traditional religious values dominate.”70 A later study sought to create a scale using traditional
values vs. secular-rational values as one dimension and survival values vs. self-expression values
both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality
of life.”
5. Long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation (LTO): “Long Term Orientation stands
for the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance
and thrift. It’s opposite pole, short Term Orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues
related to the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’
and fulfilling social obligations.”
6. Indulgence versus restraint (IND): “Indulgence stands for a tendency to allow relatively
free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having
fun. Its opposite pole, restraint, reflects a conviction that such gratification needs to be
curbed and regulated by strict social norms.”).
67
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and Outcomes, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 275 (2003) (“This study examines the relationship
between Hofstede's cultural dimensions and how country corruption is perceived. Power
distance, individualism and masculinity were found to explain a significant portion of the
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as the second dimension.71 It found that “a strong ‘survival’ orientation contributes twice as much
as a strong ‘traditional’ orientation to higher levels of corruption.”72
The consequences of corruption for cultures are huge, since such consequences, whether
they are legal, political, or economic, directly or indirectly affect cultures and societies. The
inability of governments to impose regulatory laws, as a legal consequence, has further cultural
and societal impacts. Corruption leads to more violations of building codes, environmental
regulations, and health standards, which can result in severe social harm. Around the world, we
hear about such incidents resulting in a huge number of casualties.
Income inequality, as an economic impact, not only creates a vacuum in which powerful
groups allocate resources for their private benefit, it also extends its impacts to further inequalities
in education, health, and land distribution.73 Education and health are affected not only by income
equality, but also by misallocation of expenditures.74
Moreover, corruption affects income distribution by concentrating the wealth among few
individuals out of the whole population.75 Consequently, the burden becomes heavier for the poor,
since they become unable to pay bribes in order to obtain basic necessities in life. Correlated with
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that is a change in the pattern of consumption where the wealthy class becomes obsessed with
keeping up to date with the new fashions and modern lifestyle, creating what can be called an
unproductive and superficial society.76
At the personal level, in societies with high levels of corruption, talents and resources are
misallocated and eventually lost.77 This explains why individuals in such societies are more
attracted to occupations providing extra revenue—an occupation where one can receive bribes, or
where one holds high rank in order to create a wide network of connections, rather than an
occupation where an individual can be more productive and contribute directly to the society’s
success.78 The scarcity of talented individuals, scientists, and entrepreneurs is also impacted by
the lack of incentives, since the society’s evaluation is not based on merits.
3. Economic Explanations
As a central argument, a number of researchers propose that the absence of economic
competition and the expansion of a monopoly of profit fuel a higher level of corruption.
Competition between suppliers diminishes the monopoly which ultimately reduces the irrational
prices. The existence of competition reduces the motivation of politicians and public officials to
seek bribes, since they have little to “sell” in exchange for bribery. The opposite, however, can
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also be seen: less or limited competition creates more opportunity and high rents for politicians
and public officials to exchange for bribery or other corrupt practices.79
A downside of competition can be a decrease of quality: that is, competition may lead
private firms to reduce the quality of supplies or projects by, for example, paying off projects
inspectors or auditors to ignore violations of quality standards.80 Nevertheless, a negative
correlation between corruption and competition is supported by numerous studies.81 For instance,
a study examining data from a market dominance index82 and an anti-trust laws index83 shows
that high levels of corruption are more likely to be seen in countries that provide domestic firms
with higher rents.84 This can happen where domestic firms are protected by nature or policy from
foreign firms’ competition or where there is an absence of effective anti-trust laws.85
In line with competition, there is an inverse relationship between openness toward more
international investment and corruption. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the growth of
globalization restricts to a great extent the expansion of corruption.86 In support of that, Sandholtz
and Gray noted that the level of corruption is lower if a nation is a member of international
organizations and institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, or the
79
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World Trade Organization. The study also reported that the longer the time a nation had been a
member of such organizations, the lower the level of corruption in the country.87 In a similar vein,
another study found that the longer period of time a country had been exposed to imports and
open to trade, the lower the level of corruption.88
Finally, economic development is negatively associated with the level of perceived
corruption, i.e., the higher the level of economic development, the lower the perceived corruption
level. The direction of causation, however, is debatable. While some argues that good institutions
foster economic development, others suppose the opposite.89 The debate extends to the wage level
and its effects on the level of corruption. The relationship between wages and corruption remains
ambiguous. Earlier researchers encouraged high wages as an instrument to fight corruption.90
More recent research has concluded that increasing wages reduce bribery, but “only under some
circumstances”.91 On the other hand, other studies show that high wages pose no significant roles
in reducing corruption.92 Other economic factors such as inflation have been proposed as indirect
reasons for corruption. Since it lowers the ability to monitor public spending, inflation increases
the level of corruption.93
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The consequences of corruption on the economy are diverse and ultimately lead to
inhibiting economic growth. To begin with, studies provide evidence for the negative impact of
corruption on both domestic and foreign investments. In order to initiate a new business or
investment, bribes or other similar corrupt practices are required, not to mention the continuous
corrupt practices needed to keep the business running.94 Due to the lower commitment of corrupt
governments to trustworthy policies, both domestic and foreign investments are likely to suffer
from corruption.95 If a country is affected by corruption, this discourages investors from
expanding or even initiating investment in that country.
Though there are studies indicating the benefits of corruption for economic growth,96 the
more recent studies provide evidence for the adverse impacts of corruption. A great number of
these studies demonstrate the negative impacts of corruption on foreign direct investment, rather
than on domestic investment.97 Mauro argued that corruption reduces the level of private
investments, which negatively effects the economic growth in general, noting that if Bangladesh
had a bureaucracy as efficient and honest as that of Uruguay, “its investment rate would rise by
almost five percentage points, and its yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a
percentage point.”98
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Different types of corruption can also have different effects on the level of investments.
Investment may be deterred more by petty corruption than by grand corruption.99 Foreign
investors ultimately tend to invest in joint projects; joint projects between domestic investors and
foreign investors are preferred because the domestic investors are likely to be better acquainted
with the corrupt practices that are common in the host country.100
Corruption affects the tax revenues of governments mainly because private gain is
reducing the commitment to tax collection, which eventually lowers government revenues. A
study suggests that “[a] 1 point increase in the corruption index is associated with 1.5 percentage
point decline in total revenue-GDP ratio, [and a] 2.7 percent decline in tax-GDP ratio”.101 In line
with that, the underground economy102 tends to be larger where the level of corruption is high.
The increase in the underground economy affects the validity and the accuracy of the value and
volume of a country’s economy.103
4. Legal Explanations
States perform their roles by relying on and utilizing a set of laws and regulations. The
existence of these laws and regulations contributes to the power distribution in a state; that is, the
more authorization given to officials, the more power they have. In states with higher levels of
corruption, these officials extract more benefits through the power they have. The situation can be
aggravated in cases where the regulations and procedures are not transparent or not publically
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available.104 Corruption can be aided by ineffective substantive laws or by insufficient
implementation of the provisions.
In general, the absence of transparent and clear laws and procedures creates an atmosphere
for corruption to thrive.105 Thus, for instance, when trade tariffs are diverse, the probability of
corrupt acts is high.106 The number of substantive laws can create more rents and profits for
public officials and eventually leads to corruption. Studies show that higher barriers to market
entry and higher levels of state intervention lead to higher levels of corruption.107
It is not only criminal law or anti-corruption laws108 that create space for corruption; other
types of law such as tax law,109 anti-trust laws,110 and procurement laws111 do so as well. These
laws encourage corruption when they give officials more discretionary power, have more
loopholes, and contain vague provisions. The other kind of laws relevant to corruption is
regulatory law, which mainly regulates public officials. This category creates a space for
corruption to thrive when it avoids drawing a clear line between what is legal and what is illegal.
The implementation of legal provisions relies heavily on two essential bodies. The judicial
body, on the one hand, can influence, negatively or positively, directly or indirectly, the level of
corruption in a country. Independence of the judicial branch by itself does not always provide a
safeguard against corruption. Instead, the legal procedure and the accessibility of the judicial
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system can critically affect the level of corruption.112 Yes, it is essential to have an independent
judicial body to protect individuals from arbitrary decisions and abusive powers, but if citizens
lack the ability to access the judicial system or if there is a high threshold to enter it, the power of
judicial independence is gradually diminished.113 The indirect restrictions involve, inter alia,
delayed procedures and vague litigation procedures.114 This drives individuals and firms to seek
for alternatives.
The other important body on the implementation side is the investigative and prosecutorial
body. The exact same character of being independent that is essential to the judicial branch is also
required here to achieve the goal of reducing corruption. The success of the anti-corruption
commissions was generated by their independence.115 They were also armed with an adequate
power to enforce laws and investigate cases.116 It is not only independence that leads to a
successful commission: power, tools, and resources are also factors enhancing the ability of these
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commissions to combat corruption. Recently, such investigations have begun using wiretaps, for
example to provide more details and evidence in cases.117
Generally, identifying whether a law is beneficial or not can help in directing efforts to
fight corruption. Two issues, however, remain problematic. The first is the causal direction—that
is, whether bad laws are consequences or causes of corruption. For instance, privileging domestic
firms in public procurements can cause corruption, but when domestic firms provide a way for
strong private interests to seize public funds, bad laws can merely be a consequence of
corruption.118 Secondly, it is not always obvious whether a certain law is beneficial or not. Laws
may, on the one hand, create an opportunity for corruption, but may also, on the other hand,
promote public health and safety. Thus, something that has a negative impact in terms of
corruption may have a positive impact in some other sphere.119
The impact of corruption in the legal realm is manifest mainly in the enforcement of laws
and regulation, on the one hand, and in the lawmaking process, on the other. Corruption
minimizes the capacity of governments to impose the essential regulations through which they
can monitor and control the failures of markets. This leads to unsatisfactory performance of
governments’ necessary duties in supervising financial markets, hospitals, schools, and so forth.
Even when governments intervene, their interventions are blemished by corrupt motivations and
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often lead to more monopolies and more failures.120 Moreover, the enforcements of contracts and
protection of property rights, as a fundamental duty of governments, is eroded by corruption.121
More importantly, when corruption is dominant, it erases, completely or partly, legal
restrictions and regulations. It will not be surprising if laws are violated with no regard to the
protection of people and the environment which such laws sought to create. In many countries, for
instance, violations of building standards result in a large number of casualties.122 This is mainly
because it is difficult to inculcate respect for the law in a system that is rife with corruption, since
such systems breed cynicism instead.123
Corruption also affects the quality of certain types of regulations. It has been noted that
countries where corruption is prevalent have less effective or protective laws. The example of
such laws par excellence is environmental law, where a number of studies indicate that the quality
of environmental regulation is affected negatively by high levels of corruption.124 An extension of
this can be seen in the low levels of compliance with international measures and regulations.125
E. Problems in Fighting Corruption
Before going further in outlining the problems of fighting corruption, it has seemed
worthwhile to identify the nature of corruption. Corruption is contextual, since what is considered
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an act of corruption in a certain nation is not necessarily so in another.126 A variety of factors,
such as ideology, culture, politics, and context, delineate the meaning of corruption.127 This leads
to the point that corruption is essentially a matter of perception and depends on how individuals
or societies perceive a given behavior. Consequently, corrupt behavior can be classified as white,
gray, or black.128 This implies that corruption is seen as a deviation from a moral, cultural, or
legal norm.129 Eventually, since individuals, by default, avoid the shame that results from
deviating from a norm, corruption will be committed secretly and stay hidden.
Furthermore, corruption is associated with power.130 Consequently, a bribe is paid to an
individual who is in a position of power or has control over the desired benefit, and an individual
must be a position of power to abuse it. Such an association between corruption and power means
corruption is not a unique phenomenon that only exists in the public-sector only, but can also
exist in the private-sector.131
Therefore, problems in fighting corruption raise some challenges and in some cases flaws.
Since corruption is contextual, it will be difficult to combat it once a society perceives such
practices as a normal way life. The situation worsens when a society is blind to identifying
126

See, e.g., Donald Bowser, Corruption; Trust and the Danger to Democratization in the
Former Soviet Union, in THE TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN THE POST COMMUNISM 6, 6 (David W.
Lovell ed., 2001) (“The use of ‘clans’ or social networks/blat, that typifies post-Soviet clientism,
nepotism and cronyism, is often not viewed in a negative light.”).
127
See, e.g., Eric C. Chan & Yun-han Chu, Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian
Democracies?, 68 J. POL. 259, 262 (2006) (“one contextual account for differential corruption is
that political cultures vary in different countries. The idea is intuitive: what is considered
unethical and corrupt in one culture maybe regarded as a routine transaction in another.”).
128
HEIDENHEIMER & JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 139-40; see also Arnold J. Heidenheimer,
Perspective on the Perception of Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND
CONTEXTS 141, 152 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2002). Yadong
Luo, An Organizational Perspective of Corruption, 1 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 119, 122-24 (2005).
129
Luo, supra note 128, at 123.
130
Id.
131
Zafar Iqbal, and Mervyn K. Lewis, Governance and Corruption: Can Islamic Societies and
the West Learn From Each Other?, 19 AM. J. ISLAMIC SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (2002).
35

corruption.132 The justification in such a case is already provided: corrupt individuals, regardless
of their own lack of integrity, tend to believe that corruption existed before they came to power
and that they did not invent it; thus, all they are doing is following the same path as those who
came before them.133 Consequently, any penalties have lost their deterrence, since most of the
time such penalties will not be associated with the loss of any social capital.134
Another problem stems from a partial view of corruption. In a number of countries, and
even in the international arena, fighting corruption focuses significantly on corruption in
governments. This is justifiable, based on the high expectations citizens may have of their
governments, but such an assumption could be misleading, since corruption can occur in every
sector of society, including the private sector and non-profit and non-governmental
organizations.135 Gerald Caiden notes that in a given culture, people who study, socialize, and live
together are not likely to be significantly different in their conduct, and thus, public ethics are not
likely to differ significantly from private ethics either.136
Finally, following on the contention that corruption is associated with power, we can see
that a significant obstacle manifests itself as power in opposition to fighting corruption. This
occurs through two main ways: first, through a lack of government willingness to fight corruption
that occurs through refusing to ratify and implement anti-corruption measures.137 Political
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willingness is not only needed to promote anti-corruption measures, but also to support efforts
and individuals fighting corruption.138 In fact, a number of politicians and officials gain more
power merely by allying with corrupt cliques.139
The second way in which power seeks to restrain anti-corruption movements is by
sabotaging them. This can happen when politicians and others who benefit from the existence of
corruption will be negatively affected by the abandonment of corruption. As for others, so long as
they are spoiled by corrupt benefits in one way or another, they lack an incentive to abandon
corrupt practices, which creates a sufficient motivation to nullify any efforts to fight corruption.140
This can be seen where there is a strong will from governments to fight corruption, yet the
measures taken against corruption are weak and ineffective. In this case, there may be an
investigatory body, but it is enfeebled and lacks the power needed to act.141
Practically, there is a significant obstacle posed by national security. Many of countries’
defense projects involve a huge amount of corruption that goes unchecked and unprosecuted. In
such cases, the investigation is dismissed under the justification of national security. In the same
spirit, human rights standards can be an issue in fighting corruption. For instance, if a country
with a poor human rights record sends another country a request for extradition on the grounds
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that the accused has committed acts of corruption, should the other country approve such a
request or not?142
CONCLUSION
From what has been said so far, it can be seen that corruption has attracted many
explanations from several perspectives. Not all disciplines have been equally involved in
examining this topic, however, as some of them have given it much more study than others. The
analysis of corruption in particular circumstances may require a more in-depth analysis, since
each nation and culture may possess factors distinguishing it from others. Underestimating these
differentiating factors may jeopardize not only the analysis but also the purposed solutions and
measures to fight corruption.
This chapter has sought to survey the issue of corruption from various perspectives.
Initially, it highlighted the issues related to defining corruption. Distinctions between the forms
of corruption were offered in order to provide an adequate understanding of the issue of
corruption and how it should be combated. Further, this chapter explored the general causes and
consequences of corruption in different dimensions with an aim of connecting the dots together
that make up a picture of corruption. In light of that picture, the problems encountered in fighting
corruption were identified.
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND: ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
In the pre-Islamic era in Arabia, criminal law was associated with or based on the idea of
retaliation. Due to the importance of the tribal system, the emphasis was on collective
responsibility; thus, not only would offenders be punished, but also their tribes. Motivated by
revenge and the desire to maintain or repair tribal dignity, the Arabs of that era tended to apply
severe, and in many cases, unjust punishments. So, for instance, in a case of the punishment for
murder, a man must be punished, rather than a woman; a male slave did not represent a sufficient
revenge, and in the case of a tribe that was considered superior to the offending tribe, two or more
men had to be killed as punishment, rather than one. These examples show the aggressiveness and
the seeming irrationality of the system, which, however, is not strange when the Arabs’ collective
social structure is taken into consideration.143
In 610 C.E.,144 the Arabs were introduced to a new era. In this year, the Prophet
Mohammad received the first Quranic verse (ayah). The divine revelation continued for twentythree years,145 ending in 632 C.E. with the completion of the Holy Quran, which consists of more
than 6,200 verses146 (āyāt, sing. ayah) divided into 114 chapters (suwar, sing. surah). The
chapters were also divided according to where they were received. The first category, those
received in Mecca, or the Meccan chapters (610–622 C.E.), includes 86 chapters. The general
theme of the Meccan chapters is the belief in Allah and the afterlife. The second category, those
received in Medina, or the Medinan chapters (622–632 C.E.), includes 28 chapters, which are
143
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devoted to the organization of Muslims’ social life and their relationships with each other and
with non-Muslims as well.147
A. The Sources of Islamic Law
The study of the Islamic law resources generally is called usul al-fiqh. It is important to
mention that there are four Sunni schools of interpretation, or Madhãhib (sing. Madh'hab), the
Maliki, the Hanafi, the Shafiʿi, and the Hanbali.148 The schools agree on the primary resources but
they disagree about the ranking of the secondary resources.149 Moreover, the disagreement does
not relate to the essentials of Islam, such as faith in God and the Five Pillars of Islam (profession
of faith, prayer, fasting, alms, and pilgrimage).150 Thus, the disagreement led the schools to adopt
in some cases different legal positions or notions.151 More importantly, the emergence of
different notions among the four schools can be seen as the result of the different situations,
geographical areas, and traditions in which they arose.152
To illustrate, Imam Abu Hanīfah (80–150 A.H., or 699–767 C.E.), did his teaching in
Kufa.153 Imam Malik (97–179 A.H., or 717–795 C.E.) established his school in Medina, where
the Prophet Mohammad had been, which led him to consider the Medinan people’s traditions as a
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secondary resource.154 Imam Al-Shāfīʿī (150–204 A.H., or 767–819 C.E.), unlike the previously
mentioned imams, was not known for taking up residence in a particular place. He started his
journey as a student of Imam Malik in Medina, and then was in Iraq as a scholar of Imam AbuHanifa. He did his teaching in Mecca, Baghdad, and Yemen, and finally ended his journey in
Egypt.155 Similarly, Imam Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal (164–241 A.H., or 780–855 C.E.) was a student of
the illustrious Hanafi scholar and judge, Abu Yusuf. He also met and studied under the
supervision of Imam Al-Shāfīʿī in Mecca. His well-known saying, “With the inkwell to the
cemetery,”156 illustrates his frequent travels seeking more knowledge. Among the places to which
he traveled are Baghdad, Kufa, Basra, Hejaz, and Sana.157
1.

Primary Sources

a. The Qur’an
In Islam, the Qur’an is the Holy Book, and it contains 114 chapters, or suwar, and 6,342
verses.158 Since it contains codes regulating religious and social matters, the Qur’an is not a text
that is fully devoted to legal issues, which explains why the Qur’an only has approximately 500
verses that can be considered as legal provisions. Not surprisingly, 30 of the 500 verses relate to
criminal law.159 The 500 verses contain injunctions that may take the form of a command (amr) or
a prohibition (nahi).160
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The Qur’an in its formulation is considered to be general, allowing it to govern issues that
might exist in the near or distant future, either explicitly or implicitly.161 Thus, a full
understanding of the Qur’an is difficult without relying on its commentaries (tafsir), which
include both the text’s historical and its linguistic aspects.162 This character is what explains the
rules of scholars to whom religious and judicial rulings are attributed.163
In Islamic law, the Qur’an and the Sunnah are considered as the primary and the supreme
resources which no other rules should violate. As with many constitutions, the Qur’an provides
general rules and leaves the details to be worked out later. For instance, the Qur’an orders
Muslims to pay alms (Zakah), but does not specify what constitutes a quorum (Nisab) of the
money above which the Zakah is mandatory.164 Conversely, in other cases, the Qur’an provides
detailed rules, such as for the rule of inheritance. Consequently, in the Qur’an, there is a clear
reference to the Sunnah (“Whatever the Messenger gives you, take; whatever he forbids you, give
over. And fear God; surely God is terrible in retribution”).165
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b. Sunnah
The Sunnah, as the second primary resource, is defined as any act, saying (hadith), or
confirmation of another’s practice by the Prophet Muhammad.166 As a result, a Sunnah may take
one of three forms.167 The first is an uttered Sunnah in which the Prophet spoke and addressed a
certain issue. The second is a reported act performed by the Prophet. The third form is when the
Prophet did not act or speak, but gave a confirmation of a certain act or statement. The Sunnah
can play two main roles; the first is to be a supplement to the Qur’an, i.e., to be explanatory to the
general provisions of the Qur’an.168 The second is to be a primary resource by providing a rule
that is not given in the Qur’an.169 It is significant to mention that the Sunnah cannot violate the
Qur’an, and that other sources should be in concurrence with the Qur’an and the Sunnah.170
From what has been said so far, it can be seen that the Sunnah can be considered as an
additional instrument that developed many of the Qur’anic principles. Thus, in addition to relying
on the Qur’an’s commentaries, scholars consider the Sunnah to be a significant source for
reaching a comprehensive understanding of the Qur’an in order to develop a particular doctrine.171
Consequently, the Sunnah is considered as a first-tier source and has the same legal authority as
the Qur’an.
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By the time of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E., there were more issues that
were not referred to or addressed directly by the Qur’an or the Sunnah. Subsequently,
supplemental sources of law were developed to deal with issues about which the Qur’an and the
Sunnah had no direct rules.172 Thus, it was necessary to develop further supplemental sources, an
undertaking carried out by the four Sunni schools of interpretation. The schools, however, ranked
and applied the supplemental sources differently, which ultimately led to having an “intellectual
framework within which the Shari'a maintained some rigid continuity, while at the same time
preserving elasticity for change.”173
c. Ijma (Consensus)
Consensus (ijma) is recognized as the third source of Islamic law. Ijma occurs when the
jurists of any era, not limited to a certain era, reach a consensus over an issue confronting them.174
Ijma is derived from the affirmation of the community and unity of Muslims as an essential
characteristic. This emphasis on the significance of the community and the legitimacy of
consensus as a source of Islamic law is derived from various Qur’anic and Sunnah texts. In the
Qur’an, for instance, a verse reads, “And hold you fast to God's bond, together, and do not
scatter,”175 and another verse says, “But whoso makes a breach with the Messenger after the
guidance has become clear to him and follows a way other than the believers’, him We shall turn
over to what he has turned to and We shall roast him in Gehenna — an evil homecoming.”176 In
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the Sunnah, there is a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad saying, “My community will never agree
on an error.”177
The question then becomes, whose opinions are considered in seeking consensus?
Qualified jurists and scholars, known as mujtahidin (sing. mujtahid), are individuals who are
identified by their ability and capability to form judgments relying on other Islamic sources (usul
al-fiqh) following the process of ijtihad.178 Consensus (ijma) may take one of two forms: the first
is an active consensus, which occurs when the mujtahidin in a certain era reach and express the
same judgment regarding the same issue. The second is a passive consensus, which occurs when
some mujtahidin express a judgment while the others remain silent and express no objections.179
d. Qiyas (Analogical reasoning)
The fourth source of Islamic law is analogical reasoning (qiyas), which has a wider
application than consensus due to the fact that consensus is hard to reach in the contemporary era.
The difficulties of reaching ijma can also be attributed to the differences in the attributes of each
of the sources, since ijma is a group task, whereas qiyas is an individual task.180 As a result,
opinions and judgments based on analogical reasoning are abundant.181
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Qiyas can be defined as deriving a judgment on an unresolved issue from an existing
judgment because they share the same raison d'être, known as illa in Arabic. To render a
judgment relying on qiyas, there must be an existing judgment or rule that is similar in its
reasoning that can be applied to the new situation which has no rule or judgment. For the
application of qiyas, the identification of the raison d'être of the existing rule is the first and
fundamental step. This is different from the rationality expected of all legal rules, which is similar
to hikma (wisdom),182 because illa is more specific.
The prohibition of narcotic drugs, for example, was based on qiyas. To render a judgment
on prohibiting narcotic drugs, a new situation with no rules, jurists relied on analogy by extending
the prohibition on drinking alcohol, an existing rule in the Qur’an, because both kinds of
prohibited substances have the same illa, that is, they are both intoxicating.183 Though the Hanifi
School refrained from using qiyas, the Shafiʿi School applied it to determine punishments in
Islamic law.184
2. Secondary Sources
In order to keep up with new issues as they arose over time, earlier scholars, mainly the
founders of the four schools, developed a number of secondary resources to solve issues not
covered by the primary sources.185 This sprang from the idea that Shari'a applies at all time and in
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all places. This chapter will shed light only on those sources that are related to the issues relevant
to this dissertation.186
a. Custom (urf)
Custom, or urf, refers to the common practices of individuals in societies or communities.
All of the Islamic schools consider custom as a secondary source of the rules of law.187 The
authority of custom has been established in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.188 In practice, Islam did
not reject the rules of the pre-Islamic Arabs, but rather adopted a number of rules that were
compatible with the values and mission of Islam. Accordingly, custom is divided into valid
customs, compatible with general Islamic rulings, and invalid customs, which are incompatible
with Islamic rulings derived from the Islamic primary sources. Valid custom is further
categorized into two categories: the first is a specific custom that is a practice of certain group of
people, a certain business, or a certain region. The second is a general custom which is the
practice of the people in all the regions or among many cultures.189 As a good example of the
latter, taking an oath is upheld by the Islamic rules of law when giving evidence,190 and exactly
what sum constitutes the crime of theft is defined by custom.191
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b. The common good (masalih mursala)
The common good (masalih mursala) can be defined as any common interest that has not
been recognized by itself or has not been categorized in the primary sources.192 Islamic jurists
identified five essential values that should be protected: personal faith, personal life, personal
intellect, personal progeny, and personal wealth. Consequently, any rule that further endorses and
protects these values and that is compatible with the Qur’an and the Sunnah is considered a valid
rule.193 The presumption behind these five values is that they not only serve the individual’s
interest, they also serve the community’s interest.194 Having that in mind, the common good, as a
source of Islamic law, can be considered an essential source that has enabled Islamic law to
advance and face social and economic changes.195
c. Ijtihad (Individual Reasoning)
To reach a ruling on a certain issue, scholars follow the process of ijtihad, which is
“literally striving, the individual search for a ruling from God's law to govern a human action in
conditions where the divine law is not definitively revealed.”196 A dialogue between the Prophet
Muhammad and Mu’adh, when he was appointed as a judge and sent to Yemen, illustrates the
process of the rule-making in Islamic law.
The hadith is essentially as follows:
The Prophet: “How wilt thou decide when a question arises?”
Mu'adh: “According to the Book of Allah [the Qur'an].”
The Prophet: “And if thou findest naught therein?”
192
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Mu'adh: “According to the sunnah of the Messenger of Allah.”
The Prophet: “And if thou findest naught therein?”
Mu'adh: “Then I shall apply my own reasoning [meaning ijtihad].”197
Rule-making (ijtihad) is now governed by what has been known as usul al-fiqh, which has been
described briefly in the discussion above.
B. Islamic Criminal Legislation
At the outset, crimes in Islamic criminal legislation can be divided into two main
categories: determined and discretionary. The determined crimes include the crimes and
punishments found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The determined crimes encompass the crimes
of hudud, retribution (quesas), and compensation (diyya). The hudud crimes include exclusively
seven crimes. Crimes of retribution (quesas) and compensation (diyya) acquired their names due
to the fact that the punishment for these crimes includes either retributive punishment (quesas)—
i.e., a penalty equal to the victim’s injury—or monetary punishment (diyya). It is important also to
mention that retribution is not applied if the victim or the victims’ heirs waive their right to
compensation or retribution, or where other reasons make the application of retribution inexecutable or impossible.198
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The discretionary (ta’azir)199 crimes are the second category of crimes in Islamic criminal
legislation. This category of crimes arose to protect individuals and societies from crimes that fall
outside the hudud, quesas, and diyya framework. Having the category of ta’azir crimes is a
method through which Islamic criminal law is able to cope with rapid social changes and
challenges and to protect the five values that have been mentioned previously (personal faith,
personal life, personal intellect, personal progeny, and personal wealth).
1. The Classification of Crimes in Islamic Criminal Legislation
Generally, what crimes have in common is the fact that they are all prohibited acts or
omissions and are punishable; they differ, however, depending on the angle from which they are
analyzed. The classification of crimes in Islamic criminal jurisprudence is based on the penal
aspect, i.e., on the severity of the punishment.
a. The Hudud Crimes
“There are the limits ordained by God; so do not transgress the limits ordained by God.”
“Those are God's bounds; do not transgress them. Whosoever transgresses the bounds of God —
those are the evildoers.”200 Hudud literally means “limit” and the term refers to a certain group of
crimes punishable by a hadd, a fixed punishment specified in the Qur’an; each of these crimes is
an offense committed against the rights of God or the rights of individuals.201 In this category of
crimes, the Qur’an criminalized the acts and their corresponding punishments, leaving the
definition of other details and the elements of each of these crimes to the Sunnah. The seven
199
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hudud crimes202 are theft,203 illicit sexual relations,204 sexual defamation,205 drinking
intoxicants,206 apostasy,207 rebellion against the legitimate authority, and brigandage.208
Hudud crimes are distinguished by their punishments because of the physical pain they
involve. These severe punishments are not aimed at threatening Muslims, but instead at
preventing the crimes by fighting their root causes and the milieu that enhances the growth of
these crimes.209 Hudud punishments are subject to strict scrutiny and require strict evidence,
making their application and enforcement neither automatic nor arbitrary.210 A good example of
the hudud punishments’ effectiveness can be seen in the 1980s and 1990s,211 when Saudi Arabia
and other Islamic countries had a lower rate of crime, mainly of hudud crimes, than did other
countries.212
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b. Quesas and Diyya Crimes
These crimes are defined as crimes punishable by retaliation (quesas, i.e., the lex talionis
principle)213 or by monetary compensation (diyya). This category covers mainly the homicide
offences and battery offences, under each of which there are further classifications on the basis of
intent (mens rea).214 The punishment, thus, varies depending on the intent of the offender.
Consequently, intentional crime is punishable by the quesas or diyya, while the unintentional is
subject to diyya. These crimes and their punishments are also established and defined by the
Qur’an215 and the Sunnah.216
Since these offenses are considered crimes committed against a right of an individual,
satisfaction or monetary compensation to the victim or to his or her family is required.217 In
addition to these punishments, there are other penalties that might result from a conviction, such
as exile or being prevented from receiving an inheritance.218 Crimes in this category, similar to
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those in the previous category, are also subject to sophisticated elements governing the
application of the punishments219
Within the atmosphere of heightened emotions that might surround such situations, Islam
encourages reconciliation between the parties, i.e., encourages the victim or his or her family to
accept diyya, rather than insisting on quesas. Pardon and forgiveness is supported by numerous
Qur’anic and Sunnah texts. The Qur’an says, “And the recompense of evil is evil the like of it; but
whoso pardons and puts things right, his wage falls upon God; surely He loves not the
evildoers.”220 It was also narrated that Anas bin Mãlik said, “I never saw the Messenger of Allah
when any case involving retaliation was referred to him, but he enjoined pardoning.”221
c. Ta’azir Crimes
The literal meaning of ta’azir is discipline, rehabilitation, or correction. Legally, AlMawardi defined ta’azir as punishments inflicted for prohibited acts which are not punishable by
hudud.222 Clearly, hudud and quesas crimes and punishments are not categories that cover all the
crimes that could be committed. Consequently, there are several crimes that are left to the
discretion of judges, jurists, and governors. This category encompasses any act jeopardizing the
public good or considered damaging to the social order at any time. As a result, corrupt acts,
sexual harassment, or human trafficking are without doubt condemned and held to be crimes by
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any person at any time or place, since they bring harm, if not to the whole society, then certainly
to individuals.223
Appropriately, ta’azir crimes may be divided into three essential categories. The first
category covers those offences related to the hudud or quesas and diyya crimes, such as attempts
to commit a crime of hudud, like attempted robbery. The second category involves offences
punishable by hudud, but where one or more elements of a hudud crime is missing, such as a theft
committed against a relative of the offender. The last category covers all other criminal acts that
fall outside the hudud framework.224
Since this category is discretionary, judges evaluate harmful acts and apply the
punishments they see fit. Accordingly, judges take into consideration the culpability, subjectively,
of the offender, and objectively, of the nature of the offense.225 This discretion, however, is
limited by the general principles of the framework of Islamic criminal law.226 In addition to that,
the punishments are subject to certain restrictions that ensure the protection of communities and
their welfare. First, a committed act must cause an actual harm, or at least threaten the public
good.227 Second, the punishment must be justified and reasonable.228 Third, the reasoning behind
the punishment must provide flexible rules that can be adapted to others’ situations.229
This category provides Islamic criminal law with great flexibility, enabling communities
to deal with changes that may occur at any time. This category of law requires the continuous
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reform and development of jurisprudence to gain the full benefit of it. It can backfire, however,
when jurists and judges do not keep up with new events.230
2. The Legal Consequences of Classification
a. Forgiveness and Amnesty
Since their commission is considered an offense against the rights of God, neither
forgiveness nor amnesty may be granted in hudud crimes. Consequently, forgiveness or amnesty
has no legal effect on either the crime or the punishment.231 In quesas and diyya crimes, on the
other hand, forgiveness, as previously noted, is encouraged but not mandatory, meaning that
forgiveness may occur in this category if the victim agrees to accept monetary compensation
instead of demanding punishment for the offender. The victim also has the right to issue a full
forgiveness, i.e., one that does not even ask for monetary compensation. It must be noted that the
right of forgiveness is limited to the victim and his or her relatives, under some circumstances.
Therefore, judges or other officials who are considered delegates of the sovereign, and even the
sovereign him- or herself, do not have the right to forgive such crimes, as forgiveness or
reparations for these crimes are considered to be the rights of individuals.232
In ta’azir crimes, forgiveness can be issued by a judge or a delegate of the sovereign. This
is limited, however, if the victim has a right to retaliation or reparations, or if immediate harm
occurred to an individual. By the same analogy, the victim has also the same right to forgive, but
only within the scope of his or her rights; that is, a victim has no right to forgive if the crime
damages the public order.233
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b. Judicial Discretion as to Punishments
As mentioned before, if an offender is convicted of a hudud offense, the judge has no
discretion either to minimize or to maximize the fixed punishment. The judge’s authority is
limited in this category to examining the elements of the crime and, accordingly, either to issue a
conviction or not.234 In the quesas category, the judge’s discretion is also restricted to imposing
punishment once the offender is convicted. However, if the victim has fully forgiven the offender,
the judge may have some discretion to impose a ta’azir punishment when the punishment is
considered to serve the public good.235
The judge’s discretion manifests itself more obviously in ta’azir punishments, but not
beyond the principles of Islamic criminal law and the restrictions previously mentioned.236
Mitigating circumstances, consequently, are more to be considered in imposing punishments in
ta’azir crimes than in other categories of crimes.237
c. Rules of Evidence
The basis for proving guilt in the hudud crimes is exceptionally restricted, meaning that
such crimes cannot be proven by other means than by the testimony of a specified number of
witnesses, which varies depending on the offence; thus, for example, to prove the offence of illicit
sexual relations, four witnesses must testify, while for slander and defamation, two witnesses are
sufficient to prove the offender’s guilt.238 In quesas crimes, the same means of proof applies, and
such crimes cannot be proven by other means — two witnesses or confession are required to meet
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the legal requirements.239 In ta’azir crimes, on the other hand, the rules of evidence are more
flexible.240
The Hanafi, the Shafiʿi, and the Hanbali schools of jurisprudence restrict the evidence
(bayyina) to testimonies, confessions, oaths, and written documents. They rely on the following
Qur’anic verse: “And be not loth to write it down, whether it be small or great, with its term; that
is more equitable in God's sight, more upright for testimony, and likelier that you will not be in
doubt. Unless it be merchandise present that you give and take between you….”241 The Maliki
School adopted the more liberal view and included more than 17 types of evidence, while the
jurist Ibn Al-Qiem242 recognized 26 types of evidence.243
3. Characteristic Features of Islamic Criminal Justice System
a. The Religious Character of Islamic Criminal Legislation
Since most of its regulations are derived either directly (as with hudud, quesas, and diyya)
or indirectly (based on Muslim jurists’ reasoning and discretion, or ijthad) from provisions of the
Qur’an or Sunnah, which have been characterized as divine resources, these regulations have a
religious character. Consequently, the definition of Islamic Shari'a is “the collection of legal
provisions (ahkam) divinely revealed to the Prophet.”244 Thus Alshafi noted that “[f]or
everything that affects the life of a Muslim, there is prescribed in the Qur’an a guide to lead him
on the right way.”245
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As a consequence of this religious character, 246
1. conformity to these provisions is considered an act of faith in God;
2. violation of these provisions is punishable in this life and in the hereafter;
3. obedience to these provisions results from the previous two consequences;
4. enforcement of these provisions is a part of the state’s obligations according to the
principles of Islamic government; and
5. a change of the ruler does not change the law.247
b. Protection of Morality
In a number of Qur’anic and Sunnah texts, the emphasis on morality and moral values can
be clearly observed. The reasoning behind the prohibition of drinking alcohol, for instance, is
based on morality: “Satan only desires to precipitate enmity and hatred between you in regard to
wine and arrow-shuffling, and to bar you from the remembrance of God, and from prayer. Will
you then desist?”248 Another example is the hadith in which the Prophet says, “I was sent to
perfect good character.”249
Due to the religious character of Islamic law, the conflict between Islamic criminal
legislation and moral values is minimized. Furthermore, the issue of the intervention of criminal
law to protect morality does not arise due to the integrated relationship between moral principles
and Islamic criminal legislation.250
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One of the consequences of the religious character previously mentioned, i.e., punishment
in this life and in the hereafter, also gives an indication of this character. This link between the
present life and the hereafter increases the link between the criminal justice system and moral
values. In short, one of the reasons or sources of respect for and conformity to Islamic criminal
provisions is Islamic principles of morality.
c. Equality before the Law and the “Equal Application of the Law”
Again, this principle is manifested clearly in Qur’anic and Sunnah texts. A Qur’anic verse
reads, “O mankind, we have created you male and female, and appointed you races and tribes,
that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most
godfearing of you. God is All-knowing, All-aware.”251 The significance of this principle was
emphasized by the Prophet when he stated that “[w]hat destroyed the nations before you, was that
when a noble person committed theft, they used to leave him (without punishment), but if a weak
person among then committed theft, they would inflict the legal punishment on him.”252 He then
stated, as a role model, that even if Fatimah, his daughter, was the offender, the specified
punishment (the hadd) would be carried out. Further, several Qur’anic verses clearly command
believers to avoid discrimination on any basis, whether of race, religion, kinship, or state of
hostility.253
This strong emphasis was a result of the discrimination that had previously existed in the
Arab world specifically and in the surrounding nations generally. As has been stated earlier in this
chapter, among the pre-Islamic Arabs, the application of punishments was extremely
discriminatory, which was a result of the fact that the Arab nation was constructed of highly tribal
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competitors for wealth, resources, prestige, and power. The ultimate result, unsurprisingly, was
wars between tribes that lasted for decades. As a direct response, the Prophet abolished
discriminatory customs.254
C. Corruption in Islamic Law
Fasad, often used as an equivalent to the word corruption, in Arabic literature refers to
any conduct or article that contradicts goodness or the good.255 The definition covers a wide range
of conduct that jeopardizes the society, economy, morality, or politics.256 Thus fasad translates to,
inter alia, mischief, abuse, rottenness, putrefaction, depravity, wickedness, viciousness, iniquity,
and dishonesty.257
Accordingly, the Islamic perspective on corruption is quite broad and is not limited to a
certain act, nor to a certain category of office, so long as the phenomenon referred to affects the
principles of justice.258 This broad perspective results in there being a number of definitions and
even more categories of crimes that can be considered corrupt practices. It must also be taken into
consideration that these crimes fall under the umbrella of ta’azir crimes, since neither they nor
their punishments were identified in the Qur’an.259 What follows from considering corrupt
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practices to be ta’azir crimes is that these practices can be proven by a variety of types of
evidence, rather than the prosecution being limited to specific types of evidence.260
1. Bribery
As a Qur’anic verse states, “O my people, fill up the measure and the balance justly, and
do not diminish the goods of the people, and do not mischief in the land, working corruption.”261
The Qur’an prohibits individuals from giving bribes262 to rulers, judges, and decision makers in
order to obtain a favorable ruling.263 In the Sunnah, there is an explicit prohibition of bribery, as
narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-'As: “The Messenger of Allah cursed the one who bribes and
the one who takes bribe.”264 It has been reported on the authority of Abu Humaid as-Sa'idi, who
said the following:
The Messenger of Allah appointed a man in charge of Sadaqat (similar to tax) to be
received from another tribe. When he came back, the Messenger of Allah asked him to
render his account. He said: This wealth is for you (i.e. for the public treasury) and this is
a gift (presented to me). The Messenger of Allah said: You should have remained in the
house of your father and your mother, until your gift came to you if you spoke the truth;
then he addressed us. He praised God and extolled Him, and afterwards said: I appoint a
man from you to a responsible post sharing with the authority that God has entrusted to
me, and he comes to me saying: This wealth is for you (i.e. for the public treasury) and
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this is a gift presented to me. Why did he not remain in the house of his father and his
mother and his gift came to him, if he was truthful? By God, any one of you will not take
anything from (the public funds) without any justification, but will meet his Lord carrying
it on himself on the Day of judgment. I will recognise any one of you meeting Allah and
carrying a growling camel, or a cow bellowing or a goat bleating.265
Jurists, accordingly, have provided a number of definitions of bribery, but the most
comprehensive definition is, as Ibn Abidin defined it, that bribery is what is given to a ruler,
judge, or others to obtain a favorable ruling or to gain a needed benefit.266 This definition is quite
broad, since it does not specify what is given nor to whom it is given. In light of the analysis of
bribery in Islam, jurists and scholars have categorized bribery, and, accordingly, the ruling for
each type.
The bribery may differ depending on the purpose for giving it. It might be paid in order to
invalidate someone’s rights or to validate a falsehood, such as obtaining a ruling or judgment that
favors the briber. The bribery may also be paid in order to obtain a public position. Both of these
cases are considered bribery, and punishment should be applied both to the briber and to the
bribee.
What is controversial among the jurists is the case where the bribery is paid by an
individual to obtain or secure his or her right or to reverse an injustice. The dissent considers this
situation as no different from the previous situation, i.e., as a crime of bribery, since this disagrees
with the general rules of Islamic jurisprudence.267 The majority of scholars, however, including
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the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanbli schools of jurisprudence, hold that the briber is permitted
and not guilty, but the bribee is still forbidden from accepting the bribe, and if he does so, he is
guilty of bribery.268 The majority based their authority on a Quranic verse that reads, “God does
not burden any soul beyond its ability,”269 and a hadith narrated by Ibn 'Abbas that the Prophet
said, “Allah has forgiven my nation for mistakes and forgetfulness, and what they are forced to
do.”270
A critical issue related to bribery is whether a particular gift is considered a bribe or not.
Generally, gifts are permitted and encouraged between individuals. However, rulers are not
allowed to accept gifts. The same ruling applies to judges in the following situations:
1. A gift from a party to a dispute.
2. A gift from an individual who did not give gifts to the judge before that person was
elevated to the judiciary; in other words, a gift that was given solely because of the judge’s
position.
3. An unusual gift from an individual who used to give gifts to the judge before he became a
judge.
The rules about gifts to judges also apply to public officials in general.271 A principle in
regard to gifts that can be derived from the previous analysis is that if the gift is given because of
the official’s position, it is a bribe.
2. Nepotism and Intercession (shafa’ah)
The term shafa’ah, or intercession, corresponds to the concept of nepotism, known today
as wasta. It can be defined as intercession on behalf of another individual in order to gain a
268
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benefit or prevent harm.272 Based on legality, Shari'a divides intercession into two categories:
permissible intercession and forbidden intercession. Between these two categories, a fine line is
drawn. A Qur’anic verse says, “Help one another to righteousness and piety; do not help each
other to sin and transgression.”273
Accordingly, permissible intercession can be defined as intercession to uphold and gain a
benefit that is considered an individual’s right. In contrast, intercession that results in others’
losing their rights, in transgressing public good and order, or in upholding falsehood or deception
falls under the category of forbidden intercession.274 In contemporary times, intercession is also
forbidden when it used to violate a regulatory statute, for instance, traffic violations, fees, and so
forth.275 For forbidden intercession, the intent is self-centered, since permissible intercession must
spring from a pure intent to help; otherwise, it will be forbidden. So, for example, if intercession
is done with the intent to get a non-monetary276 benefit, i.e., to obtain a service or intercession in
return, or if it is motivated by any illegal reason, it falls into the category of forbidden
intercession.277
A number of Qur’anic and Sunnah texts forbid the former category. In addition to the
previously cited verses, in the Qur’an, a verse says, “Whoso intercedes with a good intercession
shall receive a share of it; whosoever intercedes with a bad intercession, he shall receive the like
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of it….”278 Commentators indicate that “shall receive a share of it” implies that this kind of
intercession is forbidden and is rewarded with punishment in this life and in the hereafter.279
In the Sunnah, the previously mentioned hadith (footnote 253) is another example where
the Prophet, as the highest authority, refused the intercession of Osama280 when he was
interceding with him not to execute punishment on a thief, and condemned Osama’s deed. It has
also been narrated on the authority of Abu Dharr, one of the Prophet’s companions, who said,
I said to the Prophet: Messenger of Allah, will you not appoint me to a public office? He
stroked my shoulder with his hand and said: Abu Dharr, thou art weak and authority is a
trust, and on the Day of judgment it is a cause of humiliation and repentance except for
one who fulfills its obligations and (properly) discharges the duties attendant thereon.281
The previously mentioned Qur’anic and Sunnah verses are in agreement with the principle
of equality and in general with justice as a fundamental principle of Shari'a, since the forbidden
type of intercession ultimately generates inequality of opportunity and rights. It also works
against honesty and trustworthiness, which eventually results in corruption.282
Principles that can be derived from this understanding are as follows:
1. Intercession that would work against the public good and order is forbidden.
2. Intercession that would impair equality and justice for all citizens is forbidden.
And further, as a strategy to combat corruption, do not appoint someone who asked to be
appointed because he will follow that pattern in appointing others.
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D. Islamic Mechanisms of Combating Corruption
It can be said that Islam has dual mechanisms, both internal and external, for fighting
corruption. The internal mechanisms aim at establishing self-control or self-government. In order
to achieve that, what is required is adherence to the Islamic principles and commands derived
from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The external mechanisms rely on the broad criminalization of
abuse of power and crimes of dishonesty by categorizing them under the broad category of
ta’azir.
1. The Internal Mechanisms
As noted previously, Islamic law is characterized as religious law, which implies that
responsibility for such law exists both in this life and in the hereafter. This implies that in making
risk assessments, Muslims must take into consideration not only the risks of being caught in this
life, but also the consequences of their deeds in the hereafter. This, however, does not exist
without roots. Moral education is required to establish and enhance the internal mechanisms.
Conduct, and especially moral conduct, is an external reflection of social values. In a
similar vein, to fight corruption, social values must form the frontline of defense by condemning
corrupt acts on moral grounds. A moral education is exactly what has been established and
followed in Islamic criminal legislation, not only as regards corruption, but also in relation to
other criminal acts.283
Although compliance with divine commands and standards is, on the face of it, done to
please God, it also serves another purpose solely aimed at human beings. This is what is referred
to as huquq al-íbad, or individuals’ rights and duties toward each other.284 This category
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establishes several morally based standards to organize and govern individuals and communities,
and eventually nations. This path aims at achieving a peaceful and just co-existence of
individuals.285 To sum up the significance of the internal aspect of individuals’ behavior, consider
the concept of justice in Islam. A Qur’anic conception of justice implies that justice emanates
from the interior of individuals (bāţin), rather than from the exterior (zāhir). Thus, true justice
requires the proper intention behind it.286
2. The External Mechanisms
Since the corruption-fighting mechanisms at the internal or personal level can fall short,
and can even be expected to do so, for a variety of reasons, Islam has recognized the need for
external mechanisms that fight corruption also. The external mechanisms are manifested in a
series of laws and incentives. The ta’azir category of crime, as noted above, was developed in
order to provide adequate flexibility to define contemporary crimes based on how they endanger
the five essential values mentioned previously. This was enhanced by the precaution of
criminalizing a series of acts in furtherance of fighting the root causes of corruption, or the crimes
that might lead to corrupt practices in the future.
As a mechanism for fighting the root causes of corrupt practices, Islamic criminal
legislation creates no scope under which the legalization of corruption will be allowed. This zero
tolerance stance toward corruption appears lucidly in the rejection of the so-called “grease that
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oils the economic wheels” or any form of unjustified facilitation of business endeavors.287 Such a
mechanism can also be seen in the principle that rulers should refuse to appoint individuals to
positions in the judiciary who are actively seeking such a position and are relying on their
connections with high public officials, and the tight restrictions on, if not the complete prohibition
of, officials’ acceptance of gifts.288
At the administrative level, not only is the separation of powers promoted, but also a
restricted framework of legislation is implemented. The legislative process, as has been explained,
is well established by defining and rooting it in transcendent rules and principles. This
characteristic feature makes Islamic legislation something that it is difficult for the state to
monopolize for political purposes. Instead, the Islamic legal framework opens the door to
knowledgeable and sophisticated jurists and scholars who are not necessarily affiliated with the
state.289
CONCLUSION
The Qur’anic and Sunnah provisions that have been cited clearly condemn and reject
corruption. Moreover, corruption clearly negates the main characteristic features and principles
established and articulated by Shari‘a. Most notably, corruption contradicts the protection of
morality since corruption is essentially an act of dishonesty which is inconsistent with moral
principles. Furthermore, corruption jeopardizes the equal application of the law, an aspect to
which Islamic jurisprudence has responded with firm disapproval, as has been noted.
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Islamic law and principles have to be distinguished from the practice of individuals
within Muslim nations. Though it does not designate or assign a penalty, Islamic law pronounces
its firm rejection of several corrupt practices. Thus, those practices remain subject to the ta’azir
crimes and penalties since they violate the principles and commands of Shari‘a. These can be
considered, as previously noted, the external mechanisms for fighting corruption. In fighting
corruption, however, Islam also relies on the internal mechanisms, which derive their
effectiveness from the religious character of Islamic criminal law.

69

CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND: SAUDI ARABIAN LAW
INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to explore and provide a foundation to the Saudi criminal justice
system; it gives an overview of the criminal judicial system, jurisdiction, and criminal
procedures. It also offers a brief introduction to the development of the Saudi legal system and
identifies the challenges facing it. Following that, the general problem of corruption in Saudi
Arabia is highlighted.
A. The Saudi Criminal Justice System
Essentially, Saudi criminal law is derived from mainly from three resources: Islamic law,
statutory law, and royal decrees and orders. Saudi Arabia confirms its adherence to Islamic law
through articles 1,290 7,291 and 48292 of the Basic Law of Governance. Consequently, Saudi Arabia
remains reliant on Islamic criminal jurisprudence when identifying the substantive and general
rules of criminal law and refrains from adopting a criminal penal code.293 Since the Saudi
criminal justice system adopts Islamic criminal jurisprudence,294 crimes are classified in
accordance with the traditional classification of Islamic criminal jurisprudence as follows:
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1. The hudud crimes include the seven crimes of theft, illicit sexual relations, sexual defamation,
drinking intoxicants, apostasy, rebellion against the legitimate authority, and brigandage.
2. Quesas and diyya crimes cover the crimes of homicide and battery.
3. Ta’azir crimes encompass all other types of crimes.
In general, as discussed in the preceding chapter, there are four schools of Islamic
jurisprudence, each of which places an emphasis on certain aspects of law in a way that
distinguishes it from the others. This can be an emphasis on traditions, logic, or textual
interpretation.295 In each Muslim country, there tends to be a strong reliance on one of the schools
more than the others. The situation in Saudi Arabia, however, needs further explanation.
The Hanbali School is recommended, but not mandatory, for the Saudi courts to follow—a
fact that runs contrary to the argument of some scholars that the Saudi courts are mandated to
apply the Hanbali School.296 The Royal Order issued by King Abdulaziz in 1346H/1928 indicates
that there is no required school of jurisprudence, so long as the reasoning of the holding is in
accordance with the general principles of Shari’a.297 The Royal Order also recommended a
number of works authored by Hanbali scholars and jurists as guidance, rather than as a mandatory
requirement.298
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Thus, Saudi judges handle cases by relying on direct reference to Qur’anic and Sunnah
texts, rather than by “making close analogies to Hanbali fiqh rules.”299 The situation in Saudi
Arabia, as described by Shaykh Al-Lahaydan, is this: “Saudi qadis [judges] are Hanbalīls, though
they do not commit themselves in every one of their cases to the school of the Imam Ahmad.”300
Instead, judges “are required to be Hanbalis in their fiqh, but only as a starting point, for the sake
of unification of the system.”301 Dr. Hamad al-Faryan, former Deputy Minister of Justice for
Administrative and Financial Affairs, noted that practitioners in the Saudi legal system have told
him that “Saudi judges do occasionally apply rules from other schools when they believe such
rules are suited to the case before them.”302
Additionally, statutory laws, influenced by the civil law system (mainly by the legal
systems of France and Egypt), have emerged since the late fifties.303 The statutory laws are
generally issued by royal decrees through the Council of Ministers as the legislative branch.304
Accordingly, ta’azir crimes are partially but not completely codified in Saudi Arabia. The
criminalization of certain acts and practices is done in one of two ways. The first is by setting
forth a complete criminal act, such as the Anti-Bribery Law, the Anti-Money Laundering Law,
the Law of Combating Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, and so forth. The other way this
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occurs is through the criminalization of some acts within other laws. This can be seen, for
instance, in the Commercial Court Law305 and the Saudi Arabian Citizenship System.306
The adoption of statutory laws derives its legitimacy from the doctrine of the common
good (al-maslahah al-mursalah) as a source of Islamic laws, so long as provisions are in
accordance with the divine law.307 Being in accord with and in conformity to the principles of
Shari’a as a stipulation for the legitimacy of the codified law, which can be seen in a number of
provisions in different laws. For instance, Article 67 of the Basic Law of Governance states that
“[t]he regulatory authority shall have the jurisdiction of formulating laws and rules conducive to
the realization of the well-being or warding off harm to State affairs in accordance with the
principles of the Islamic Shari‘a.”308
1. The Criminal Judicial System
According to the most recent Law of the Judiciary,309 Saudi Arabia has a three-tier court
system consisting of First-Degree Courts, Courts of Appeals, and the High Court.310 The structure
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of the first two tiers is based on specialized courts where the matter of the case determines the
specialized court in which it is tried. The number of judges hearing a case depends also on the
matter of a case.311
In the first-degree courts, the criminal courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases. The
criminal courts consist of three specialized panels: the hudud and qisas cases panel, the ta’azir
cases panel, and the juvenile cases panel.312 Generally, cases in these panels are heard by a threejudge panel with exception of some offences which the Supreme Judicial Council has specified
should be tried by one judge.313 In districts where there are no specialized criminal courts, general
courts establish a criminal cases panel that has a jurisdiction over the criminal cases.314
For criminal cases, the courts of appeals are structured in the same way as the first-degree
courts, with minor differences. The courts of appeals do not consist of a number of panels, as the
first-degree courts do; instead, the criminal circuits have jurisdiction over all criminal cases,
including those that were decided by the general courts.315 The general rule is that three judges
rule on a case, but there are five judges in cases dealing with homicide, amputation, stoning, or
qisas cases.316 The role of the High Court is critical, since any ruling on homicide, amputation,
stoning, or qisas cases must be affirmed by that Court.317
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2. Jurisdiction
In identifying the Saudi jurisdiction, it is important to give an overview of the concept in
ancient Islamic jurisprudence. The four schools of jurisprudence are divided over the issue of
jurisdiction. The majority, including the Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali Schools, hold that Islamic
laws apply to any individual who has committed a crime inside a Muslim country, yet the laws
apply only to a Muslim or a dhimmi318 who commits a crime outside a Muslim country, similar to
the principle of nationality .319 The Hanafi School, however, restricts the jurisdiction to crimes
committed within a Muslim country’s boundaries and committed only by a Muslim or dhimmi.320
According to the Saudi Criminal Procedures Law, jurisdiction is determined by the place
where the crime was completely or partially321 committed, or the residence of the accused.322 In
the case of a conflict of jurisdiction, the High Court identifies which court has jurisdiction over
the case.323 In codified laws, generally Saudi jurisdiction is based on the principle of
territoriality,324 which links the jurisdiction with the place where the crime was committed, unless
otherwise specified. This is can be confirmed by inference from Article 3 of the Law of Terrorism
Crimes and Financing, which states that, “[n]otwithstanding the principle of territoriality, the
provisions of this Law shall apply to any person, Saudi or non-Saudi, who commits, aids,
attempts, instigates, participates or conspires to commit—outside the Kingdom—a crime
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(1971).
75

provided for in this Law….”325 Other laws specify the jurisdiction over and the application of the
provisions to certain group of individuals, which can be seen in the Anti-Bribery Law, as will be
illustrated in Chapter Six.
3. Criminal Procedures
Criminal procedure is regulated by the Criminal Procedures Law326 and its executive
regulation.327 The provisions of the Law can be divided into two main categories: investigative
procedures and trial procedures. In the investigative procedures, the law first identifies the
investigative bodies. Instead of identifying their jurisdictions precisely, the Law refers to other
laws or orders laying out their jurisdictions.328 Additionally, the Law regulates the collection and
seizure of evidence,329 flagrante delicto,330 arrest procedures,331 searches of individuals and
homes,332 seizure of mail and surveillance,333 and the investigative process.334
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Law of Terrorism Crimes and Financing, Royal Decree No. M/16 of 1435H (corresponding to
2013), art. 3 (SA); see also Combating Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Royal
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Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308.
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specified duties with respect to crimes committed within their respective jurisdictions.
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Id. § 3, pt. 1.
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In the trial procedures, the Law identifies the courts’ jurisdictions335 (as noted above), trial
procedures,336 and the appeals process.337 In trials, the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution
has jurisdiction over prosecuting criminal cases, in addition to the authority to investigate
criminal cases.338 It must be noted, however, that the Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts
applies in any case where “there are no provisions provided herein, and in matters that are not
inconsistent with the nature of penal actions.”339 The case par excellence is that the provisions
regulating the law of evidence in the Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts will be applied in
criminal cases, since the Law of Criminal Procedures does not regulate them as the former law
does.
B. The Historical Development of Laws
Saudi Arabia has witnessed some significant legal changes, especially in the past decade.
Nevertheless, the Saudi legal system is still in need of reform.340 In essence, the Saudi legal
system is based on the interaction between three factors: Islamic law, modern law, and the Saudi
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tribal structure.341 Identifying the history of each element can help in identifying the main
obstacles the Saudi legal system faces.
Saudi Arabia, and more specifically King Abdulaziz, opted to follow Islamic law and
based the legal system’s identity on that since its establishment in 1926. To have a comprehensive
understanding of the reason why, it is necessary to step back and take a broader view. An early
Saudi Sheikh, Mohammed ibn Sa’ud (1710–1765), had established an alliance with Muhammad
ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1791).342 When the latter observed a deviation from the pure Islamic
faith, the former offered support for him to achieve his goal of returning to the pure faith.343 Thus,
when King Abdulaziz came to power, he adopts the same path of restoring pure Islam as the
foundation of the new Saudi State in order to unify and unite scattered people from diverse areas
and tribes. Since then, Islam as a religion continues to be the foundation of the country344 and has
formed the country’s identity and its legal and political system.345
Further, Saudi Arabia holds a position of particular eminence within the Muslim world,
since the Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, are located within its boundaries. The fact that the
birthplace of Islam constitutes a distinctive status of Saudi Arabia is another reason why Islamic
law ought to be the basis of the country’s legal system.346 Consequently, Muslims around the
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Esmaeili, supra note 341, at 7; see also Al-Sudairy, supra note 345, at 5.
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world consider Saudi Arabia the center of Islam and that the Shari'a should govern every aspect in
this area, and the government bears the responsibility to protect and uphold it.347
Being the birthplace of Islam has also a significant impact manifested in the role of tribal
laws and customs in the Saudi legal system. As explained in Chapter 2, Arab traditions and
customs have had an influence on Islamic law.348 In Saudi Arabia, unlike in other Muslim
countries, Arab customs overlap with Islamic law.349 This is mainly because in other Muslim
countries, such as Turkey, Iran, or Asian countries, the traditions and customs to some extent may
not be consistent with Islamic principles.350
The role of tribal customs appears in the process of settling cases, or mediation. A case par
excellence is the homicide cases, where the tribes engage in the process of settlement in order to
persuade the victims or their heirs to accept monetary compensation instead of qisas.351
Furthermore, the role of tribal customs has caused some difficulties in the application of some
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Esmaeili, supra note 341, at 8-9. See also Mark Jones, Islamic law in Saudi Arabia: a
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Id. at 22 (The negotiation process witness the heavy involvement of middlemen who might be
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involvement, which is against Islamic principles.); see, e.g., Diyya auction; who is paying more,
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laws, on the one hand, and created fertile ground for certain crimes to thrive on the other. This can
be seen most obviously in crimes of domestic violence.352
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has opposed tribal rules and customs353 and has reduced their
impact to some extent. This is mainly because the movement of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab
at its core aimed at diminishing those traditions that violated the Shari'a.354 Moreover, civilization
and the movement into cities has also weakened those customs.355 In line with the increase in
civilization, a number of laws were promulgated against those customs.356
Modernity and civilization lead to the third element of Saudi legal system history, namely,
modern laws and a modern legal system. Modern laws and a modern legal system have clearly
been developing, as will be described in the next section, since the beginning of the twenty-first
century. However, the ongoing issue in Saudi Arabia is whether the authorities, the state, or rulers
can codify the Shari'a rules and adopt a codified legal system.357
The dilemma here is essentially between the role of the authorities and the role of judges.
Judges’ autonomy springs from the autonomy of Shari'a from all human beings through the
practice of ijitihad,358 whereas the authorities gain their power from siyāsa shar´iyya,359 the power
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and rule of governance given to the authorities through the common good, masalih mursala, as a
non-textual source. Between these two poles, the ulamā360 and the judges on one side and the
authorities and rulers on the other, the issue arose.361
As a firm response to the movement toward codification, the Board of Senior Ulamā
issued a fatwa362 rejecting the idea of codification.363 Furthermore, due to Shari'a judges’
reluctance to apply the state’s legislation, which comes in the form of codes, and their insistence
on applying the traditional form of Islamic law, the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts over a number of
cases were relocated to several administrative boards, specialized committees, and
commissions.364
This issue has existed since the establishment of Saudi Arabia, but it became more acute
after the discovery of oil, when Saudi Arabia was about to step into the arena of international
trade. Saudi Arabia is not the only country facing this issue,365 yet it must also reckon with the
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additional factor of being the birthplace of Islam, which has made the area unconditionally
controlled by Shari'a since then.366 Looking back at history, we can see that the Ottoman Empire
went through an almost similar experience.367 The Ottomans adopted a hybrid system which had
Islamic law and state legislation, mainly similar to the Western system, and established a dual
legal system of secular courts and Shari'a courts.368 However, the Hijaz area in which the Holy
Cities are located was governed by Shari'a and Shari'a courts.369
The debate over codification is not a new issue in Saudi Arabia370 and in fact the debate
has been going on since 1926, when the Hijaz was conquered.371 The continuous debate seems to
indicate a sort of agreement between the two parties specifically on three points: firstly, the status
quo in Saudi Arabia is neither adequate nor stable. Secondly, the smooth and effective interaction
between policymaking and Shari'a and between laws and courts requires a legal system that
creates and enhances more internal harmony. Finally, all of that should lead in one direction,
avoiding the creation of “the sort of ideologically dual (secular/religious) legal system” that exists
in many neighboring countries.372
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Figure 1. Saudi Legal Dilemma
C. The Saudi Legal System in the Twenty-First Century

The Saudi legal system has been subject to significant legal amendments in an effort
aimed at modernizing the legal system. At the outset of the twenty-first century, the Law on
Procedures before Shari'a Courts was promulgated.373 A year later the Criminal Procedures
Law374 was issued to bring together a number of scattered procedures issued in various laws and
ministerial circulars under one law.375
In 2007, the Law of the Judiciary was amended to change the landscape of the litigation
system and trial law and to unify the court system.376 The Law, as previously noted, establishes
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criminal courts for the first time in order to unify the jurisdiction over criminal matters.377 In
addition to the specialized courts, the judicial system was transformed to a three-tier court system.
Subsequently, judicial powers were assigned to the newly established Supreme Court instead of to
the Supreme Judicial Council.378 Courts of appeals were also introduced to create a “fully fledged
court of appeals” system, in place of the Shari’a Review Court (mahkamat al-tamyiz).379
Moreover, the Law of the Board of Grievances was also replaced in creating the three-tier court
system.380
In 2013, upon the establishment of the new judicial system, the procedures were again
revisited. This time all the procedures were replaced with new laws, including the Criminal
Procedures Law,381 the Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts,382 and the Law on Procedures
before the Board of Grievances.383 This group of procedural laws were promulgated to include
provisions regulating the appeals process in accordance with the new judicial system.
Substantively, though the penal code seems far from being adopted, criminal laws and
provisions have developed. In the past decade alone, most of the criminal laws have been
introduced or revised. Nevertheless, there are number of fragments and drawbacks due to the lack
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of criminal provisions related to certain criminal acts. Another related issue is the absence of a
sentencing guide.384
At the international and regional level, Royal Order 7/b/12661 was issued urging all
governmental agencies to revise and amend laws that are necessary for Saudi Arabia to sign
international treaties.385 Near the end of 2005, Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organization
(WTO).386 At the regional level, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries have
started adopting unified laws;387 such laws aim at strengthening the foundation of GCC markets.
If this cooperation is developed and extended further, this may result in the adoption of a unified
penal code.
To summarize, the development of the Saudi legal system shows that the formal system of
government law retains legitimacy and effectiveness. Despite the challenges posed by the other
poles, formal laws have their own influence on individuals and their behaviors and acts, which
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can be observed through the obedience to formal regulations and laws in recent times. The
demands for reforms in many aspects of the legal system also bear witness to the significance of
formal laws and regulations.
D. Corruption in Saudi Arabia
Corruption in Saudi Arabia can be found at the highest levels of the government, which,
however, does not imply that there is no corruption at the middle and lower levels.388 Over the last
three decades, there has been a gradual increase in the level of corruption at the lower levels,
boosted by an increase in the cost of living alongside “stagnating wages.”389 Accordingly, the
corruption level may differ from one institution to another.390 On the other hand, the judicial
branch remains relatively clean compared to other countries and to other branches of government
in Saudi Arabia.391 Judicial corruption mainly manifests itself in cases involving land registration
and disputes.392
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The United States came close to investigating and prosecuting a number of corruption
cases that occurred in Saudi Arabia through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).393 For
instance, through the FCPA, the U.S. Department of Justice discovered a bribe of $500,000 a year
that was paid for five years to a Saudi official in exchange for rewarding HealthSouth a contract
for operating a hospital.394 Regrettably, a number of other cases that are cited as being among the
largest settlements in the history of the FCPA took place partly or completely in Saudi Arabia.395
This can be attributed partly to a lack of disclosure coupled with the absence of
transparency, which indicates the absence of public accountability. Through the history of Saudi
Arabia, it is rare to hear of an official being tried on corruption charges.396 Thus, the “naming and
shaming” strategy of calling attention to corruption does not often take place in Saudi Arabia.397
Further, the dismissal of public servants is considered a challenge to the officials’ superiors and a
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restriction on their discretion.398 All of these issues derive their support from the patronage
culture.399
Thus, the backbone of the patronage culture is favoritism, including, inter alia, the practice
of nepotism and cronyism, more broadly referred to as wasta, which has a dual function. It
functions by itself in many cases as a practice of corruption where it takes the form of influencepeddling. In addition to this function, it can open a path for other corrupt practices to occur. This
can occur through the collaboration of middlemen and their role in facilitating bribery, for
instance, which depends in the first place on reciprocity and trust between the parties.
In 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (Nazaha) conducted a survey to assess
corruption in Saudi Arabia.400 The survey revealed that the practice of wasta was the most
prevalent corrupt practice constituting about 62 percent of the corrupt practices in the country. On
the other hand, around 81 percent of the corruption in Saudi Arabia was attributed to the
complexity of procedures and to outdated laws.401 Consequently, what can be derived from this
survey is that wasta forms a challenge to the Saudi legal system, as will be explained in Chapter
Five. Secondly, the legal instruments available have proved to be inadequate to fight corruption.
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CONCLUSION
The present chapter has offered a brief review of the Saudi criminal justice system that has
surveyed the criminal judicial system itself and the issues of jurisdiction, and criminal procedures.
This chapter has also examined the development of the laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia and
the challenges associated with such development. The chapter concluded by examining briefly the
problem of corruption in Saudi Arabia.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CORRUPTION AND SAUDI ARABIAN SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter explores the Saudi criminal justice system in general and corruption
in Saudi Arabia and the anti-corruption legal framework in particular. Since society plays a
significant role in corruption in Saudi Arabia, it is essential to give an overview of Saudi history,
culture, and society. At the outset, this chapter will examine the relationship between society and
corruption. After briefly reviewing corruption in Saudi Arabia, it will then proceed to provide
essential background about Saudi history, culture, and society. Finally, it concludes by
examining corruption through the lens of sociology and social psychology by outlining the
argument of Ibn Khaldun, representing a sociological analysis of cultures similar to Saudi
Arabia, and by examining the influence of power and intergroup biases on corrupt behaviors and
acts.
A. Societies and Corruption
The question attracting scholars in the early discourse on corruption was, why do certain
societies or countries seem to be more inclined to be corrupt than others? In an effort to provide
an answer to this question, scholars have set forth two main analyses.402 The first analysis was
culturally based, arguing that corruption is a result of social norms which value loyalty and giftgiving over the rule of law. This analysis also has two main streams; the first expresses the views
of the moralists, most notably Banfield403 and Wraith and Simkins,404 who considered those
norms and corrupt behaviors to be both politically immoral and economically harmful. The
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COUNTRIES (1964).
90

second stream, represented by Wertheim405 and other scholars, merely seeks to shed light on the
differences in norms and the results of such differences.
The second stream, led by the revisionists, argued that corruption is merely a result of
political and administrative norms that are different from those adopted in the West.406 Those
norms, in their view, satisfy political, economic, and administrative demands. Influenced by the
revisionist school, some have argued in favor corruption, since it enhances the efficiency of
bureaucrats, helps in avoiding the problems of capital formation, and provides administrative
flexibility.407 Others, despite adopting the same view—that corruption is a result of the process of
modernization—remain skeptical about its positive consequences or its necessity.408
During the 1960s, revisionists and moralists engaged in a lengthy and unresolved debate.
As the discourse on corruption has advanced, a new approach has emerged that bases its analysis
on public choice.409 This approach focuses on many economic and political variables and attempts
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to find a causal nexus between these variables and corruption.410 However, the answer to the
previous question remains unresolved and open to debate.
Thus, scholarly approaches differ in answering the question of why some societies have
more corruption than others, and consequently what they attribute corruption to and how they
analyze it differ. While some scholars build their analysis on the organizational and societal level,
others tend to center their analysis on the individual—that is, some scholars attribute corruption
primarily to societies rather than to the individual, other scholars do the reverse. In attempting to
find an answer, we should take into consideration some of the concepts from different approaches
and analyses.
The popular explanation adopted by sociologists of the different levels of corruption
between the countries emphasizes the different norms adopted by different countries which result
in different perceptions of the same acts. However, it cannot be assumed that non-Western
countries are not concerned with corruption.411 In fact, in many of the developing countries,
respondents to public opinion polls consider corruption to be one of the top problems in their
country. In China, for example, people condemn guanxi (personal and political connections) on
the one hand, while on the other they still “admire the ingenuity of individual exploits among
their acquaintances in its use.”412 Moreover, as one scholar has noted, “A major problem with

see, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J.
224, 224-32 (1967).
410
See, e.g., Chapter 1 of this dissertation (the studies explaining the causes and consequences of
corruption). Montinola & Jackman, supra note 402, at 149 (arguing that at their core, public
choice explanations of corruption attribute the phenomenon to a lack of competition in either or
both the economic and political arenas).
411
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norm-based explanations is that they can very easily be near-tautological (‘a country has more
corruption because its norms are more favorable to corruption’).”413
With that being said, numerous scholars argue that the difference between the public
perception in different cultures of certain acts as being corrupt or not is the reason for the different
levels of corruption—that is, what is considered a bribe in the West may be considered a gift in
other cultures.414 To complicate the issue, however, a number of studies suggest that there is a
firm moral disapproval of corruption even in the most corrupt countries. For instance, a study
conducted by the Afrobarometer in the African context asked respondents to evaluate three
different potential acts by government officials, and whether they would consider these acts to be
“wrong but understandable” or “wrong and punishable.””415 The vast majority of the African
respondents considered the acts in all three scenarios “wrong and punishable.”416
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Yet despite this firm disapproval, individuals in corrupt countries not only choose not to
punish corrupt acts, but also continue to perpetuate them. Individuals in such settings are not
necessarily corrupt, but they are corruptible417—that is, in a given setting, individuals engage in
corrupt acts even though they morally disapprove of them and comprehend the negative social
consequences of them, since they know that these are the rules of the game by which they can
gain more benefit. In the short term, not being corrupt is not only costly, but also will not change
the rules of the game, and this ultimately drives individuals to continue to engage in corrupt
behaviors.418
The most relevant form of corruption that may help in providing a comprehensible view of
the situation is the concept of systemic corruption introduced by Caiden and Caiden. In their
words, “Systemic corruption occurs whenever the administrative system itself transposes the
expected purposes of the organization, forces participants to follow what otherwise would be
termed unacceptable ways, and actually punishes those who resist.”419 Consequently, corruption
is structural and systemic rather than incidental. Caiden and Caiden argued that the revisionists
tend to consider corruption in individual terms, even though the revisionists identify corruption as
a social phenomenon.

Ukraine about corrupt practices.); see also STEN WIDMALM, DECENTRALIZATION, CORRUPTION
AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: FROM INDIA TO THE WEST 166-173 (2008) (Based on a survey conducted
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Systemic corruption exists not only in poor countries, but also in any country which is an
organizational society420—those societies that value organizational loyalty more than the public
interest. It is worth noting that systemic corruption is known to exist and to thrive in certain kinds
of transactions rather than others.421 The example par excellence is military and defense contracts,
which become riddled, if not controlled, by systemic corruption.
Systemic corruption gains its complexity from the characteristics it has, the consequences
it creates, and the difficulties involved in fighting against it. Systemic corruption has some
characteristics that distinguish it from individual or incidental corruption. First, organizations
usually claim adherence to an external code of ethics which in fact differs from the de facto
internal practices. These internal practices play significant roles not only in hiding the
infringements of the external code, but also in hiding the rewards the organization gives for such
infringements.422 Thus, it is not surprising to find strong protections for the violators accompanied
by punishments for the non-violators for “foregoing the rewards of violation and offending
violators.”423
Second, in systemic corruption the exposing of such infringements is diminished
significantly. On the one hand, the whistle-blowers, unless they enjoy some protection from being
the victims of future revenge, are forced into silence.424 On the other, institutions and officials
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charged with monitoring, investigating, and uncovering corruption rarely take action. Even if they
do act, they will consider the incident of corruption as an exceptional act that rarely occurs.425
Owing to these characteristics, systemic corruption poses a number of risks to a society
that are greater than those posed by incidental corruption. Since it prevents the reflections of
social developments from being integrated into institutions, systemic corruption enforces
restricted access and closed policies on the one hand, and enhances class, economic, and even
social divisions on the other.426 This situation leads to the suppression of opposition, which
eventually results in limited reforms and changes in administration and policy.427
The preceding explanation lays a foundation for introducing the collective reputation
theory, its interpretation, and its relevance to corruption. As Tirole sensibly argued,
When belonging to a group is an unalterable trait, poor collective [behavior] in the past
may make current good [behavior] a low-yield individual investment and thus generate
poor collective [behavior] in the future. Even more fascinating is the history-dependence
of collective reputations. In our view, stereotypes are long-lasting because new members
of a group at least partially inherit the collective reputation of their elders.428
That is to say, younger generations inherit the reputation of being corrupt from the older
generations and continue to use corrupt alternatives because they lack incentives to be honest, and
this eventually results in the persistence of corruption in a given group, culture, or society.429
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There is a fine line between a corrupt society and corrupt individuals. Yes, there are
corrupt norms that exist in some countries, yet the public are not satisfied with them nor do they
morally believe in them. The use of corrupt alternatives and behaviors existing in a particular
society does not render a judgement that the society is corrupt when most people in that society
disapprove of corrupt alternatives and behaviors.430 What can be said instead is that there is a
corrupt atmosphere forcing individuals to use corrupt alternatives and behaviors. The disapproval
does not make the individuals who constitute a society corrupt; the fact that they have no option
but corruption has forced to be corrupt. In fact, when applying the collective reputation theory,
one may discover the opposite result—that is, there are certain cultures, societies, or countries that
may benefit from the collective reputation of not being corrupt while they are still having a
number of corrupt behaviors.431
This discussion is not merely a theoretical analysis but is beneficial in terms of practice. It
not only points to the root cause of corruption, it also provides an essential step toward solving
and curbing corruption. Most of the strategies that successfully identify the root cause of the
problem have failed to provide adequate solutions, since a number of these strategies tend to
import already prepackaged remedies. The reliance on over-the-counter remedies and solutions
does not obviate the need for more precise and sometimes customized cures.
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B. Saudi Society in Context
1. History
The roots of what we now know as Saudi Arabia go back to 1744 and the establishment
of the Emirate of Dir’iyyah, which became known as the first Saudi state.432 The first Saudi state
was the result of an alliance established between the earlier Saudi Sheikh, Mohammed ibn Sa’ud
(1710–1765), and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1791), which aimed at restoring a pure
orthodox Islam in the Arabian Peninsula and fighting to abolish heretical practices (Bida’).433
This politico-religious alliance led to a strong movement that captured an enormous area of the
Arabian Peninsula.434
However, the Saudi state did not last very long, as the Ottoman Empire responded to the
expansion of the Emirate and its seizure of Ottoman territory by launching a military campaign
to recover their lost territory. At the domestic level, the Saudi state faced the challenge of the
Banu Khalid, a tribe that had controlled the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula since their
rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1670.435 The Saudi state was also confronted by the
Sharifian family in Hejaz.436
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The Emirate of Najd, the second Saudi state, emerged in 1824, shortly after the fall of the
first state, and moved the capital to Riyadh.437 This occurred when Turki bin Abdullah bin
Muhammad successfully reconquered Riyadh from Egyptian forces.438 In 1891, the Battle of
Mulayda brought an end to the second Saudi state.439 A number of factors contributed
significantly to the collapse of the second Saudi state, inter alia, internal conflicts in the house of
Al-Saud440 coupled with the emergence of the Rashidi Emirate in Ha’il in northern Najd (1836–
1921) as a powerful rival.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud launched on the path to
restore the rule of his forefathers. In 1902, Abdul-Aziz led a small group from Kuwait, where his
family had settled after they fled in 1893,441 to Riyadh, the capital of his ancestors.442 At that
time, the Rashidi Emirate had expanded its territory to include, in addition to Ha’il in northern
Najd, Qassim, the center of the Arabian Peninsula, and Riyadh.443 When he successfully
reconquered Riyadh in 1902, Ibn Saud was able to consolidate other parts of Najd.444
Between 1902 and 1906, there were series of battles over the Qassim between Ibn Saud
and the Rashidi Emirate, which had already lost a significant part of their territory in southern
Najd; these eventually ended with Ibn Saud conquering Qassim.445 However, Ibn Saud’s
conquest was not fully stable. Faisal Al-Dawish, supported by other leaders of the Mutair tribe,
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formed a secret alliance with Abdullah Aba Al-Khail and split from Ibn Saud. In 1907, Ibn Saud
defeated the Mutair in a battle near Al-Majmaa, a town in Najd, and Faisal eventually submitted
but retained his status as a leader of the Mutair.446 At that time, Abdullah Aba Al-Khail still had
an alliance with part of the Mutair tribe and the people of Buraida, a town in Qassim, and joined
Sultan ibn Hamud, a ruler of the Rashidi Emirate. In 1907, the battle of Tarafiya occurred and
Ibn Saud again emerged successful, but he was not able to return to Buraida until 1908, when his
support in Buraida grew and enabled him to enter the town.447.
In 1913, the first hijra (settlement) was founded as a response to the emergence of the
Ikhwan (Brethren) movement. The first settlement was Al-Artawiya, where the Mutair tribe was
settled. Although the shift from a nomadic lifestyle to farming was a difficult step for the
Bedouin, it took only a decade to establish sixty more settlements.448 These settlements were a
milestone in the consolidation of the Arabian Peninsula, as they provided stability and
powerbases for the army of Ibn Saud. The purpose of these settlements was not completely
fulfilled, since individuals who joined the settlements were supposed to abandon the habits and
duties derived from tribal traditions; instead, settlements continued to be inhabited based on
tribal affiliation.449
In 1913, after the stabilization of Najd, Al-Hasa also fell under the sovereignty of Ibn
Saud.450 Again, Ibn Saud confronted another tribal rebellion. This tribe was the Ajman, and they
were rebellious and refused to fully submit to Ibn Saud. This rebellion started when, during the
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battle of Jarrab (1915), Ibn Saud experienced disloyalty from the Ajman, and ended in the battle
of Kanzan, in which the Ajman were defeated, although only with difficulty.451 The defeat of Ibn
Saud’s long-time rival, the Rashidi Emirate, came in 1921.452 This was followed shortly by the
consolidation of Asir. In 1925, Hejaz submitted to Ibn Saud, which ended the rule of the
Sharifian family.453
Throughout the history of Saudi Arabia, tribal culture and Islam have exercised a strong
influence. The role of Islam can be observed in the fact that, without wealth or a confederation
between the tribes in Najd, there was little if any means of expanding the sovereignty, but
adopting a religious message enabled Mohammad ibn Saud and his successors to achieve a
confederation.454 This cannot be overemphasized when the role of tribes is considered.
The role of tribes in the history of the Saudi state was of central importance. First and
foremost, the center of Arabia, Najd, was not controlled by the Ottomans and was ruled by the
amirs (leaders) of each tribe, who maintained their autonomy and independence. 455 This was
mainly due to the mobility of the tribes, which was part of their very nature, coupled with the
tradition of autonomy.456 Furthermore, when comparing the Saudi states to their rivals, the
Rashidi Emirate and the Sharifian family, the role of tribes becomes more obvious. The Rashidi
Emirate was perceived as dominated solely by the Shammar tribe, which imposed difficulties on
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the Emirate’s control over other tribes; this was not the case for either the Saudi states or the
Sharifian family.457
The Sharifian family, descendants of the prestigious Hashemite tribe, which has a direct
lineage from the Prophet Muhammad by way of his daughter Fatimah, relied on their lineage to
impose their sovereignty.458 In Hejaz, nonetheless, there was a sharp division between the rural
and the urban population,459 coupled with the absence of an “overarching tribal leadership
capable of claiming authority over the whole confederation.”460 That is to say, the Hejazi tribes
were separated into different entities, each of which was led by a prominent shaykh (leader),
resulting in an implicit agreement that no one would claim leadership or authority beyond his
territory.461
2. Culture
The geographic insularity of Arabian Peninsula led to a lengthy period of isolation,
resulting in a high level of ethnocentricity in Saudi culture. The small exception is the Hejaz
region, which was exposed to the pilgrims from all over the world visiting Mecca and Medina.462
In addition to being birthplace of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula is the cradle of the Arabs, whose
cultural identity was based in the tribe and the extended family as much as in linguistic or
political bonds, if not more so.463
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For Arabs, accordingly, bloodline, rather than wealth or success, is what shapes and
establishes personal status. Thus, the Saudis maintain their pride in their Arabian ancestry and
deem themselves to be the center of their own universe.464 Further, the Saudis have preserved “a
proud, closed, and extended family-oriented society that is secure in its own worth and destiny”
because their area has never been colonized, which also diminishes the “feeling of cultural
inferiority.”465 More specifically, the family is the cornerstone of the Saudi social structure,
playing a significant role in maintaining the lineage, reinforcing the social cohesiveness, and
enhancing the structural integrity of the nation.466
A number of the Saudi social customs derive their roots from the code of personal and
collective honor (sharaf).467 As a good example, hospitality for the Saudis is considered a matter
of honor; this determines their roles as hosts, in addition to the “mutual security consideration,”
that is, the welfare of the guest.468 As a form of personal honor, sincerity and loyalty (ikhlas) is
one of chief elements of Saudi social norms.469 The personal-oriented pattern in Saudi society
boosts the significance of ikhlas, since it is fundamental to these close relationships. Ikhlas can
blind the eyes of Saudis to an individual’s slips.470 As a result, personal trust and a close personal
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relationship are considered to be a conditio sine qua non for successful relationships and social
transactions of any kind.471
As a form of honor, preserving “face” is one of the most compelling characteristics of
Saudi society. The essentiality of preserving face can be seen in how it explains the ultimate goal
of several behaviors. A number of these behaviors generally aim at protecting the image of
Saudis.472 Thus, Saudi employers, for instance, tend to prefer exaggerated flattery rather than
honest criticism, which can be considered an insult.473
Shame (ayb) is a concept which is inversely related to honor. As with many Arab
societies, Saudi society is driven by shame;474 that is to say, individuals are concerned about
shame and their behaviors are shaped accordingly.475 Honor, as a matter of supreme importance,
concerns the individual and group reputation, which must be maintained. Consequently,
individuals, their families, and even the groups to which they belong are considered to be shamed
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when their honor is tarnished.476 The scope of behavior that is consider shameful in a given area
can be broader or narrower than the number of permissible behaviors in Islam477
Saudi social behavior, thus, is constructed in stylized patterns whose existence has not
been affected by modern Western social norms, but Saudi interpersonal behavior is contextual as
well, which adds to the difficulties of understanding these patterns.478 Saudis practice Western
social patterns while at the same time they maintain their own behavioral patterns between
themselves, i.e., the Saudi stylized patterns between fellow Saudis.479
To gain a more comprehensive view of Saudi culture, one needs to take a step back. In the
heyday when the rapid development and expansion of the Saudi government was coupled with the
oil boom, there were huge demands for Saudi human resources. Those individuals who seized the
opportunity at that time have now become family elders. The family elders now hold the
responsibility of maintaining the welfare of their family members by using their influence in
either business or public affairs.480 This chain of events has created an overlapping network
between senior business figures and high officials, on the one hand, and the younger
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats predominating in both the public and the private sector, on the
other.481 “The dominant feature of overlapping interpersonal networks was the centrality of
extended family loyalties in symbiotic public-private sector alliances.”482
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At an early period in Saudi Arabia, mainly the pre-modern era, the extended family
system “served a positive purpose by distributing government contracts among the various family
business concerns.”483 With the economic and governmental expansion and development, the
situation has changed. The system has become inadequate because, while there has been some
development in the standards and procedures of accountability and transparency, the senior
executives and bureaucrats remain the elders of their extended families, which leads to standards
and procedures being maintained essentially the same as they were in the past.484
The extended family delineates a difference between Saudi society and Western societies.
While Western societies have become more youth-oriented and the importance of the extended
family has diminished, Saudi society still maintains the extended family: great respect is paid to
age and seniority, and the younger members remain in a place of lower status until they attain a
certain age.485 These young people, who are the majority of the population as a result of the
population boom, can be categorized as something of an underclass.486
The dichotomy between the Saudi business culture and Western business culture can be
attributed to their sources. While the concept of law governs business relationships and
transactions in the West, the concept of honor plays the same role in the Saudi context.
Consequently, in Western culture, business decisions and transactions are made in the light of
legal principles, and viewed through this lens, the informal and personalized norms the Saudis
adopt in carrying out transactions are immoral and illegal. On the other hand, from the Saudi
point of view, the code of honor controls both interpersonal relationships and business
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transactions. From that point of view, transactions are judged to be immoral, no matter whether
they are legal or illegal, if they are considered to be dishonorable.487
3. Social Stratification
Although Saudi Arabia is often considered ethnically and religiously homogeneous, each
region has its own unique cultural and historical aspects that existed before the consolidation of
Saudi Arabia.488 Within Saudi Arabia, although it is administratively divided into thirteen regions,
culturally there are at least six regions: Najd, Hejaz, Asir, the Eastern region, the Northern Area,
and Najran.489 Moreover, each tribe has developed its own customs and traditions.
a. Regional Differences
What follows is an overview of the regional history of the Arabian Peninsula. As
explained above, the Peninsula can be broadly divided into the different regions. Within one
region, there is a further stratification based on where one’s hometown is. As in many places
around the world, regionalism in Saudi Arabia is shaped by how far a region and its population is
from a center of power. In present-day Saudi Arabia, however, regionalism is considered to be
somewhat taboo.490
Loyalty to one’s own region and denigration of other regions operated reciprocally. At its
zenith, the situation between Najd and Hejaz represented regionalism in a clear way. The Hejazis,
or inhabitants of Hejaz, saw themselves as more civilized than the Najdis, the inhabitants of Najd.
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Conversely, the Hejazis “viewed the [Najdis] as ignorant and uncultured.”491 The Najdis, on other
hand, saw themselves as “ethnically purer” than the Hejazis.492
Even today, the people of different regions of Saudi Arabia remain relatively divided and
distinctive. When people from different regions immigrate to the big cities, there is a subtle
tendency among them to develop their relationships with people from their own region, rather
than others, indicating the existence of regionalism in the country.493 However, this cannot be
considered a tendency promoted by the government, at least officially. A number of decisions
taken by the government indicate a dissatisfaction with regionalism.494
The existence of regionalism has led to a dangerous form of discrimination. Regionalism
has created a form of favoritism in many areas. The most obvious example can be seen in the
process of hiring or promoting of individuals, and this can also be extended to the appointment of
officials to high positions.495 As an extension of creating unequal opportunity, regionalism affects
the distribution of services based on regions, which means that some regions enjoy more services
than do others.496
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b. Tribal Differences
Tribes (qab’il, sing. qabila) in Saudi Arabia play a major role in shaping the culture of the
country.497 The significance of the tribes manifests in the role of the tribes as the “source of the
Saudi value system,” which includes “[p]olitical decentralization, minimal administration, kinrelated political behavior, social solidarity, and economic cooperation,”498 and also as a fertile
ground for bias and discrimination. The Saudi nation has been influenced and shaped by their
traditions and heritage, both the bad and the good. Saudis have inherited, along with chivalry,
courage, and generosity, tribalism (asabiyya qabaliyya), which could decimate all their other
benign cultural inheritances.499
Arab genealogists rely on a structure of descent extending back to “Adam” in order to
define the qabila, or tribe.500 The structure is based on a segmentary lineage, or a unit model
consisting of, from top down, the tribe (qabila), and then ever smaller units, such as the clan, the
extended family, and so on down to an individual’s father.501 This model can be seen in Figure 2.
To put it simply, the ego is a part of the family at the smallest and closest segment in which the
siblings stand next to each other. At the next level, the previous segment becomes part of a larger
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segment consisting of the closest cousins and their families. The segments become larger and
larger at every level.502

Figure 2. Segmentary Lineage Folk Model503
It is not unusual to find a copy of the family tree either placed on display or kept for
reference in Saudi houses.504 Such a family tree visually displays to a boy “the precise way in
502
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which he is related to his patrilineal kin and he can see the ancestors after whom he has been
named: his great grandfather, his grandfather, and his father.”505 In the modern urban context,
people are often not completely conversant with their segmentary lineage, unlike their personal
ancestries, but they know their al-qabila, as the highest segment; al-fakhid, the middle segment;
and definitely their families, the bottom segment.506
The social divisions caused by tribalism exist in different forms, but the most significant
forms are between tribesman and non-tribesman (qabila and non-qabila) or between tribesmen
from different tribes. The former (qabila member and non-qabila member) division has replaced
the traditional division of “Arab society into nomadic (bedouin) and sedentary (hadar)
populations.”507 The basis of this division is, to put it simply, the pure lineage, which leads the
qabila members to deem themselves of superior status.508 In contrast, the division between
tribesmen from different tribes results from loyalty to one’s tribe as well as taking pride in one’s
tribe.509
c. Religious Differences
Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country, as stated in First Article of the Basic Law of
Governance.510 The majority of the population are Sunnis, whereas the Shiite population makes
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up 5 to 10 percent of the whole population.511 Sufism is a minority that also exists in the Hejaz
region.512 Within the Sunnis a division exists between the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence
(madhãhib): the Maliki, the Hanafi, the Shafiʿi, and the Hanbali.513 It is worth noting that there is
no article of the Basic Law of Governance that defines the school of jurisprudence (madh'hab) or
the religious sect of the country.514
Regional differences add more complexity to this aspect of the culture. The overlap
between the religious differences and regional differences can be seen more clearly in the fact that
the religious differences exist in certain regions.515 Sufism, for instance, exists mainly in the
Hejaz, and the Shiite population live in the eastern region and tend to inhabit certain cities.516 On
the other hand, madhãhib differences seem to be regional, but are not as distinctive and obvious
as the sectarian differences.517
With the rapidly increasing mobilization of the population, it has become more ambiguous
whether these religious distinctions have begun to lose their importance or not;518 that is to say,
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the regional or tribal differences may overcome or undermine the religious differences.
Furthermore, the madhãhib differences have also begun to lose their significance, which can be
seen in the appointment to the Council of Senior Scholars (Majlis Hay’at Kibar Al-Ūlama) of
members who adopt schools of jurisprudence other than the Hanbli.519
d. Nationality Differences
Saudi Arabia is a country that has one of the largest numbers of foreign workers, with
more than six million foreign workers living in it.520 Like its neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia
has employed a huge number of foreign laborers due to a lack of local laborers.521 Thus, the
foreign workforce plays a crucial role in the Saudi economy. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has
managed to keep the number of foreigners in the workforce lower than in many of the other Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries.522
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The great number of foreigners and the need for their labor do not seem to have eased
Saudi xenophobia. As in many other cultures, the relationship between Saudis and their foreign
workers cannot be characterized as warm, and this can be attributed to religious, cultural, and
language differences,523 but above all to Saudi Arabia’s long period of isolation, as noted
above.524 This isolation has created a highly secretive society in which individuals trust their
families and tribes rather than outsiders.525
Moreover, economic aspects also play a significant role in shaping the strained
relationship between Saudis and foreign workers. The imposition of the expatriate income tax in
1988, for example, led to the resignation of a number of foreigners.526 This was perceived by
Saudis as foreign workers’ refusal to contribute to or sacrifice for the common good of the
country. From their perspective, the Saudis argue that foreigners have access to a number of free
and subsidized services, which has created an unjust situation.527 In general, the dislike can be
described as mutual, and even worse, the foreigners themselves dislike each other.528 “The Saudis
and their Western [and other foreigners] work force coexisted in a state of tension that was not the
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result of ill will on the part of either, but rather resulted from a combination of Saudi insecurities
and Western insensitivities.”529
C. The Application of Social Psychology to Saudi Arabian Society
1. Ibn Khaldun’s Analysis
In the Muqaddimah (the “Introduction”), Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), an
Islamic historian who lived in North Africa, provided a theoretical framework that sought to
illustrate relevant group dynamics. The importance of this work is that it explains the character of
tribal psychology within a general analysis that begins with the establishment of a state, continues
through its growth and prosperity, and ends finally with its breakdown.
Ibn Khaldun initially argued that Bedouins and sedentary people are both natural groups.
Yet the lifestyles these different groups adopt result in differences of conditions among them.530
As a result, people form social organizations in order to cooperate in making their living, starting
with the essential necessities of life.531 In time, people eventually improve their conditions,
increase their wealth, and reach a state of more comfort than before, and even one that is more
comfortable than what they essentially need, which results in a shift in the cooperation toward
secondary needs rather than primary needs.532 This leads Ibn Khaldun to conclude that sedentary
peoples emerged after the Bedouins, which means that the desert was the basis and the source of
civilization.533
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Ibn Khaldun then asserts that the existence of an effective and distinguished leader is a
precondition for the success of any group.534 Such a leader can either rule through commands or
with the support of a group feeling that induces others to obey him.535 The second method, the
support of the group, leads to asabiyya—a term for which it is hard to find a translation that
reflect[s] the real significance and dynamism of asabiyya as meant by Ibn Khaldun. This
has led some writers to use the Arabic term as it is, while others tended to use synonyms
such as the “sense of solidarity”, “group feeling”, “group loyalty”, and “esprit de corps”.
This may reflect in different circumstances various connotations like faithfulness to the
group, will for defense, internal unity, common will for power, or the group itself.536
For Ibn Khaldun, asabiyya is a cornerstone of the dynamic human quality which
“produces the ability to defend oneself, to offer opposition, to protect oneself, and to press one’s
claims,” as without asabiyya, no one could do any of these things.537 Aware of Islam’s
condemnation of and firm opposition to asabiyya,538 Ibn Khaldun, in order to preserve his
theoretical approach, sought to find a meeting place between Islamic principles and asabiyya.539
Ibn Khaldun emphasized that there is a strong causal relationship between Badawa
(primitive culture) and asabiyya because people in a primitive culture rely on asabiyya to survive
the rough life of the desert.540 In his view, the strength of the tribal unity depends on purity of
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lineage and common descent.541 Thus, pure Bedouins maintained an untainted and pure lineage
when they isolated themselves by living in the desert.542 Furthermore, asabiyya can be of different
types, such as wala (clientship) or hilf (alliance),543 yet silat al-rahim (blood ties) are supreme
above the other kinds since they are something natural among almost all human beings. Such ties
motivate affection for one’s blood relatives and a desire that no harm come to them.544
2. Power and Corruption
Human beings are considered to be hierarchical animals, a facet of human behavior which
can be observed and noticed clearly across cultures, even though cultures vary greatly in their
level of hierarchy.545 Within the hierarchical relationship, the restrictions of autonomy and
obedience are imposed on both powerful and less powerful individuals.546 Though less powerful
individuals are subject to more restrictions and must demonstrate more obedience, powerful
individuals must follow the strictures of their role in the society and fulfill its demands and
obligations also if they wish to remain in power.547
Thus, power plays a significant role in many aspects of human life. More particularly, a
discussion of corruption and dishonesty highlights the role of power captured by Lord Acton’s
well-known saying that “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This
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quote not only summarizes the conclusion of scholarly studies and research, but also highlights
the layperson’s understanding of power and hierarchy.548
Generally, the findings of a number of studies on power have shown that power is
associated with unethical behavior and decision making.549 Specifically, empirical studies indicate
“that powerful individuals and members of powerful groups differ from powerless individuals and
members of powerless groups with regard to (a) how they perceive and judge others, (b) how they
are evaluated as targets, and (c) how they behave.”550
In term of judgement, powerful individuals and groups are more likely than powerless
individuals and groups to negatively evaluate the out-group, and consequently they show more ingroup bias, leading the dominant group members to exercise more discrimination against
subordinate out-group members than vice versa.551 A number of studies provide support for this
view. Guimond et al., in examining the relationship between social positions, social dominance
orientation (SDO),552 and prejudice, found that when an individual is assigned a powerful
position, this increases her social dominance orientation, causing her ultimately to show more
prejudice against lower status groups.553 Social power has also been positively associated with
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reliance on stereotype,554 leading to a favoring of powerful in-group members when distributing
rewards.555 This can be attributed to the likelihood that “high power individuals indeed apply the
out-group homogeneity bias to a greater extent than individuals belonging to a group with little
power.”556 Those in power, thus, “may be motivated to neglect or oppress their subordinates in
order to maintain the status quo … [and] to legitimate their privileged position.”557
Power also affects the way that powerful individuals and groups are perceived and
evaluated. While powerful individuals and groups tend to evaluate other individuals and groups
negatively, as noted, they are evaluated positively, as people attribute more positive
characteristics and less negative characteristics to powerful individuals and groups than they do to
powerless individuals and groups.558 Though the reason behind this is unclear, system
justification theorists suggest that individuals tend to attribute positive characteristics to powerful
groups in order to defend and rationalize the social system.559 As a target, powerful individuals
and groups, then, are subject to less stereotyping.
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Lastly, power affects the way individuals act. The approach inhibition theory of power,
which deals with power’s influence on behavior, distinguishes between the behavior of high
power and low power individuals.560 According to this theory, power triggers “approach-related
processes” for two main reasons.561 Firstly, power is associated with resources—material,
financial, and social resources—by which powerful individuals are surrounded.562 Secondly,
power is associated with the awareness that an individual can act on her dispositions with less
social restrictions.563 “Acting within reward-rich environments and being unconstrained by
others’ evaluations or the consequences of one’s actions, people with elevated power should be
disposed to elevated levels of approach-related affect, cognition, and behavior.” Conversely, lack
of power is correlated with inhibition, which means that low power individuals have a limited
access to resources and are more attentive to the evaluation and restrictions of others and society,
making them more vulnerable to threats and punishments.564
According to the approach inhibition theory, powerful individuals are more sensitive to
material and social rewards, consider others as means to satisfy their goals and targets, adopt a
systematic way of processing information, act on their dispositions with less consideration of
social restrictions, and transgress those restrictions.565 Conversely, less powerful individuals are
more attentive to punishments and threats, perceive themselves as a means to others’ goals and
ends, adopt a controlled and complex way of processing information, act and behave in
accordance with social norms, and adopt an inhibited manner.566
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In light of this, the activation of the behavioral approach system can offer a link between
power and corruption. Powerful individuals’ sensitivity to and focus on rewards rather than
punishments, coupled with the elimination of restrictions that can be imposed on their behavior,
lead them to seek after their self-interested ends, disregarding limitations that would inhibit the
pursuit of self-interest.567 The result of this is “increased risk-seeking and unethical behavior
among the powerful, … both of which indicate an enhanced propensity for dishonesty and
corruption.”568
Further, the focus on self-interest and ends may affect the perception of justice and
consequently “how justice criteria are prioritized.”569 Knowing that powerful individuals tend to
emphasize ends rather than means may lead to a greater focus on distributive justice and the
elimination of the significance of procedural justice. Within the different criteria of distributive
justice, equity is mostly adopted in pursuing productivity goals.570 Consequently, the powerful
may tend to adopt the equity form of distributive justice rather than equality or need, even when
others believe the latter forms are appropriate.571 Consider the situation where the powerful adopt
equity criteria, believing those criteria to be just, to assign employee benefits or other resources.
In such a case, less powerful individuals are likely to suspect that allocating these resources via
equity occurs due to corrupt acts that seek to benefit those favored by the powerful.572
On the other hand, power may decrease the resistance of less powerful individuals to
corrupt practices. Due to the behavioral inhibition system, less powerful individuals are more
likely to be attentive to punishments and threats and to perceive themselves as a means to others’
567
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goals and ends, leading them to adopt a conforming approach.573 This also may explain the
frequent and undeterred attempts of powerful individuals to influence less powerful individuals’
behaviors and acts.574 The reduced resistance may also be attributed to less powerful individuals’
positive perception of the powerful enhanced by the system justification mechanism which the
former may adopt.
We have focused on the individual level, but what is the relationship between power and
corrupt behaviors at the organizational level and the ideological level generally? Among the
power theories, it seems that the Social Dominance Theory (SDT) can offer an explanation for
that.575 It also provides an explanation for favoritism behaviors between groups and individuals.
The theory aims at identifying the processes of social psychology that establish and maintain
group-based social hierarchy.576 It distinguishes between the dominant groups, controlling a
disproportionately large amount of valued resources, and subordinated groups, possessing a
“disproportionately large share of negative social values.”577
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In essence, SDT proposes that the human tendency toward group-based hierarchy
contributes to group conflicts and oppression.578 Legitimizing myths579 influence such tendencies
toward group-based hierarchy and may take the form of hierarchy-enhancing myths, i.e.,
promoting group-based inequality, or hierarchy-attenuating myths, i.e., promoting group-based
equality. To an extent, what influences an individual’s endorsement of either form of legitimizing
myths is her psychological orientation toward group-based social hierarchy (i.e., her Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO)).580 Accordingly, individuals higher in SDO are likely to adopt the
belief that societies are fundamentally stratified and that those at the top of the stratification
deserve to be in the dominant position, whereas those at the bottom of the hierarchy deserve to be
in the subordinate position.581 Conversely, individuals lower in SDO are likely to adopt
egalitarian ideologies and endorse group-based equality.582
Thus, SDT suggests that a greater endorsement of SDO is derived from high status and
dominant members attached to their own group, rather than low status and subordinate groups.583
This seems to be in line with other studies suggesting that powerful individuals and groups desire
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to defend and maintain their power and the status quo.584 To justify and maintain power and the
status quo, powerful individuals and groups may rely on information confirming stereotype-based
expectations, such as the incompetence or laziness of outgroups and individuals.585
As noted above, a number of studies have linked SDO to prejudice and discriminatory
behaviors. For instance, SDO has been identified as a factor that increases prejudice against
disadvantaged and minority groups, in addition to increasing “the tendency to allocate fewer
economic resources to ethnic outgroups compared to ethnic ingroups, even if doing so can lower
the absolute profit of the ingroup.”586 To explain more clearly, dominant groups may exercise
favoritism toward their in-groups, yet subordinate groups may exercise out-group favoritism
toward the dominant groups rather than toward their own in-groups.587 In this situation, thus,
subordinate groups’ members shift from being an object of discrimination to being active
participants in the process.588
Since individuals with high SDO are less aware of losses and harms associated with their
behaviors and feel entitled to exercise power to obtain resources and positive social value for their
groups or themselves, they are less likely to recognize that their behaviors or acts involve a
misuse of power in order to gain personal or organizational benefits.589 They are more prone to
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use moral disengagement to frame their actions and attitudes as less harmful and to diminish their
own sense of guilt or responsibility.590 On the other hand, motivated to show loyalty to be in a
dominant position benefiting from positive social values associated with the position, the
members of subordinate groups are more likely to engage in corrupt practices rather than
challenging them.591
At the organizational and ideological level, studies have found a positive association
between the level of corruption and the endorsement of hierarchy and power inequality.592 That is,
a high level of corruption is found in cultures that tend to endorse hierarchy and power inequality
(SDO). Moreover, the more vertical that hierarchical social structures are, the more prone they are
to corruption.593 In order to provide an explanation for the previous relationship, the gap between
the factor (hierarchy) and the result (corruption) has to be filled.
Building on the previous discussion, it has been shown that 1) high SDO individuals
endorse group-based hierarchy 2) through legitimizing myths. The role of the latter is critical and
central in the process by mediating the relationship between the tendency of individuals to
endorse group-based hierarchy and their awareness of corrupt behaviors at the organizational
level.594
At the organizational level, the establishment and enforcement of norms, structures, and
bureaucracy that “promote informational ambiguity and maximize organizational focus on
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dominance and advancement” reduces individuals’ awareness of corrupt practices around them.595
The support of schemas and scripts encourage a focus on efficiently accomplishing tasks rather
than thinking about what end result is achieved through such efficient activities.596 Moreover,
hierarchical structure can reduce awareness of organizational corruption by facilitating the
diffusion and normalization of practices and values that promote “inequality, dominance,
favoritism, and the misuse of power or positions.”597
To illustrate the role of legitimatizing myths, we may consider the practice of guanxi
discussed above. One of the norms promoted by guanxi is gift-giving, a practice that aims at
exhibiting honor, respect, and gratitude.598 Such a practice creates and establishes a cultural norm
and script that may lead eventually to organizational corruption or nepotism.599 In a similar vein,
wasta involves cultural scripts and norms on which individuals rely to overcome bureaucracy and
routines. However, following these scripts and norms, individuals may easily and without full
awareness come close to committing bribery, abuse of power, or even influence peddling. On the
other hand, informational ambiguity facilitates the practice of wasta or other corrupt practices by
creating an ambiguous situation in which a person may argue easily that no harm or violation of
rules has taken place. Even if that happens, i.e., even when there is knowledge of a violation of
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rules or harm, an individual may resort to moral disengagement600 as a type of legitimizing myth
or rationalization allowing her to restructure such an act so that it appears harmless or to place the
responsibility on others and consequently eliminate the sense of guilt.601
3. Corruption and the Role of Intergroup Bias and the Culture of Collectivism
Bias, as a term, covers a scope of intergroup orientations encompassing “beliefs about the
traits and characteristics of groups, or individuals by virtue of their group membership, as well as
unfair evaluative, affective, or behavioral responses to groups and their members.”602 Generally,
these types of bias can be linked to stereotypes (overgeneralized beliefs), discrimination (biased
behaviors), and prejudice (biased attitudes).603 Broadly, bias can be defined as “an unfair
evaluative, emotional, cognitive, or behavioral response toward another group in ways that
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devalue or disadvantage the other group and its members either directly or indirectly by valuing
or privileging members of one’s own group.”604
A large number of studies show that the perception of in-groups differs from the
perception of out-groups in several aspects. The most highlighted difference appears in the
“tendency to evaluate the in-groups more favorably than out-groups.”605 This phenomenon, which
may take different forms, is what is referred to as in-group bias. One of the forms that in-group
bias may take is the evaluation of the efforts of in-groups “as superior to the efforts of outgroups.606 Another form is the tendency to treat the members of in-groups more favorably than
the members of out-groups.607
Essentially, human beings are social animals, which implies that group living is a
significant aspect of their lives. Since the activities of human beings are by and large rooted in
interdependence, group living constitutes a survival strategy. Through the cooperation between
the members of groups, group systems provide significant survival benefits over other systems
that lack “reciprocally positive social relations.”608 However, trust is a fundamental element in
deciding whether to share resources with nonrelatives to benefit from them, since “the ultimate
benefit for the provider depends on others’ willingness to reciprocate.”609
To accomplish this, group boundaries and social categories establish the foundation for
achieving the advantages of cooperative interdependence. Thus, in-group membership can be
considered as a form of conditional cooperation that eliminates the risk of non-reciprocation by
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restricting the cooperation to in-group members.610 In light of this, in-groups “can be defined as
bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence and
cooperation.”611 Group boundaries, whether they are based on culture, race, or other bases,
ultimately serve the purpose of distinguishing who is “in” and who is “out.”612
Categorization has profound consequences that manifest in behavioral orientations toward
other individuals and groups. As to behavioral outcomes and social relations, cooperation and
trust is extended to in-group members rather than out-group members.613 Further, positive forms
of social behavior are more likely to be displayed between in-group members.614 When deciding
whether to share scarce resources with in-group members, individuals are more likely to exercise
personal restraint over scarce resources which they share with in-group members and tend to be
more generous in their reward distribution to in-group members rather than to out-group
members.615 Additionally, “empathy for a person in need of assistance is more strongly predictive
of helping behavior when that target is an in-group member than an out-group member.”616 Thus,
individuals tend to provide more help to in-group members rather than to out-group members.617
Though it plays a fundamental role in intergroup bias, social categorization is not the sole
cause of it. Different researchers on intergroup bias have provided different explanations.
Competition has been highlighted as a main cause of intergroup conflict and has been adopted by
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a number of theories. Realistic group conflict theory proposes that the perception of competition
over scarce resources generates attempts to limit the access of out-groups to such resources.618
Sherif posited that win-lose competition between groups produces positive outcomes for the ingroup and negative outcomes for out-groups.619 What must be noted is that this theory emphasizes
the perception of competition rather than actual and explicit competition.620
Furthermore, a number of studies point to the feeling of interdependence on the in-group
as a cause of intergroup bias. The behavioral interaction model, for instance, proposes that
dependence on in-group members by itself is sufficient to stimulate intergroup biases, and thus
the more dependence, the more intergroup bias.621 In a similar vein, Gaertner and Insko showed
that individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of their in-group members when there is
an outcome dependency.622
The instrumental model of group conflict, built on the framework of realistic group
conflict theory, proposes that resource stress coupled with the awareness of potential competition
from outgroups generates a perception of other groups competing for resources. 623 The perception
of competition takes the form of zero-sum beliefs—beliefs that when the other groups obtain
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more resources, this decreases the resources available for an individual’s own group. Such
perceived competition then produces strategic attempts to remove the source of competition.624
Those attempts may take the form of discrimination, outgroup derogation, or avoidance of other
groups.625 A number of factors play a significant role in determining the degree of perceived
resource stress, including, inter alia, the scarcity of resources and the desire for the unequal
distribution of resources.626
Other studies opt to emphasize the role of collective identity. Influenced by such
perspectives, social identity theory (hereinafter SIT) examines the effect of collective identity on
intergroup relations. Essentially, SIT posits that individuals possess a strong desire to maintain or
enhance the personal and the social identity that is entwined with in-group membership. The
members of an in-group distinguish themselves positively from members of out-groups.627 Such
an “evaluation of one's own group is determined with reference to specific other groups through
social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics.”628 The distinction of
social groups then creates what is known as the “we” v. “they” concept, which leads ultimately to
favoring members of the in-group to satisfy social identity and the need for positive selfesteem.629
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It follows that conformity to in-group norms can aggravate bias. The decision of
individuals to distribute rewards and resources is influenced by in-group norms. Jetten et al.
found that the norms of the in-groups influenced members’ behaviors, making them favor their
own group more and show more discrimination to those outside of the group.630 That is, if ingroup members discriminate against others, other in-group members will conform as well, so that
they fit the in-group norms. The research also showed that these norms can change discrimination
strategies.631 The members of groups tend to conform to what the other members are doing, even
as regards discrimination.632 The study also discusses how in-group norms change in-group biases
and actions.633 These norms moderate biases from the group, so the other members will follow the
ideals of the rest of the group.634
Thus, the allocation of resources and rewards constitutes the intersection between
intergroup bias and corruption. Fundamentally, corruption refers to an abuse of power for private
benefit where the object of the abuse of power is the allocation of resources and rewards.
Intergroup bias involves the allocation of resources favorably for in-group members, suggesting
that favoring in-group members constitutes utilitarian behavior which maximizes the resources
and rewards of the in-group. On the other hand, intergroup bias influences the perception of
corrupt practices and those who commit such practices.
There are certain factors that play a significant role in intergroup bias which deserve to be
highlighted because of their relevance both to Saudi society and to corruption. Status is
considered one of the moderators determining the level of intergroup bias. Generally, high-status
630
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groups are more likely to exhibit bias toward low-status groups.635 Nevertheless, if such status is
perceived as illegitimate, low-status groups tend to show more bias than high-status groups.636 In
the same vein, power determines the level of bias. When power is associated with high status,
members of such groups tend to be more discriminatory, even if they are members of a numerical
minority.637
In light of this, it can be argued that members of powerful and high-status groups tend to
favor their in-groups in their allocation of resources and rewards. Thus, status and power can fuel
corruption, as will be explained in the next section, by the favorably allocating resources to
members of the in-group. This can be seen in the real world where certain groups of people
dominate the top tiers of hierarchies and perform the job of gatekeepers in order defend the
existing social structure that benefits them.
The other factor that influences the level of intergroup bias is represented in the perception
of threats. “Threat can be perceived in terms of the in-group’s social identity, its goals and
values, its position in the hierarchy, even its existence.”638 A threat can be tangible, as in the case
of competing over limited resources, or it can be symbolic, as in the case of protecting the values
or traditions of the in-group.639 Essentially, realistic group conflict theory posits that conflict of
interest between different groups is the basis of discrimination and prejudice.640 One of the
premises of this theory is that “the greater the intergroup threat and conflict, the more hostility is
635
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expressed toward the source of the threat.”641 In accordance with SIT, it was also found that ingroup bias is exhibited more when a threat to the distinctiveness of the group is perceived.642
Groups in Saudi Arabia, therefore, may exercise and show more in-group bias to protect
their identity, as seen in scenarios involving tribalism or regionalism. The competition over scarce
resources and behavior showing in-group bias can be seen explicitly between Saudis and
foreigners, though it may also exist between different groups. As an example of the effect of
feeling threatened, consider the racist attitudes exhibited by the skilled blue-collar workers in the
United States and Britain who are “most vulnerable to competition from other (e.g., immigrant)
groups and thus feel most threatened and fraternalistically most deprived.”643 Another example of
the role of a sense of threat is manifested in hate crimes and xenophobia against other groups,
mainly minorities. When a high influx of immigrant minorities is associated with an unsteady
economic situation, the perception of threat and the incidence of violence are escalated, and this
can be exacerbated by far-right political leaders.644
In line with the interdependence of the in-group, reciprocity represents an influential
factor in intergroup bias. The hypothesis of in-group reciprocity proposes that in-group favoritism
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in reward allocation in the minimal group paradigm constitutes utilitarian behavior aiming at
increasing economic self-interest.645 Specifically, “category members follow a norm of reciprocity
and exchange favorable allocations with [in-group] members.”646 Accordingly, Yamagishi et al.
found that “subjects in MGEs [minimal group effects] do not practice [in-group] favoritism in
reward allocation unless they expect similar favorable treatment from [in-group] members.”647
Building on the distinction between “restricted exchange” and “generalized exchange”,648
Yamagishi et al. noted that when a favor is provided to a member of in-group, reciprocation of
such a favor is expected from any member of the in-group, and not directly and particularly from
the same member for whom the favor was performed.649 Thus, the reciprocation of such favors is
diffuse; it is not restricted to mutual exchange between particular dyads (“restricted exchange”),
but rather takes the form of multilateral and indirect exchange (“generalized exchange”).650
Reciprocation aiming at enhancing the economic self-interest is also an essential factor in
corruption, both in interpersonal corrupt practices and in practices involving the abuse of power.
As will be explained in Chapter 5, individuals are “aware of the fact that certain behavior (e.g.,
corrupt cooperation) in the present might lead to positive outcomes in the future (e.g., reciprocal
payback).”651
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For those committing corrupt practices, norms, as explained above, influence the
perception of such actions. Following the “black sheep effect,” in-group members whose
attributes (i.e. behaviors, attitudes, etc.) are inconsistent with in-group norms are judged more
negatively than normative in-group members and even more negatively than are members of outgroups.652 Such derogation of non-normative members of the in-group can be seen as “a
cognitive-motivational strategy to purge from the group those [in-group] members who negatively
contribute to social identity.”653 However, if the leader of the group behaves in a socially
undesirable way, the situation may differ. De Moura and Abrams found that “transgressors were
judged less punitively if they were [in-group] leaders than [in-group] members, outgroup
members, or outgroup leaders.”654
Having discussed the nature and origins of intergroup bias, we turn to the roles and the
forms it takes in different cultures. Cultures can be divided into two main categories: individualist
and collectivist cultures. In individualist cultures, “attitudes, beliefs, definitions, norms, values,
and other elements of subjective cultures … are centered on the individual.”655 The situation is
different in the collectivist cultures, where these elements “are centered on the ingroup.”656 Four
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main attributes distinguish the two cultures: “(a) how individuals perceive themselves, (b) how
they relate to others, (c) the goals they follow, and (d) what concerns drive their behavior.”657
In collectivist cultures, individuals tend to identify themselves “as interdependent with an
ingroup” (which can be a family, tribe, region, etc.); social relationships are characterized as
communal rather than individual; communal or group goals are prioritized over individual goals;
and norms, duties, and obligations strongly guide and predict social behaviors.658 Thus, “the
major gap for collectivists occurs between [in-group] and [out-group], [i.e. we and they]; the
major gap for individualists occurs between self and others, [i.e. I and others].”659
Thus, “obedience, conformity, acquiescence and loyalty” are essential elements of
collectivist cultures, and these play a significant role in the thriving of corruption and the decline
of whistle-blowing roles.660 Further, individuals in collectivist cultures tend to violate the rules,
especially if they come in conflict with the traditionally established norms.661 Notably, individuals
in collectivist cultures consider loyalty to the group as an ethical standard which leads them to be
“more likely to seek consensus and [they] might be more prone to nepotism because networks of
friends and family tend to create loyal relationships that encourage [favoritism].”662
Nevertheless, collectivist cultures are not all the same; there is a further distinction among
these cultures which also applies to the individualist cultures. Depending on whether the culture
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emphasizes hierarchy or equality, the culture can be described as vertical or horizontal.663 If the
culture’s emphasis is on hierarchy, it can be described as vertical, whether it is individualist or
collectivist, whereas if the culture’s emphasis is on equality, this society is then characterized as
horizontal, whether it is individualist or collectivist.
In the vertical collectivist cultures, which include Saudi Arabia, members are not
perceived as equal; rather, some members are considered more important than others.
Consequently, obedience to the authorities and sacrifices for the group are valued, or even
required.664 On the other hand, horizontal collectivist cultures place the emphasis on equality,
where members of the group are perceived as equal.665
Both vertical and horizontal collectivist cultures tend to maintain group harmony, but this
tendency is more emphasized and obvious in the vertical collectivist cultures. This implies that
individuals will be guided by the norms of their groups and act in accordance with “what is
expected of them.”666 Though both vertical and horizontal collectivist cultures share a similar
character, in vertical collectivist cultures, the tendency toward nepotism, favoritism, and
deception is higher than in horizontal collectivist cultures.667
CONCLUSION
This chapter began by exploring the nexus between societies and corruption. This nexus
necessitated providing the reader with some background on Saudi history, culture, and society, in
addition to brief review of corruption in Saudi Arabia. The chapter ended by exploring Ibn
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Khaldun’s discussion of asabiyya as a sociological analysis relevant to corruption and Saudi
culture. From the social psychological perspective, this chapter has sought to highlight the
impact of power and intergroup bias on corrupt behaviors and acts. This chapter has aimed to lay
a sufficient foundation for the following chapter, which addresses the practice of wasta.
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CHAPTER FIVE: WASTA IN SAUDI ARABIA
INTRODUCTION
To this point, it has been shown that corrupt practices may not only take different forms,
they are also contextual. Consequently, cultures and regions may vary in their perceptions of
those practices, for what is good in the East may not be perceived the same way in the West. In
fact, within the same area such different perspectives may exist. This applies to the practice of
wasta, a practice has been recognized by the Nazaha as the most prevalent corrupt practice in
Saudi Arabia.
Wasta generally refers to an act of favoritism on any basis, whether that of race, region,
religion, tribe, or family. In this chapter, wasta will be defined and a comprehensive explanation
will be provided. This chapter will also shed light on the background and evaluation of wasta in
Saudi Arabia. Since the practice of wasta can be categorized as a form of informal influence
processes that exist in a number of countries around the world, wasta will be distinguished from
other similar practices. Finally, wasta will be examined from a legal and a moral perspective.
A. Wasta and Similar Concepts
Wasta is an Arabic word that is often loosely translated as “nepotism,” but in fact the
meaning of the word is somewhat wider than that. Wasta, in contemporary Arab societies, is
generally an act of favoritism. Yet such a characterization may not be accurate since wasta, as
will be explained, requires mutual interdependence and reciprocity in most cases, i.e., an
expectation of quid pro quo, which may be immediate or may remain in the future -- features
which favoritism may lack.668
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Wasta, or wasata in general, in Arabic means essentially “the middle” and is related to the
verb yatawassat, which means a compromise between the needs of two conflicting parties in
order to reach a middle ground.669 A distinction is made in classical Arabic between wasata,
which refers to the act itself, and wasta or wasit, which refers to the person carrying out the act;
despite this distinction, wasta is commonly used in contemporary spoken Arabic to refer to both
the act and the person carrying it out.670
Defining wasta creates some difficulties, and probably Justice Stewart’s famous phrase, “I
know it when I see it,” is applicable to wasta. Wasta can be defined as “the intervention of a
patron in favor of a client in an attempt to obtain privileges or resources through a third party.”671
Others suggest that wasta is an implicit social contract between members of a group, mainly tribal
groups, which imposes certain kinds of obligation upon the group members to provide favorable
treatment.672
The role of wasta creates another distinction. Wasta may serve the purpose of mediation
or intercession. Wasta as mediation involves a family intervention to solve a conflict between one
of a family’s members and a member of another family. Mediation also can be conducted by a
third party. The reliance on mediation, a trait intrinsic to Arab societies, can explain the hesitance
of individuals to rely on government officials to resolve their issues. Judges, influenced by this
trait, still frequently urge and prefer mediation rather than issuing a judgment.673 Historically,
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even the central authorities, which have included the Ottoman Empire and various occupiers,
refrained from imposing full control over the tribes and opted to give them more independence in
the area of settling disputes.674
The other role played by wasta is one of intercession, in which individuals utilize wasta to
gain advantages and seek benefits from the government. With the rapid development and increase
of the size of government, wasta as a form of intercession has become more notable. In this role,
wasta departs from the impartiality and neutrality that can be found in its role as mediation, where
a person serves the benefits of both parties. In contrast, in wasta as intercession, a person is acting
as a patron of, rather than as a mediator for, a client aiming at securing a benefit or advantage
from a third party.
In contemporary Arab societies, wasta rests on family loyalty as the foundation of its
existence, and thrives, since family performs the traditional role of intervening to solve
difficulties or to obtain a benefit of any kind.675 Though blood relationships (i.e., the family
unit)676 remain the cornerstone of loyalty within which wasta plays a twofold role—to show
loyalty and to enhance family ties and relationships—other loyalties based on membership in
various groups, whether ethnic, religious, regional, or even political, may facilitate the use of
wasta. Thus, wasta may not be only an act of nepotism, but may also extend to include others
such as close friends, and may eventually become cronyism.677
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Wasta may also extend beyond such groups to serve the stranger who is willing to pay for
such a service.678 In such a case, a wasta or wasit receives a sum of money to utilize his influence
or connections to secure benefits for another. An “expediter” (mueaqqib), for example, can be
contacted by a total stranger who offers a sum of money to receive certain government services, a
passport, or any of several different kinds of licenses. However, this is not always the case; in
some circumstances, a wasta or wasit becomes a middleman in bribery transactions. Since Arab
culture is heavily regulated by personal relationships and personal loyalty, the role of the
middleman in a legal or illegal transaction is fundamental.
At this point, the use of wasta may fall into one of three categories. First, wasta is sought
to obtain an advantage for a family member or for a member of one’s tribe. Second, wasta is
sought to gain benefits for a friend outside the family or tribal unit. Third, wasta is sought by a
stranger with whom there is no kinship or friendship. The first two categories are relevant to the
issue under discussion, while the third category must be distinguished in some ways from the
previous two scenarios. In the first scenario, the wasit will fall into one of the first two categories,
which makes it partly relevant to the issue, unlike the third scenario, which does not fall
completely within the category of wasta due to the financial incentives involved.
As explained in Chapter 2, shafa’ah is the term used in Islamic jurisprudence to refer to
wasta. However, the approved and legal form of shafa’ah or wasta is contrary to the
contemporary form of wasta. The permissible shafa’ah was fundamentally aimed at supporting
solidarity for the whole society (takaful al Ijtima’i), which is not the same as the contemporary
form of wasta. Aspects of Islam work to promote social solidarity: a “strong emphasis on social
it from cronyism. While cronyistic obligations do not pass through different generations,
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cohesion, charity, social justice, collective responsibility for the welfare of society, the legitimate
claims of the weak upon community, and the duty to help the poor and strangers at all times and
regardless of economic and social circumstances.”679 Though wasta helps to enhance social
solidarity, it does so between a smaller group of individuals and with a clear emphasis on
economic and social circumstances.680
Having explained briefly the concept and the practice of wasta, we should note that
similar practices and concepts have existed in different societies around the globe. Guanxi is a
similar concept in China, as is jeitinho in Brazil, and sv'ázi thrives in Russia, while “pulling
strings” is still recognized in Britain. These concepts and practices definitely share some similar
characteristics, though they exist in different societies and cultures.
Guanxi literally means connections, relations, or relationships. Generally, guanxi is “an
indigenous Chinese construct” that is defined as “an informal, particularistic personal connection
between two individuals who are bound by an implicit psychological contract to follow the social
norms of guanxi such as maintaining a long-term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and
obligation.”681 A distinction must be made between the existence of guanxi and the practice of
guanxi in the context of Chinese society. While the existence of guanxi depends on personal
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relationships and human sentiments, the practice of guanxi involves the utilization of these
relationships to make exchanges or generally to obtain advantages.682
The existence of guanxi requires a relatively low threshold, which is a familiarity between
two individuals resulting from past interactions. However, special guanxi requires personal
relationships which involve sentiment and obligation.683 Rather than demographic or personal
similarities, guanxi is based on specific social institutions, kinships, or regions, or sharing the
same alma mater or work unit.684 Accordingly, and similar to Arabs, Chinese people categorize
others within three categories, moving from the closest ties to the most distant: family, familiar
people, and strangers.685
Guanxi and wasta both depend heavily on the trust between parties, which derives from
long-standing relationships. In both Arab and Chinese cultures, the family is fundamental. Such
an importance imposes on the individual the obligation to maintain the honor of the family and to
be loyal to its members.686 Both cultures place an emphasis on reciprocal obligations, leading to
the reciprocal relationships that are essential for guanxi and wasta to exist and thrive.687
The dichotomy may be observed in how each society considers and perceives these
practices. The Chinese are able to distinguish good guanxi from bad guanxi or other corrupt
practices. Consequently, they primarily perceive and consider guanxi to be a positive aspect of
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interpersonal relationships.688 In contrast, the Arab societies still view wasta suspiciously. Despite
the classifications of shafa’ah in Islamic jurisprudence, which fundamentally shapes Arab
societies, wasta is still widely practiced even though individuals in these societies tend to
associate wasta with corruption and to perceive wasta negatively.689
Another similar practice existing in Brazil is called jeitinho, which literally means a “little
way out”; the term “refers to creative ingenuity in rapidly achieving short-term solutions to
problems.”690 The application of jeitinho, then, can be a way to avoid bureaucratic boundaries and
rules or to avoid any potential difficulty with higher-level officials within a strictly hierarchical
system.691
Barbosa placed jeitinho in the middle of a spectrum between two extremes, with a favorlike action at the positive end of the spectrum and corruption at the negative end.692 Accordingly,
he distinguished between dar um jeitinho (to find a way out), which aims at achieving a goal and
solving a problem, regardless of whether the way is legal or illegal, and jeitinho brasileiro (the
Brazilian way out), in which creativity is employed to deal with daily circumstances and
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situations.693 In this sense, the first form is perceived to be close to corruption, while the second is
perceived more as a part of Brazilian social life.694
In this regard, jeitinho and wasta are double-edged swords that may be used to create
social justice which privileges the individual human and natural rights instead of legal and
institutional rights.695 Thus, both are appeals to emotion, rather than to reason, employing
behavioral tactics like excuses and justifications which are “based on a personal situation that
differentiates the person asking for the jeitinho from others in society.”696 However, what
distinguishes jeitinho from both guanxi and wasta is that a long-standing relationship is required
between the parties in the latter two, but not necessarily in the former.697
Generally, the previously mentioned concepts are recognized as indigenous forms of
informal influence processes. These processes involve a reliance on informal linkages to achieve
and gain certain advantages and benefits.698 The differences appear mainly in the “emphasis on
the intensity, duration, and hierarchical nature of the relationship between the parties.”699 To
illustrate, guanxi and wasta occur within a hierarchical system and context and require longstanding emotional commitments, which is not necessary in the case of jeitinho.700 Thus, a
number of studies consider these practices to be forms of informal influence processes that are
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societally related rather than societally bound, which suggests that the variation between countries
is a matter of quantity, rather than of the distinctive qualities of certain processes701—meaning
that there are certain factors which make these processes more salient in one country than another.
Finally, based on various grounds, wasta can be distinguished from the mentoring and
networking systems adopted in Western nations. In the Western notion, the mentor is traditionally
a senior manager within the entity itself, whereas wasta is not limited within the borders of the
entity involved: in fact, it is notable that wasta is obtained from outside the entity.702 The other
major difference lies in what is provided by wasta in contrast to what is provided by the
mentoring system. For Westerners, a mentor is expected to help individuals navigate through the
system, which can be a form of coaching, counseling, or advising, whereas wasta is more along
the lines of intervening on behalf of an individual to guarantee that person certain advantages or
benefits.703
Furthermore, networking does not involve reciprocal obligations, as is the case with
wasta, since the qualifications and merits of the individual are the basis of networking, but not
always of wasta.704 Most notable is the individualistic characteristics of networking in the
Western context vs. the collectivistic characteristics of wasta in the Arab context. From the
Western perspective, networking has an individualistic character and exists primarily between
individuals. In contrast, wasta has a collectivistic character in which the family or groups are
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involved; that is, the element of dependence is more salient in the case of wasta than in the case
of networking.705
B. The Background and Evolution of Wasta in Saudi Arabia
The history of the evolution of wasta seems to be similar in the various Arab societies, but
there is no exact time period at which wasta was initiated.706 Nevertheless, old publications, such
as Ibn Khaldūn’s Intruduction to History, in which he noted the significance asabiyya and the
connections between members of a group in order to obtain a benefit or profit, inform us that the
practice of wasta or similar acts of favoritism existed and can be traced to at least the fourteenth
century. Thus, it can be said that wasta is a long-standing practice that evolved and spread
throughout Arab societies, among which was Saudi Arabia.
The goal of wasta is historically related to the two forms of wasta, the old form and the
contemporary form. The old form of wasta, which existed before the formation of the new
nations, was used to reach a solution to conflicts raised between tribes, as mentioned above; that
is, wasta was a tool through which the peace, solidarity, unity, and integrity of the tribe itself and
of the society in general was achieved and maintained. Thus, wasta was a form of social
insurance in in the past, mainly before the emergence of the new states in the second half of the
twentieth century. This is in line with Ibn Khaldūn’s analysis when he noted that asabiyya is a
necessity to overcome the rough life of the desert and its risks.707 In the Arabian Peninsula, which
was populated largely by nomadic tribes, people lived in isolation and when raids occurred
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between different tribes there were limited channels through which to solve such conflicts.708
Hence, the most effective avenue was wasta, through which tribes could live in peace and survive
the harsh environment in which they lived.
When the nation-states were formed and governments developed, a new form of wasta
emerged. Wasta shifted to be more of a means of intercession. The emphasis consequently shifted
toward the interests of the individuals constituting the tribe, rather than on enhancing tribal
status.709 The shift from the collective benefit to a relatively individual benefit was due to
modernity and and has been boosted by globalization, which imposed more competition and more
services provided by the state, resulting ultimately in more stress on Arab societies.710
Despite this shift, the welfare of the tribe and family remains a motivating factor, even if
only implicitly and subtly: wasta is used to obtain and serve individuals’ interests, but this
ultimately enhances the status of the tribe itself.711 This results from the fact that wasta was
initially used to promote a person to a position of high rank, which not only provided that
individual with benefit, but also increased the resources that the tribe had at its disposal and
enhanced their status among other tribes due to their having more people in higher positions.
Those now in higher positions are expected to do the same for their group members, and the
vicious circle goes on.
This shift in the nature of wasta from mediation to intercession created another shift in
the mechanism of wasta itself. The new mechanism diminished and altered the role of middlemen
in two main ways. First, individuals who had powerful acquaintances could go beyond the
middlemen and reach their goals directly. Second, the role of middlemen has become more
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personal, since the middlemen now tend to enhance their own status, fame, and even their
wealth.712 Thus, the new mechanism allows for a more extensive practice of wasta and less family
or tribal coordination in the prioritizing of the goals of wasta.
Basically, the differences between the old form of wasta and the contemporary form of
wasta can be narrowed down to two specific areas. First, the process of directing wasta, in the old
form, was a top-down one, as the leaders of the tribe or group obtained benefits on behalf of their
tribe or group, whereas the process in its contemporary form tends to operate from the bottom up,
where individuals seek to gain advantages for themselves initially which will benefit the group
ultimately.713 Second, the role of middlemen, which once provided the elders and leaders of the
tribe or the group with authority and high status, receded when the contemporary form of wasta
evolved.714 Consequently, wasta has become a tool for seeking advantages rather than peace, and
the wasit, the person who is performing wasta, has become a dispenser of benefits instead of
being a problem-solver.
It must be emphasized that the nature of tribal society is central to the development and
evolution of wasta. In Saudi Arabia, as discussed in Chapter 4, the role of the family and the tribe
is crucial in shaping the society and interpersonal relationships. The history of Saudi Arabia’s
consolidation is replete with events and incidents that illustrate the significance of the tribes.
Since the first Saudi state, the role of the tribe has been pivotal.715 The Banu Khalid, for instance,
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was a tribe that created difficulties for the Ottoman Empire and for the Saudi state as well. The
Sharifian family and the Rashidi family were also obvious examples of tribes that had a
significant role.716 Further, some elite and powerful tribes or figures were supported financially
and exempted from the taxes, either by the Ottoman Empire or by the British, to provide safety
for trade routes and to prevent tribal raids.717
During the consolidation period, the concept of tribal solidarity, the belief in tribes and
families as the fundamental unit of organization and identity, and the emphasis on the leading role
of tribal leaders were elements of the consolidation process. Historically, as discussed in Chapter
4, settlements were inhabited on the basis of tribal affiliation. Thus, settlements were mainly
inhabited by the members of the same tribe.
In the twenty-first century Saudi Arabia, affiliation with the tribe and the support for its
members can be seen most clearly in the elections of municipal councils. Tribalism has revived in
the process of the municipal elections and has played a significant role in the results of these
elections.718 Although it is illegal to run as a candidate based on tribalism, informal tribal
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alliances have been formed not only to win elections, but also to exclude non-tribal candidates
from an election.719
The role of tribal leaders was strong during the consolidation of Saudi Arabia, as can be
seen, for instance, in the role of Faisal Al-Dawish and Sultan ibn Bijad as leaders of the Ikhwan
movement.720 More recently, the political role and influence of tribal leaders has been weakened
with the emergence of the new technocrats and elites.721 This has not, however, undermined the
relationship between the government and some of these leaders, mainly those of the leading
tribes.722 In fact, the degree to which tribal or customary law serves as an obstacle to the
development of the legal system shows how effective the role of the tribes is. The leaders or elites
of tribes may act as arbitrators to settle internal or inter-tribal disputes. In their arbitration, they
rely on customary law, which is based on the idea that reconciliation should provide the victim
with compensation.723
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With that being said, the seed of wasta was initially planted in the system early in the
consolidation of Saudi Arabia.724 As emphasized repeatedly after the consolidation, the backbone
of the tribal system is honor, which by its nature is tightly linked with loyalty;725 that is, to be
honored, an individual must be loyal to those around him, to friends and acquaintances, but more
importantly, to members of his family and tribe. This creates a closed structure, based on family,
tribe, or blood ties generally, which is a fertile ground for wasta to flourish in. Such a closed
structure assures members within it “that their efforts are pooled for the benefit of all and that
recipients are thus predisposed to act favorably in return, a ‘tit-for-tat’ for the group.”726
Thus, it is not always the case that those performing wasta personally know the individual
who sought their services; instead, they may provide wasta as a favor to their acquaintances in
order to maintain their trust.727 Since trust and performing favors are highly regarded, those
performing wasta are semi-obligated to make the necessary efforts to provide the advantages
sought by the requestor in order to maintain that trust.728 On the other end, the person who is
performing wasta may not personally know, and need not know, the individual who has the
authority to provide the advantages or the benefits sought. Hence, if the wasta does not personally
know the individual who has the power to provide the advantages or the benefits, he will rely on
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his own network circle and acquaintances to make contact with that individual and achieve his
goal.729
In essence, then, wasta requires and involves implicitly reciprocal and cooperative
obligations presupposing the existence of a loyalty which has expanded wasta relationships to
cover other ethnic, religious, or regional groups.730 Even the political structure itself has been
influenced by this concept of loyalty, which can be seen in the government’s assignment of
educated tribal elites and their close relatives to major positions in the government in order to
gain their loyalty.731 All in all, these networks and relationships eventually lead an individual to
be dependent on rather than independent from others. The welfare and fate of a member of a
group depends heavily on the actions of other members and the network in general.732
In practice, wasta depends mainly on the group an individual is considered to be a
member of, that is, the individual’s family, tribe, village, region, or nationality. Thus, people tend
more often to identify themselves with their tribal or regional affiliation.733 Individuals from the
same group largely rely on each other by practicing wasta in order to gain certain advantages. In
this sense, individuals are defined by their family, tribe, or region, rather than by their own
achievements and qualities. Thus, “who you are” significantly influences the relationships
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between individuals and wasta.734 The relationships between individuals require a certain
familiarity between them which the answer to “who you are” provides; that is, people sharing the
same family, tribe, or region form a relationship more quickly and easily. This quick formation of
relationships assumes implicitly the existence of the loyalty which enables wasta to be practiced
and favors to be exchanged more fluently.735
Within an organizational context, a wasta can be anyone with sufficient power to
influence the behavior of others.736 The sources of such power do not always derive from a formal
position, but can also derive from a socio-economic position which has a high level of respect
from others in the society.737 Thus, people tend to build good relationships with those who are
powerful and influential in a society, since they naturally “like to be associated with those in
power.”738 Accordingly, activities individuals perform to build and establish interpersonal
connections with influential and powerful people, whether in the political, the economic, or the
social sphere, explain the networking aspect of wasta.739 The aim of these relationships with
powerful and influential people is not merely to provide for one’s immediate needs, but to prepare
for whatever exigencies may arise in the future.740
In Saudi Arabia, wasta is a deep-rooted practice in the society. Wasta can be used to
obtain a license or permit or a favorable legal ruling. The hierarchical system of power is parallel
with the similar hierarchical system of resources—that is, not everyone has the same access to the

734

Saleh Al-Harbi et al., Culture, Wasta and Perceptions of Performance Appraisal in Saudi
Arabia, 28 INT’L JOURNAL OF HUMAN RES. MGMT. (forthcoming 2017).
735
See, e.g., Al-Ramahi, supra note 724, at 36 (“[Wasta] is also a personal exchange system
between members of society that is entrenched in the tribal structure of the country.”).
736
Tlaiss & Kauser, supra note 702, at 476.
737
Id.
738
Id. at 476-77.
739
Id.
740
Id.
156

same resources; thus, the scarcer the resource that is sought, the stronger the wasta represented by
a powerful individual who has a higher rank in the hierarchal system. In this sense, though the use
of wasta is essentially to overcome a barrier, wasta itself can be a barrier in some cases. To
illustrate, resources or services can be restricted to those who have a strong wasta, despite their
merits or eligibility. It also worth noting that the frequency and intensity of using wasta varies
from one institution to another and also from one object sought to another.
In ordinary life, wasta can be sought in order to avoid burdensome bureaucratic
procedures, in recruitment or promoting, or to obtain certain services.741 In Saudi Arabia, as in
many Arab nations, wasta seems to be an effective means of dealing with weak institutions. Thus,
“the family network functions as a ‘state within a state’.”742 Nowadays, the existence and practice
of wasta cannot be denied, despite the debate about whether it is beneficial or not. It is
unfortunate that people use wasta to get things that they are entitled to by law, and that without
wasta a person may not be able to get them.743 In these situations, wasta itself acts as a barrier.
The most notable situation in which wasta is used and practiced is in recruitment or
promoting scenarios.744 The family-based nature of Saudi society means that “the prestige and
wealth of families … determine the level of power and influence, i.e. wasta, not only to position
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their members in desired jobs but to influence their career advancement as well.”745 Regional
background is another factor in the use of wasta in the recruitment or promoting process.746
Generally, wasta eliminates the merits and qualifications requirements in either recruitment or
promoting. A number of incidents have clearly demonstrated the existence and the thriving of
wasta practices in employment procedures.747
Further, individuals use wasta to obtain certain services provided mainly by the
government, most notably education and health services. Though most health services in Saudi
Arabia are provided by the government for free, access to these services is not necessarily equal.
Thus, individuals may use wasta in scheduling an appointment or even in some cases to be
admitted to see a doctor.748 Education, mainly higher education, is also an area where wasta plays
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a significant role, though the introduction of an electronic application process has reduced the
practice of wasta to some extent.749
Lastly, lengthy and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures have forced Saudis to use wasta.
In this grey area, wasta is used to overcome costly and difficult bureaucratic red tape. The dark
side to this, however, is that wasta is used by those who might not succeed if decisions were
based on individual merit.750 This can occur in obtaining a permit or license of any kind, all the
way up to winning a government contract.751 The introduction of e-government in some
governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior, has successfully reduced the number
of interventions and uses of wasta, yet some of the e-government processes remain as slow as, if
not even slower than, they were before.752
In general, this can be attributed to the absence of clear rules, which aggravates citizens’
unfamiliarity with the legal system.753 The lack of clarity is associated with the wide discretionary
powers that are vested in the hands of officials, who tend to extensively, and in some cases
inconsistently, issue regulations and procedures.754 This situation seems to be consistent with the
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characteristics of high uncertainty avoidance societies, in which individuals to some extent
become preoccupied with need for rules and regulation; the extensive promulgation of regulations
and rules leads to the existence of inconsistent, or even dysfunctional, rules.755 Eventually, this
situation leaves a wide open door for wasta to be practiced and to thrive.
C. Is Wasta an Act of Corruption? When and How? Legal or Moral?
Wasta can be perceived either as a form of corruption or as a form of networking. At
either end of the spectrum, wasta can be viewed differently. On the one hand, wasta can be
viewed as a useful means of resolving disputes. On the other hand, wasta may involve the use of
power in order to secure certain advantages, which can be perceived as corruption.756
Distinguishing between these dimensions of wasta is not an easy task. From one perspective,
wasta is viewed as a means of reducing and overcoming red tape, and therefore as legitimate,
while from another perspective, mainly that of those who do not have wasta, it is viewed as a
mere act of corruption.757 Clearly, wasta is an ambiguous practice. It can serve to enhance fairness
and help the disadvantaged, but it also inappropriately benefits family members or those who are
financially powerful. In reality, today wasta seems to be a negative term that most often refers to
corruption.758
In its origins, wasta had a more positive function; today, however, it is a pervasive
problem.759 Manifestly, wasta has some of the consequences that corrupt practices do. Although,
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as in the case of corruption, some research argues that wasta is beneficial,760 yet it is definitely
more beneficial for those who have access to it or those who are influential and powerful.761 As
noted above in regard to the consequences of corruption, wasta negatively affects economic
competition and the development of nations where it is widely practiced. Since it depends more
on connections than on merits and qualifications, wasta provides entities with unqualified
resources, which eventually affects the productivity and performance of these entities, as well as
destroying fair competition.762 In a similar vein, wasta decreases individuals’ incentives to
develop their skills or merits, since they become more dependent on wasta than on their skills or
capabilities.763
Socially, wasta, similar to corruption, leads to social inequality. To have a strong wasta,
one must already have connections, and thus “wasta may create a reinforcing cycle where the
powerful receive the resources while the weak becomes weaker.”764 Broadly speaking, wasta
provides undue advantages and benefits to certain individuals or groups rather than others, and
does not do so based on merit, and thus, rather than reinforcing social equality, wasta corrodes it.
Though this may be clearly seen in scenarios of recruitment or promotion, it can also be seen,
even if less clearly, in other domains, including the provision of services and rule of law
applications.
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Similar to what has been noted above about the consequences of corruption, wasta has a
negative legal impact. Effectively, wasta negatively affects equality before law and the equal
enforcement of the law, which eventually leads to having less effective laws.765 At a trivial level,
for instance, many violators of traffic laws who are subject to imprisonment according to the law
will be released simply because they have wasta.766 This phenomenon is not limited to such cases;
other cases can be subject to the influence of wasta, though they vary in intensity and frequency.
In general, wasta is a form of favoritism that involves discrimination in favor of an
individual’s tribe or group. Though it provides benefits and advantages to those using and
practicing it, wasta comes with a cost that increases and decreases with the size of discriminatedagainst groups. In his analysis, Bucker provided a comprehensible explanation. He distinguished
between the situation in the United States and that in South Africa, where the size of the
discriminated-against groups differed; that is, the majority in the United States are whites,
whereas whites are a minority in the context of South Africa. In essence, if the discriminatedagainst group is small, the cost of such discrimination is relatively small in comparison to a
situation where the size of the discriminated-against group is large, in which the cost will be large
as well.767
Applying the previous analysis to the practice of wasta, it can be argued that if the use of
wasta, as a form of discrimination, is carried out by the majority group to favor its members
rather than the minority group, the cost is relatively small since the minority, rather than the
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majority, will bear the cost.768 The reverse situation is one that imposes more cost on both sides—
the majority who is discriminated against, and the minority who practice discrimination, or wasta,
as well. In the Saudi context, the latter situation seems to be more applicable, since the minority
are carrying out discrimination, whereas the size of the group being discriminated against is not
small.769 For example, if the members of one regional group are practicing wasta, then the size of
this group is small, since the size of this group is one region out of thirteen. The same can be said
in the case of tribal groups when there is one tribe against many, and so on. However, if several,
or most, regional groups or tribes are practicing wasta, then the cost to the society becomes very
high.
After considering generally the main consequences of wasta, it is important to consider
how individuals perceive it morally. Among the Arab nations, for instance, 90 percent of
Jordanians surveyed said they would continue using wasta in the future, even while 87 percent
expressed a desire to see wasta eliminated.770 This suggests that individuals perceive wasta
negatively despite the de facto widespread practice of wasta, even by those who perceive it
negatively. Another study, targeting people’s perception of the competency and morality of those
who obtained their employment via wasta, showed that those who were appointed by wasta were
perceived as less moral and less competent.771 Interestingly, however, respondents of lower
socioeconomic status perceived those who used wasta more positively than did respondents of a
more affluent status.772 Ironically, another study showed that students who had completed an
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ethics class tended to use wasta in the future, which suggests that such classes are ineffective in
promoting the change of such a resistant practice.773
In the Saudi context, a similar pattern exists where individuals of lower socioeconomic
status perceive those using wasta in recruitment and promotion relatively less negatively. The
difference can be seen in how men and women perceived those who were promoted due to wasta.
In this context, 77 percent of men perceived an individual promoted through wasta as less
competent, while only 46 percent of women did.774 From the morality perspective, 54 percent of
men perceived anyone promoted because of wasta as less moral, while only 33 percent of women
did.775
More broadly, the same survey revealed a pattern of perceptions similar to those of other
Arabs, where respondents perceived wasta as an unfair practice and corruption but still believed it
was a tool to overcome barriers. Though both women and men agreed, by 67 percent and 66
percent, respectively, that wasta was a means to overcoming barriers, there was a difference in
how they perceived wasta generally:776 among women, 57 percent believed that wasta was a form
of corruption that introduced low morality into the organization, and 61 percent perceived it as an
unfair practice.777 Among men, 80 percent considered wasta as a form of corruption and 76
percent considered it an unfair practice.778
To illustrate the role of socioeconomic status in perceiving wasta, a comparison between
the generations may be significant. Though Saudi men hold a negative view of wasta regardless
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of their generation, a difference in views can be noted between the younger and older generation
of women. While only 44 percent of the older generation of women perceived wasta as an unfair
practice, this rose to 65 percent among the younger generation.779 The same pattern is apparent in
terms of viewing wasta as a corrupt practice, where 48 percent of the older generation of women
did so, whereas among the younger generation, 61 percent did so.780 A significant difference
between the perceptions of the younger and the older generation of women was found in regard to
the belief that those who were promoted through wasta were less competent. While 27 percent of
the older generation perceived them as less competent, 52 percent of the younger generation did
so.781
This seems to be in line with the findings, mentioned above, that people of lower
socioeconomic status tend to view wasta more positively. Accordingly, the difference between
the view of wasta among the younger and the older generation of Saudi women can be attributed
to the change in their socioeconomic status. In Saudi Arabia, the socioeconomic status of women
has changed significantly during the last decade, which can be seen in the dramatic increase in the
percentage of Saudi women participating in the private sector, whereas Saudi men’s
socioeconomic status was not subject to the same shift.782
Regardless of whether they perceive wasta negatively or positively, individuals seem to be
continuing to use wasta in their life. It is also important to emphasize that the contemporary form
of wasta is clearly inconsistent with Islamic teachings and jurisprudence. As explained in Chapter
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2, Shari'a has a firm position against wasta, which is similar, to some extent, to the prohibited
forms of shafa’ah. For instance, the emphasis on hiring based on qualifications and merit can be
found in several Qur’anic and Sunnah texts.783
The broader psychological explanation for the dissonant behavior of condemning wasta
while continuing to use it is provided by self-justification theory. The inconsistent attitude
towards wasta and its widespread practice is simply a form of what is known as cognitive
dissonance, where people hold two incompatible beliefs at the same time.784 Since people “are
motivated not so much to be right as to believe [they] are right (and wise, and decent, and good),
they tend to reduce such dissonance.”785 This dissonance reduction, though irrational, is mainly
aimed at protecting the ego and providing a positive image of the self.786 Thus, individuals
committed to a certain attitude develop a strong desire for self-justification, leading them to resist
any attempt to change such an attitude.787 What cognitive dissonance theory provides, then, is an
illustration of the efforts people undertake to live with troublesome situations: if the situation is
unpleasant and at the same time negative, people seek to cognitively minimize the
unpleasantness.788
In addition to self-justification, individuals develop system-justification, in which they
engage in motivated psychological processes “to imbue the status quo with legitimacy and to see
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it as good, fair, natural, desirable, and even inevitable.”789 System dependence and a sense of
inevitability play significant roles in developing and motivating system-justification processes.790
Similar to self-justification, individuals within the system attempt to defend the legitimacy of the
system in order to reduce their cognitive dissonance.
This may be particularly applicable to wasta practices, and more generally to systemic
corruption. Since individuals are dependent on the system and wasta practices, they tend to
defend not only the use of, but also the legitimacy of such practices. This suggests that the more
dependent the individuals are, the more likely they are to defend and justify the practices, which
can partly explain the differing views among those of low and high socioeconomic status.791
Individuals may be also motivated by the system’s seeming inevitability, which, as with
self-justification, leads them to make the best of an inevitable situation. In reality, it is difficult to
abandon most social systems or norms, since that would involve significant loss.792 Thus,
ironically, although “rational people should judge systems from which they cannot escape most
harshly, system-justification theory instead predicts that, all else being equal, people will show
more system defense within inescapable systems.”793
Cultural differences exist in the dissonance reduction processes. For instance, dissonancereducing behavior in less individualistic societies may exist in a more communal form.794 North
American researchers have shown that people who agree to tell a lie for a small monetary reward
789
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tend to resolve the cognitive dissonance this creates by believing the lie; however, in the Japanese
context, which is considered a communal culture, individuals who only watched a friend who
participated in the experiment telling a lie to someone else experienced cognitive dissonance and
resolved it by believing the lie their friend had told. This suggests that the experience of certain
widespread practices by individuals in a communal culture may strongly encourage them to
reduce their cognitive dissonance by in some way justifying or excusing those practices.795
Shifting focus from the issue of morality and wasta, it is appropriate to consider wasta
from a legal perspective. In this regard, wasta practices overlap with a number of criminal corrupt
acts. Viewed more narrowly, wasta may involve nepotism or cronyism, where an official uses his
authority to advantage a relative, friend, or acquaintance. More broadly, wasta may include the
abuse of power, which involves, inter alia, trade in influence practices. Thus, the legal
characterization and practice of wasta may involve a grey area, where wasta may fall outside the
scope of legal provisions.
Before approaching more complex issues, we should highlight the Saudi legal provisions
related and applicable to wasta. First, Article 4 of the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law states that “any
public official who has violated any of the functions of his duty by committing or abstaining from
any functions of his duties, as a result of a request, recommendation, or mediation, is deemed to
be tantamount to having received a bribe; he shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not
exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding 100,000 Riyals [equivalent to $26,664], or both.”796
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The phrase “by committing or abstaining from any functions of his duties” can be
understood in two different ways based on one of two different judgements that can be reached.
Applying the law broadly, it can be read literally, as saying that, whether whatever action the
official took fell under his duty or not, he violates the provision only by doing so “as a result of a
request, recommendation, or mediation.” To put it another way, when a public official acts
because of wasta, this act is a violation of Article 4, whether he acts within his authority or not.
Reading the law more narrowly, the violation occurs when the act of a public official is not within
his duty or authority.797 This latter is what seems to have been adopted in Saudi courts.798
Accordingly, the actus reus in this crime is the act that violates the duty of the public
official or the mere abstaining from performing the duty. Unlike bribery, the mere acceptance of
the request, recommendation, or mediation (wasta) does not hold the actor criminally liable. Thus,
the act or abstaining must be taken to be held criminally liable.799 Further, the causation between
the actus reus and the acceptance of the request, recommendation, or mediation (wasta) must be
proven. This crime also requires a mens rea, which is a general intent to accept the request,
recommendation, or mediation (wasta). Thus, if the public official believes that he is acting in
accordance with his duty and authority, the mens rea is absent.800 This may occur, for instance, in
the case that a public official believed that he was carrying out an order of a supervisor.801
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The second related provision is Article 5 of the same law, which states that “any public
official shall be deemed to have received a bribe if he has solicited for himself or for others, or
accepted, or received a promise or gift for exercising real or alleged influence, in order to obtain
from any public authority any act, matter, decision, obligation (contract), license, supply
agreement, or to obtain a job, services, or any other kind of benefit or advantage; he shall be
punished with the penalty provided in Article 1 hereof.”802
This article requires three elements: (1) a public official who has real or alleged influence
and who (2) demands or accepts a promise or benefit of any kind (3) to use this influence to
obtain any advantages from any public authority.803 The intention required for this act is a general
intent. Accordingly, the mens rea element is met once the actor demands or accepts what has been
offered, knowing that this was in exchange for using the influence, which then does not require
carrying out the promise.804
Though there are some similarities between wasta and trade in influence, they might differ
depending on whether the legal provisions can be applied or not. As explained above, it is not
always the case that the source of such influence is occupying a certain office or formal position,
i.e., being a public official.805 Further, trade in influence and wasta might be distinguishable,
since the return in trade in influence can be visible and semi-immediate, which is not the case in
wasta. As noted previously, wasta might be prospective, rather than immediate.
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Lastly, a distinction must be made between trade in influence, criminalized by Article 5,
and abuse of power. The abuse of power is criminalized in Article 2 (A) of Royal Decree No. 43,
which states that
any public official who commits, and any individual, whether a public official or not, who
aids and abets in the commission of one of the following offenses shall be punished by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine not exceeding twenty thousand
Riyals [equivalent to $5,333] ….
A. Abuse of power for private interest806
From an analysis of most of the cases published by the Board of Grievances,807 it seems that the
scope of this particular provision and Royal Decree No. 43 in general are similar to the scope of
U.S. Color of Law violations.808 Furthermore, the promulgation of the previous provision, and
including it with the Anti-Bribery Law offenses, suggests and supports such conclusion and
finding.809 This does not, however, eliminate the possibility of applying this provision to wasta.810
This provision offers some advantages in fighting wasta, yet it causes some difficulties in proving
such a violation.
On the positive side, the scope of this provision does not require the legal character of
public official in the aider and abettor, allowing the prosecution of those whose source of power is
806
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not the public office. Further, it sets private interest as the threshold to be charged under this
provision. Thus, the scope of this provision is broader than Article 5 of the Anti-Bribery Law. On
the negative side, the difficulty manifests in the proving and providing sufficient evidence for
such a violation. Providing sufficient evidence for private interest and the abuse of power,
especially if the decision was made within the scope of an official’s authority, is not an easy task,
let alone proving aiding and abetting.
Even with these provisions, there is a grey area that remains legally questionable. To give
a comprehensive view, scenarios must be provided. Consider the situation where an official
provides certain advantages falling under his broad discretion to one of his relatives or
acquaintances, yet he does not provide such an advantage for others. In this case, what this
official does is with no doubt legal, but it is not necessarily fair. Another scenario is one in which
wasta is an additional factor—that is, among many individuals who are eligible for certain
advantage, the chosen individual is one who has wasta. This situation thrives in recruitment and
promotion scenarios, where wasta provides a fast track for one employee rather than another.
Since a person’s family can be recognized by his family name, which usually indicates a
person’s tribe and the region of origin, more complicated scenarios exist. Consider an individual
who applies for a certain position without using wasta during any of the procedures involved. Yet,
when reviewing the files, an official responsible for such procedures recognizes that his family
name was familiar or that the applicant belongs to the same region or tribe as the official does,
which leads this official to act in favor of the applicant. To further complicate the situation, an
official might do so not because the applicant belongs to the same region or tribe as the official
but because the official knows that the father of the applicant holds a high position in another
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entity. Consequently, the official exercises favoritism toward the applicant in order to develop a
prospective relationship with his father.
Clearly, the fight against wasta is not an easy one since it involves economic, social, and
political elites promoting a dual system that involves both informal social patterns and formal
institutions.811 Furthermore, the success or failure of an individual will be influenced by the strict
hierarchies of power and interpersonal relations in particular circumstances.812 Thus, “[n]o
amount of external criticism can change the inner structure of a patronage system, for wherever
patriarchal relations exist … patronage dominates.”813 In short, wasta is a cumulative and hydraheaded problem such that “distinguishing the many dimensions of [it] is problematic.”814
To summarize, as with many corrupt practices and acts, wasta is highly contextual.
Consequently, whether it is a negative or positive phenomenon may be determined on the basis of
the individuals involved, their intentions, the qualifications, and the context. What must be taken
into consideration is that opting out of the system of wasta is difficult, as the societies in which it
is practiced are highly collectivistic and use high-context communication. Thus, one is expected
to say “yes” to an individual asking for wasta in a face-to-face situation, but then not carry out the
promise. One is also expected to use another escape clause, such as the evasive bukrah
(tomorrow) or in sha Allah (if God wills) instead of saying “no.” The judgment, therefore,
whether it is a moral or a legal one, will vary significantly depending on the context.815
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CONCLUSION
It is evident that wasta constitutes a significant problem in Saudi Arabia. From the Shari’a
and Islamic law perspective, wasta is rejected on a number of bases. The current form of wasta
clearly departs from the permissible shafa'ah and takes the opposite form, i.e. the forbidden
shafa'ah which violates the principles of Shari’a. Further, Shari’a in its essence aims at protecting
morality, which includes the promotion of the principles of honesty and justice that the practice of
wasta contradicts. Such a practice is based on favoritism and discrimination, which essentially
hinder the equal application of law.
The short reach and the scarcity of the provisions prohibiting the practices of favoritism
and discrimination generally and the practice of wasta particularly aggravates the issue and
facilitates its prevalence. This is coupled with a culture that also provides a fertile ground for
wasta to be practiced frequently. Those factors and others highlighted in this chapter contribute to
the difficulties of fighting wasta.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE SAUDI ANTI-BRIBERY LAW
INTRODUCTION
Like a number of countries, Saudi Arabia enacted several regulations to fight corruption
rather than adopting an inclusive anti-corruption law. Since the establishment of Saudi Arabia, a
number of laws were enacted and amendments were issued in order to fight corrupt practices.
The Anti-Bribery Law is considered to be the main legal instrument on which the government
relies to fight bribery and related corrupt practices.
The Law defines the offense of bribery, in addition to other related corrupt practices,
including inter alia trade-in-influence and the acceptance of wasta. It also regulates the defense
and the rewards of whistleblowers. After exploring the Saudi anti-corruption legal framework,
this chapter will be devoted to explaining in general the offenses included in the Law. It also
underlines other aspects of the Law’s provisions: the jurisdiction of the application of the Law,
penalties, the rewards of whistleblowers, the role of effective regret, and other defenses.
A. The Saudi Anti-Corruption Legal Framework
In the first instance, a National Strategy for Protecting Integrity and Combating
Corruption was promulgated in an effort to strengthen the measures to fight corruption.816 The
Strategy in its Introduction embraces a wide view of corruption, stating that corruption “includes
every act that threatens the public interest as well any abuse of the civil service in order to earn an
individual advantage.”817 The broad view can be also seen in the targets and the means adopted by
the Strategy.818
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The Strategy’s significant impact can be seen in two main results. First, Saudi Arabia has
ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which was signed by Saudi Arabia
three years before the promulgation of the Strategy.819 The ratification should increase the
measures a country adopts in fighting corruption. Second, the Strategy established specifically a
National Commission for Combating Corruption and generally an apparatus to fight corruption.820
In the Saudi legal system, laws and decrees have been promulgated that aim at fighting a
number of corrupt practices. Royal Decree No. 43821 is the one of oldest legal documents
criminalizing number of corrupt practices and acts. The Decree criminalizes the engagement of a
public servant in commercial or business activities without permission, which is punishable by a
fine of between 1000 Riyals and 10,000 Riyals (equivalent to $266 and $2,660).822 Further, in
Article 2 the Decree criminalizes a number of acts including, inter alia, abuse of power and
authority, embezzlement, and the use of excessive power and coercion.823 The acts and practices
falling under Article 2 are punishable by a maximum of 10 years in prison, monetary penalties of
a maximum of 20,000 Riyal (equivalent to $5,333), or both. Those practices were then included
819
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as being prohibited for civil servants and public officials in the Civil Service Law, but that law
did not specify the penalties.824
The Employee Discipline Law focuses on the administrative, rather than the criminal,
aspect of corrupt practices. Thus, the law does not include the prohibition of acts per se; rather, it
includes any “financial and administrative violations.”825 Accordingly, the penalties in this law
are administrative, and range from warning to dismissal.826 The administrative character of this
law can be derived from Article 25, which indicates that if the accusations are crimes, the
investigation must be terminated and transferred to the authority holding jurisdiction over those
matters.827
Public-Fund Management Act also criminalizes embezzlement, considering such
custodians’ positions as an aggravating circumstance,828 though the maximum monetary penalty
is 100,000 Riyal (equivalent to $26,664) and the prison time remains the same, a maximum of 10
years.829 It is noteworthy that the Bill for a Law of Abuse of Public Trust has languished for
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almost a decade awaiting approval.830 If approved, it will invalidate Royal Decree No. 43 and
Article 9 of the Public-Fund Management Act.831 Several other laws were also amended, such as
the Anti-Forgery Law832 and the Anti-Money Laundering Law.833 Similarly, the Government
Tenders and Procurement Law was amended to enhance transparency and competition in the
bidding for government contracts.834
In addition to the previously mentioned laws, the Impeachment of Ministers Law
criminalizes several acts and prohibits the ministers from being involved in a number of
actions.835 Article 5, in particular, criminalizes a number of corrupt acts.836 In line with this law,
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the Royal Decree No. M/16 establishes a committee within the Council of Ministers to audit the
ministers’ finances. The committee also has the authority to audit the finances of ministers’
family members.837 With that being provided, the Anti-Bribery Law remains one of the oldest
anti-corruption laws promulgated and encompasses a number of crimes under its umbrella.838
Thus, the remainder of this chapter will focus on providing a comprehensive survey of the Law.
B. General Legal Analysis
Saudi Arabia is one of those countries that has neither an explicit definition of corruption
nor an inclusive corruption law. Rather, as explained briefly above, there are a number of laws
that define and criminalize a number of corrupt acts. Bribery, along with related offenses, is one
of these crimes that is inclusively regulated, defined, and criminalized within one law (the AntiBribery Law). This law went through several stages and amendment to arrive at its current form.
As mentioned previously, bribery is a crime that is categorized among the ta’zir crimes
which were prohibited by shari’a, yet no specific punishment was assigned to them. In the early
1930s, the crime was first criminalized by the Nizam Alm’amoreen (the Public Official Law),
which only criminalized active bribery. The Public Official Law was amended in the 1940s to
include more offenses in addition to active bribery, and aggravated the punishments.839
In the following decade, Saudi Arabia entered the era of bribery crimes by the
promulgation of Royal Decree No. 43, which criminalized bribery, abuse of power, and
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gratuity.840 In 1962, the first Anti-Bribery Law (the Old Law) was promulgated, overturning
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 2 of Royal Decree No. 43.841 The Old Law derives its
significance from the fact that it established clearly who is subject to the law and the nature of
the offenses. The offenses are not limited to bribery, but also include the extortion of a public
official to make him perform or omit aspects of his duties.842 Finally, the New Anti-Bribery Law
amended the Old Law three decades later. The amendments did not affect the offenses but
instead slightly amended who is subject to the law.843
In order to provide a comprehensive view of the Anti-Bribery Law, we must define who
is subject to this law before discussing the offenses and the punishments. The Law’s main focus
is on public officials and public offices, yet it also includes other individuals who are not
necessarily within that category. Thus, Article 8 of the Law defines the persons who are subject
to the application of its provisions. Article 8 reads as follows:
For the application of this Law, the following are deemed to be public officials:
(1) Persons employed by the State or any of the public administrative authorities,
regardless of whether the employment is permanent or temporary;
(2) An arbitrator or expert appointed by the Government or any entity having judicial
specialization;
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(3) Persons assigned by a Government authority or any other administrative authority to
perform a specific assignment;
(4) Persons employed by a corporation or a sole corporation, which manages and runs, or
maintains (services) a public facility or which is performing a public service; the same
applies to persons employed by joint stock corporation or corporation in which the State
has a holding, as well as corporations and sole corporations which carry out banking
operations;
(5) Chairmen and members of board of directors of corporations provided for in (the
preceding) paragraph 4 of this Article.844
As has been noted previously, the Law is mainly concerned with and centered on public
officials and offices. Thus, paragraph (1) shows that the Law applies to public officials in any
branch of the government or public servants who are employed or contracted by any public
entity established by the government, whether they are a Saudi nationals or foreigners. This
provision also applies on those who are temporarily appointed if they commit any offense within
these legal statutes.
Paragraph (2) adds arbitrators or experts to those to whom the Law applies. However, the
Law may not be enforced on them unless they have been appointed or assigned by a government
entity or agency or by an entity performing a judicial task. In light of this paragraph, experts who
are assigned by private party or individuals are not subject to the Law even if they are
performing a task in front of a court or any other judicial body.845 Consequently, the Law applies
on experts who are assigned, for instance, by the Saudi Customs Commission to examine certain
subjects.
844
845

Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 8.
NOUR, supra note 839, at 42-43.
181

The main focus of this paragraph seems to be those who are appointed by an entity
performing a judicial duty. Within the Saudi legal system, there are a number of semi-judicial
committees, such as the Committee for the Adjudication of Banking Disputes, which reviews
significant economic cases.846 Members of these committees are generally appointed by a
government entity to perform as arbitrators in the litigations that come before these committees.
The members can be professors, judges, or other high-ranking officials in another government
entity or agency. From the text of Article 8, it would appear that arbitrators assigned by parties
other than the government are not subject to the Law.847
Paragraph (3) is also related to the center of this Law, which is public officials and public
service. The paragraph includes only persons who are assigned by direct or delegated authority
to perform official duties. Thus, a person to whom the Law applies must be assigned by a
government entity holding legitimate authority over the assigned duty.848 It is also worth
distinguishing between the assignment of a person, which imposes an obligation to perform such
a duty, and permission, which may take the form of a license.849 To explain, consider a company
that has a license to perform drivers’ training and another that is assigned by the government to
train and test within the Traffic Bureau; the latter is an entity to which the Law applies, but the
former is not. Further, Courts have tended to adopt a narrow interpretation of a “specific
assignment” to public service rather than any other kind of duty.850
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Rayan Alkhalawi, Legal Education Reform in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of Taibah
University 13 (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Indiana University) (May. 22, 2015) (on file with
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NOUR, supra note 839, at 42-43.
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NOUR, supra note 839, at 46-47.
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AHMED L. MAREI, ALJARAYIM ALMASSAH BE NAZAHAT ALWAZIFAH WA ALTHTHIQAH
ALEAMMAH [Offenses Against the Integrity of the Job and Public Trust] 97 (2007).
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An extension of the application of the Law is introduced in paragraph (4), which covers a
number of persons in the private sector. This application is conditional and limited rather than
unrestricted. Paragraph (4) includes three main categories:
(a) Persons employed by a company or a sole corporation, which manages and runs, or
maintains (services) a public facility or which is performing a public service …; (b)
persons employed by joint stock companies or companies in which the State has a
holding …; (c) [persons employed by] companies and sole corporations which carry out
banking operations….851
The first category includes persons who are employed in a corporation involved in any
form of operating, managing, or performing a public service. This includes inter alia companies
operating or maintaining public facilities such as the Bin Laden Group, which operates The Holy
Mosques in Mecca and Madinah, or providing public services such as those corporations
contracted by the municipal authorities to perform sanitation or sewage operations. This also
includes non-profit organizations if they are providing or performing public services.852 For this
category, the emphasis is again similar to the previous paragraphs—the focus is on public
officials or services. This paragraph also extends to subcontractors with a main contractor that
performs public services.853
The second category is what can be considered, at least partly, an exception from the
main focus on public officials or services since it covers “persons employed by joint stock

851

Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 8(4).
MAREI, supra note 850, at 100 (For instance, the King Khalid Foundation and the Prince
Sultan Foundation are among the legal entities to which the Law applies since they are
performing and providing public services.).
853
Id. at 99 (indicating that there is unnecessary redundancy in this category since the mere
inclusion of joint stock corporations covers those in which the government has a holding.).
852
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companies or companies in which the State has a holding.”854 Unlike the persons in the previous
categories and paragraphs, persons in this category are subject to the Law without the condition
of performing public services or being assigned by a government authority.
Finally, the Law extends its application to persons who are employed by any corporation
performing banking operations. Though Article 3 (1) of the Banking Control Law requires any
banking business to be licensed to be “a Saudi joint-stock company,”855 this paragraph seems to
be intended to extend the application of the Anti-Bribery Law to companies that are exempt from
Article 3 (1).856 Similar to the persons covered in the previous category, the application of the
Anti-Bribery Law is not conditioned by the same conditions in paragraph (2) and (3).
The last paragraph extends the application of the Law to chairmen and members of board
of directors of corporations provided for in paragraph (4), since not all the members of the board
directors are necessarily employees in the corporation. Thus, this provision extends the coverage
of persons not only to executive members, but also to non-executive board members and
independent board members. Further, the importance of this paragraph is derived from the fact
that the Law of Companies prohibits the conjoining of the position of chairman of the board of
directors and any executive position, including the chief executive officer, the managing director,
or the general manager.857
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Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 8(4).
Banking Control Law, Royal Decree No. M/5 of 1386H (corresponding to 1966), art 3(1)
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Board of Directors shall be non-executive members. Article 12 (d) It is prohibited to conjoin the
position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors with any other executive position in the
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This legal status must be available at the time of committing the crime and not at the time
of investigating or prosecuting the crime.858 Thus, if a person accepted a bribe while he was
covered by any of the previous paragraphs, the Law is applied to that person even if he is not
holding one of the legal statuses during the investigation or trial process. What must be also
noted is that the legal status of the persons is not affected by the nationality of the person as long
as the provisions of Article 8 are met.859 However, the public official in another international or
foreign entity is not deemed to be a Saudi public official even if he is a Saudi national, which
restricts the application of the Law to him.860
Having identified the persons to whom the law applies, the statutes defining the offense
of bribery shall be illustrated. Initially, the Law does not adopt the notion distinguishing between
active and passive bribery. Rather, the Law mainly focuses on the action of public officials and
their counterparts included in Article 8. The two initial articles of the Law, Articles 1 and 2, can
be read similarly except that Article 1 criminalizes the active action performed in exchange for a
bribe, while Article 2 criminalize the passive action represented in the abstention from
performing a duty in exchange for a bribe.861 Article 3, though it is related to these articles,

manager.). (“The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1- 36 -2008)
Dated 12/ 11 /1429H corresponding to 10/ 11 /2008G making paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article
12 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange
effective from year 2009.”).
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MAREI, supra note 850, at 118.
859
Id. at 118-19.
860
Id.
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Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 1 & 2 (Article 1 of the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law states
that “[e]very public official shall be deemed as having received a bribe, if he has solicited for
himself or a third party, or accepted or received a promise or gift to perform any duties of his
function or claims that such act falls within the scope of his duties, even where the act is lawful,
[and] shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or a fine not
exceeding one million Riyals or both; the offense shall be deemed as having been committed,
even if the official did not intend to carry out such act.” Article 2 states that “[e]very public
official shall be deemed as having received a bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party,
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requires more illustration since it involves a different act, which is the violation of public official
duties and also involves the crime of gratuity.862
1. Bribery Offense in Anti-Bribery Law
In general, Articles 1 and 2 require proof that there is (1) a public official with actual or
ostensible authority; who (2) solicited, received, or requested; (3) a thing of value or a promise of
such thing for himself or a third party; (4) an official act; and (5) criminal intent.
First, for the Law to be applied to a person requires that a person within the scope of
Article 8 have the authority or discretion to perform or abstain from the action for which he was
bribed as long as the delegation of authority is legally valid.863 It is not also required for the
person to have complete or sole authority to perform or omit the action as long as the bribe was
paid on such a basis.864 Thus, if the person is a member of a committee where the decisionmaking process is held by vote, this person is subject to the Law as long as the bribe was paid
only to gain a favorable opinion.
Nevertheless, courts have extended the application of the Law to persons who have
indirect authority over the subject of the bribery where such a person is sufficiently able to
influence the official act.865 In a similar vein, the act of violating the lawful duties of the person

or accepted or received a promise or gift to abstain from carrying out any function of his duties,
or pretend that such act falls within the scope of his duties, even where the abstention is lawful,
[and] he shall be punished with penalty provided in Article I hereof; the offense shall be deemed
to have been committed, even if the official did not intend to carry out such act.”).
862
Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 3 (Article 3 states that “Every Public official shall be
deemed to have received a bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party, or to accept or
received a promise or gift for violating the function of his duties or for remunerating him for his
actions even where the same happened without prior agreement; he shall be punished with the
penalty provided [in] Article 1 hereof.”).
863
MAREI, supra note 850, at 121-22.
864
Id. at 124.
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Id. at 125.
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does not negate the requirement of authority. In this case, if a judge acquitted a guilty person, he
acted in violation or abuse of his authority rather than outside of his authority.866
In addition to the actual authority, the Law is applied in the case of ostensible authority.
The mere claim of authority directly or indirectly meets the threshold of this requirement.867
However, there is a fine line between impersonating a public official and claiming authority as
regards this Law. Thus, there must be a close nexus between the position that person holds and
the position he claims to hold.868 Further, this claim of authority must be in the form of an
implicit or explicit active action deceiving a reasonable person to pay the bribe.869 Though the
Law does not indicate this, courts have tended to even include a person who mistakenly assumed
the authority existed even if such authority was outside of the scope of an official’s authority
over the promised action.870
Second, the Law does not distinguish, as noted previously, between accepting and
soliciting a bribe.871 In this matter, the mere solicitation or request for a bribe by any active form,
whether directly or indirectly, meets this requirement regardless of whether the briber agreed to
pay or provide anything of value, so long as this act was committed by a public official and the
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Id. at 135.
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Id. at 136-37.
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NOUR, supra note 839, at 84 (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/2/42. Case No.
314/1/Q in 1402H (corresponding to 1982)).
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See THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION: A
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against national public officials fall into two broad categories: (1) when an official ‘requests’ or
‘solicits’ a bribe, and (2) when an official ‘receives’ or ‘accepts’ a bribe.”).
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beneficiary of the act received and knew of such a demand.872 In a similar vein, the acceptance of
an offer or promise, even if the benefit was not actually received, fulfills this requirement.873
The third element to be proven is a thing of value or a promise of any benefit. The nature
of the benefit is defined broadly in Article 12 as “every benefit or advantage which may be
obtained by the bribe, regardless of the form or description thereof, be it monetary or not.”874
Hence, the source, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether owned by the beneficiary or
not, of such benefit is immaterial in this situation.875 With regard to this element, courts have
adopted a broad interpretation which includes invisible benefits, such as exemption from paying
rent, providing a service with no fees, or even an exchange of official acts between two
officials.876 They also consider facilitating the process of providing loan as a benefit.877 Finally,
it is inconsequential whether the benefit was for the person who asked for it or for a third party,
which could include inter alia spouses, sons, daughters, siblings, or parents.878
The fourth element is the official act, which is the return for the benefit provided by the
beneficiary (quid pro quo). This can be an active act within the official’s authority, as indicated
in Article 1, where the official, for instance, asks for a benefit to facilitate the proceedings.879
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MAREI, supra note 850, at 143-45 (Thus, it is not possible for there to be “attempted bribery,”
since once the demand for or the solicitation of the bribe has taken place and the other party
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MAREI, supra note 850, at 152
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Id. at 153 (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/62. Case No. 384/1/Q in 1400H
(corresponding to 1980)).
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Id (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/86. Case No. 552/1/Q in 1400H
(corresponding to 1980) (“A public official in a department of tenders received a loan from a
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Id. at 156.
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The official act may also take the form of abstaining from performing the official’s duty, as
noted in Article 2.880 The last form of this element is introduced in Article 3, where the official
act or abstention is considered a violation of the official’s duties.881 This form is distinguished
from the previous two forms since in this form the benefit is offered for an official to carry out
an illegitimate act.882 This element is required at the initial stage; meaning that the beneficiary is
offering a benefit or the official is asking for a benefit because of the official act. However,
whether the official intended to act or abstain from the promised act is immaterial.883 Thus, the
completion of the promised act is not required to satisfy this element.884
Finally, those crimes are intentional crimes that require an intention to commit these
crimes in order for one to be criminally liable. Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Law make the public
official’s intent relevant. Thus, the intent element is satisfied by proving that the public official
knew of his authority and the quid pro quo and intended to accept or solicit the bribe or the
benefit.885 What must be noted, however, is that it is immaterial whether the public official
performed the intended act or not.886 The issue raised is when the public official knew of the
quid pro quo nature of the arrangement. That is, if the public official came to know about the
quid pro quo nature awhile after he received the benefit and performed the official act, is he still
880
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Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 3 (“Every Public official shall be deemed to have
received a bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party, or accept[ed] or received a
promise or gift for violating the function of his duties or for remunerating him for his actions
even where the same happened without prior agreement; he shall be punished with the penalty
provided [in] Article 1 hereof.”).
882
MAREI, supra note 850, at 162.
883
Id. at 165 (Similarly, Articles 1 and 2 state that the offense is committed “even if the official
did not intend to perform such act.”).
884
Id.
885
See generally NOUR, supra note 839, at 119 (citing Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/68. in
1400H (corresponding to 1980) & Board of Grievances Order No. H/1/64. in 1400H
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criminally liable? The majority of scholars argue that concomitance between the bribe and the
intent is required.887 Consequently, if an individual received a gift and he did not know the nature
of the payment or the benefit at that time, i.e., that it was a bribe or gratuity, and he then
performed or abstained from an act benefiting the person who provided the benefit, he then did
not have an intent and he is not criminally liable for Articles 1 or 2.888
Having defined the elements of the crime of the bribery, it is important to identify the
differences between Articles 1 and 2 on the one hand and Article 3 on the other. First, Articles 1
and 2 can be distinguished from Article 3 since in the former the public official may abstain or
act within the legal authority designated to him; it is intent that constitutes the crime of bribery;
in the latter, in contrast, the act or the abstaining by itself constitutes the improper performance
of a duty.889 The second difference is manifest in the fact that the second part of Article 3 targets
the crime of gratuity, rather than bribery, as will be illustrated in the next point.890
2. Punishments
The Law initially assigned certain punishments to each act. For the crimes indicated in
Articles 1, 2, and 3, offenders are subject to imprisonment for a period not to exceed 10 years
and/or fines not to exceed a million Saudi Riyal (equivalent to 270,000 USD).891 In addition,
Collateral Punishments are indicated in Articles 13 and 15. Where Article 15 orders the
confiscation of the benefit, Article 13 orders the dismissal of the offender from public service
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and places a prohibition on the appointment of the offenders to any position indicated in Article
8 subsequent to the conviction.892
The dismissal can be reviewed by the Council of Ministers, which can revoke the
dismissal after the period of five years, which makes a repeat offense possible. Thus, Article 18
imposes an aggravated punishment on repeat offenders that may not exceed twice the indicated
punishments in the Law, i.e., for the crimes indicated in Articles 1, 2 or 3, 20 years’
imprisonment and a fine of 2 million Saudi Riyals (equivalent to $540,000).893 Further, the Law
orders the Ministry of Interior to publish convictions under the Law.894
On the other hand, legal persons, a category which includes the corporate entities
mentioned in Article 8, are subject to other punishments. Article 19 imposes a set of different
penalties on the criminally liable entities under this Law, which requires proof of a nexus
between the act and the benefit to such an entity.895 In part, Article 19 increases the maximum
monetary penalty to ten times the value of the bribe and/or imposes a ban on those entities from
being in a future contract with government agencies and organizations.896 In circumstances
where the entity has an existing contract with a government agency, the ban is not final since the
agencies with which the convicted entity has contracts must file recommendations as to whether
to allow the entity to complete the contract or not.897
3. The Effective Regret Defense
The law grants the briber a defense if the briber or a middleman discloses the incident of
bribery before being discovered, stating in Article 16 that “the briber or middleman shall be
892
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exonerated from both the penalties and collateral sanctions if he has reported the offense to the
authorities prior to its discovery by the authorities.”898 Nevertheless, the payment or the benefit
provided by the beneficiary is always subject to confiscation, as stated in Article 15 of the Law:
“In all cases, the judgment shall order confiscation of any benefit provided in this transaction,
where this is possible in practice.”899 The return of the benefit is banned by the Law, unless the
benefit was provided in good faith.900 This can be seen in cases where the payer was acting in
accordance to the advice of a middleman where the payer is deceived as to the original purpose,
i.e., bribery. On the other hand, the bribee does not benefit from this affirmative defense.901
4. Rewards
The Law rewards a whistleblower monetary awards ranging from a minimum of 5,000
Riyals (equivalent to $1,340) to a maximum of half the confiscated benefit or payment.902
According to the Law,
Every informer providing information regarding an offense, which is provided herein,
which information led to establishing the commission of the offense, shall, if he is not a
briber, accessory or intermediary, be granted a reward of not less than 5,000 Riyals and
not exceeding one half of the confiscated property; assessment of rewards at the
discretion of the authority adjudging the case but the Ministry of Interior may pay a sum
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Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 16 (This article overruled Article 229 (4) of the Law
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higher than the sum which would be fixed in pursuance of this Article, subject to the
approval of the Council of Ministers.903
C. Classifications of the Crimes
In addition to the crime of bribery, the Law identifies certain acts as crimes punished
under its provisions. These include the following:
1. The offering of bribery
2. Knowingly enjoying a benefit resulting from bribery
3. Gratuity
4. The offer and the acceptance of wasta
5. Trade in influence
6. The use of force and threatening of a public official
7. Following up on a case being processed outside a public official’s authority: being an
“expediter”
Each of these acts is defined by the Law and subject to different punishments, as will be
articulated in this section.
1. The Offering of Bribery
In general, this offense occurs primarily when the briber offers a benefit and the public
official declines to receive it. Without Article 9, there would have been a great gap resulting in
legal unaccountability, since Articles 1, 2, and 3 require the involvement of the public official to
legally exist. Thus, if an offer was declined, the briber could not be legally held liable, nor could
an accomplice, since there would be no crime in the first place.904 Article 9 states that “any
person who has offered a bribe, which is not accepted, shall be punished with imprisonment for a
903
904

Id. art. 17.
MAREI, supra note 850, at 226.
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period not exceeding ten years or a fine not exceeding one million Riyals [equivalent to $
266,638] or both.”905
This offense requires certain elements to be satisfied. The first and foremost element is
that the offer must be made to a person that falls within the scope set forth in Article 8. That is, if
an individual offers a bribe to another who is not within the scope of Article 8, e.g., an individual
working in a limited liability company that has no contracts with the government, then this crime
cannot be prosecuted under this provision.906 In addition to the requirement of being within the
scope of Article 8, this offense requires, as a bribery offense, that the person has actual or
ostensible authority.907
The actus reus in this offense is the mere offering. The Article does not specify a certain
type of offer or benefit which expands the scope of this element.908 Thus, the offer includes the
immediate giving of a benefit or a promise of future giving. The offer does not have to be an
explicit and direct, but can be an implicit offer. Further, the Law adopts an open-ended
timeframe for this offense, which means that even if the offer was made after the completion of
the intended result, the offense would have been committed.909
In order to have a complete actus reus, the offer has to be made to a public official and
must be rejected.910 Consequently, if an individual intentionally withdraws her offer before the
public official declines it, she cannot be liable under this provision. A disputed case manifests
where the withdrawal is involuntary and where the offer was not delivered to the public official
for some unintended reason. Some scholars argue that the offense has already occurred, since the
905
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public official’s knowledge of the offer is not required.911 Others consider that as an attempt,
since it was not because the person who made the offer voluntarily withdrew it that the delivery
was not made, and the offense is distinguished from the offenses in Articles 1, 2, and 3.912
In addition, this offense is an intentional offense requiring that the individual offering the
bribe know the legal character of the individual to whom the offer is made, i.e., that the
individual is a public official or someone else who falls within the scope of Article 8 on the one
hand, and that she intended to solicit the public official to accomplish the intended result.913
Nevertheless, coercion is considered to be an affirmative defense if it is proven.914
Finally, Article 9 imposes a penalty of a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment and/or a
million Riyals (equivalent to $ 266,638).915 This is in addition to the collateral penalties
mentioned previously, which include dismissal from public office if the offender is holding one
and the confiscation of the benefit that was intended to be delivered when possible.916 Moreover,
offenders are subject to the rule that deals with repeat offenders provided in Article 18.917
2. Knowingly Enjoying a Benefit Resulting from Bribery
In circumstances where the briber and the bribee appoint a beneficiary outside of the
bribery schema, this beneficiary can be prosecuted under the provision of Article 11 indicating
that “Every person who has been appointed by the briber or the bribed to receive the bribe and
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accepts knowing the reason therefor shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than two
years or a fine not exceeding 50.000 Riyals [equivalent to $13,333], or both.”918
Article 11 generally criminalizes the beneficiary who accepts the benefit knowing the
reason for it. The Law distinguishes this offense from the role of complicity indicated in Article
10, since the beneficiary may not be involved in the offense, and may neither have aided nor
abetted it, which makes the crime occur with or without her involvement.919 Thus, the
punishment and the liability of the actor in this case is not dependent on the principal actors in
the crime of bribery, i.e., the briber and the bribee.920 The offense must be also distinguished
from the situation where benefits were provided to a public official in order to benefit another
individual who is not the briber, since the objective of the punishment in this offense is the
benefit provided to the public official, rather than the benefit provided by her.921
Unlike the other offenses in this Law, this offense does not require that the actor have
certain legal character that falls within the scope of Article 8.922 Further, the beneficiary can be
any individual; there is no restriction in terms of the individual’s relationship to actors in the
bribery schema, although the reality requires a close relationship between the beneficiary and the
bribee.923 It is also worth noting that the beneficiary can appointed by the briber without a
previous agreement with the bribee. Consequently, if the benefit was provided to the beneficiary
by the briber and the beneficiary accepted the benefit knowing its purpose, she meets the
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requirement of this offense regardless of whether the public official performs the briber’s
intended result.924
As previously noted, the Law defines the benefit broadly to include more than the
monetary benefits.925 Further, Article 11 expands its application to include the gratuity provided
to the beneficiary, so long as she knew the reason for such a benefit.926 Hence, as can clearly be
seen, this offense pivots around the intention of the beneficiary. In order to hold an individual
liable under this provision, the intention to keep a benefit despite knowing the illegitimate reason
for such a benefit must be proven.927
Offenders convicted of this provision are subject to not more than two years’
imprisonment and/or a fine of no more than 50,000 Riyals (equivalent to $13,335). This is not to
mention the collateral penalties for repeat offenders, which include confiscation and dismissal
from public office. Nevertheless, an individual can be prosecuted under Article 10 in addition to
Article 11 if he meets the threshold and acts as middleman or encourages the bribee to agree to
perform the briber’s intended result.
3. Gratuity
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Law criminalizes the offense of
gratuity under Article (3), stating that “[e]very Public official shall be deemed to have received a
bribe, if he has solicited for himself or a third party, or accept[ed] or received a promise or gift
for violating the function of his duties or remunerating him for his actions even where the same
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happened without prior agreement; he shall be punished with the penalty provided [in] Article 1
hereof.”928
Article 3 includes, as previously noted, the crime of bribery in which the act or abstention
from acting of a public official is considered a violation of his duty and constitutes a gratuity
offense. As with the crime of bribery, the jurisdiction of Article 3 only covers those who were
indicated in Article 8. However, this offense can be distinguished slightly from the crime of
bribery since bribery requires previous agreement between the briber and the bribee. A further
distinction is manifest in the requirement that an official have actual authority in Article 3, while
Articles 1 and 2 include ostensible authority also.929
In this offense, unlike other laws that only recognize the acceptance of a gratuity,930 the
Anti-Bribery Law does not distinguish between the solicitation, acceptance, or requesting of a
reward or gratuity.931 Moreover, this offense, similar to the other offenses that fall under this
Law, is an intentional offense requiring proof that the public official accepts the reward knowing
that it is because of an official act;932 that is, there must be a nexus between the act and the
reward, a quid pro quo. Thus, the Law imposes the same penalties imposed in Articles 1 and 2.933
In general, Article 3 aims at closing the loophole that exists in a scenario where there is
no previous agreement between the briber and bribee and the rewarding of public official for the
acts been performed, yet it also requires the proof of quid pro quo. In part, it extends the
928
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application of the Law to include those offenses not covered by Articles 1, 2, and 9, but also
imposes a heavier burden.
4. The Offer and the Acceptance of Wasta
In the previous chapter, a brief summary of this offense was provided, leaving other
aspects to be legally illustrated. Article 4 requires certain elements, some of which are not any
different from the other offenses covered under the Law, among which is the requirement of
being within the scope of Article 8.934 However, other elements deserve a further interpretation
including (1) wasta or other similar forms of influence peddling, and (2) whether acceptance
results in violation of an official’s duty.
First, the core of wasta generally is the solicitation of others based on relationship with
them in order to obtain a certain advantage as a favor.935 Thus, such an act may take the form of
mediation or a request so long as the basis of such an act is the exchange of favors. The difficulty
arises in the situation where no wasta or similar forms of influence peddling have taken place,
but rather the official was influenced by the mere favoritism that may result from social status,
familial relationship, or other causes, with implicit suggestion of future quid pro quo. In such a
case, the act would fall outside the purview of Article 4.936 The second element is that the
acceptance of wasta results in a violation of an official’s duty. As noted in the previous chapter,
to be held liable under Article 4, the act or the abstention has to be in violation of the official’s
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duty.937 Thus, a nexus between the violation and the wasta has to be proven in order to satisfy the
atcus reus element.938
With the respect to the penalties, In addition to the collateral penalties, Article 4 imposes
a penalty of imprisonment not to exceed three years and/or a fine not to exceed 100,000 Riyals
(equivalent to $26,666).939 However, unlike bribery, the conviction of the public official is
required to convict the individual exercising wasta since the latter will be punished in accordance
to Article 10, which establishes liability on the basis of complicity rules.940 Thus, if the public
official rejects the wasta, the individual who practiced it in the first place cannot be punished due
to the fact that Article 4 does not separate the two acts, nor does the Law establish such a thing
as a case of bribery where the offering of a bribe is punished by Article 9 and the solicitation,
acceptance, or requesting of a benefit is punished by Articles 1, 2, and 3.
5. Trade in Influence
As has been illustrated briefly in the previous chapter, in Article 5, the Anti-Bribery Law
criminalizes trade of influence practices. Such an offense can be distinguished from bribery on
certain grounds; first and foremost, this offense initially does not require a public official
character in the individual who is using her real or supposed influence,941 yet the Law requires
such an element in this offense. The second difference is that the core of bribery is the authority
over the advantage provided, while the core of trading influence is the influence itself being
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used, which means that the individual using the influence may not have authority, but has the
influence to secure an advantage.942
The Law requires, as noted, three elements in this offense. As with the most of the
offenses in the Law, Article 5 applies only to those individuals within the scope of Article 8,
those who have real or supposed influence. Thus, this restricts the meaning of influence in that
the influence results from a public office or position.943 The second element resembles the
bribery element of the solicitation, acceptance, or requesting of a benefit of any kind.944 Finally,
the influence, to be prosecuted under Article 5, must be exercised over a public authority, which
mainly includes the government and its agencies and organizations.945 Consequently, if the
influence was exercised over private organizations, corporations, or foreign entities, this does not
fall within the scope of Article 5.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this offense requires a general intent which is met
merely by the solicitation, acceptance, or requesting of the benefit knowing that it occurs because
of the exercise of real or supposed influence.946 Since the Law did not extend the application of
the Article 5 nor mitigate the burden of proof, it seems rational that it imposes the same
punishments provided in Article 1. This is not to mention the collateral penalties and the
confiscation of the benefit.
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6. The Use of Force and the Threatening of a Public Official
Among other offenses, Article 7 criminalizes the practice of extortion against a public
official, stating that “[a]ny person who uses force, violence or threats against a public official in
order to force him to act illegally, or to instigate him to refrain from doing any of the acts of
which he has legal charge, shall be punished with the penalty provided for in Article 1 hereof.”947
In this article, the character of the individual who is using force or threatening is
immaterial; rather, what is important is the character of the individual against whom such
practice is carried out. Thus, if any individual uses force or threatens another individual within
the scope of Article 8, he shall be prosecuted under this provision.948 It is worth noting that
courts distinguish this act from the crime of resisting arrest, excluding such an act from the scope
of this article.949 This article requires that the force or threat aims at forcing the public official to
violate the duty of his job.950
Having illustrated Articles 5 and 7, it seems that offense of extortion remains in a grey
area. On one hand, Article 7 does not specify the act of extortion as an offense within its
provision; instead, it specifies a “threat,” which cannot carry out the same meaning of extortion.
Article 5, on the other hand, requires the existence of the solicitation, receiving, or requesting of
a benefit to abuse of power, which includes inter alia the exercise of extortion. Thus, if a public
official or another practices extortion without the solicitation, receiving, or requesting of a
benefit, this may exclude such an act from the application of Article 5. This leaves no option but
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to rely on Article 2 (A) of Royal Decree No. 43, as explained above in Chapter 5, in order to
cover such a loophole.951
7. Following up on a case being processed outside the public official’s authority: being an
“expediter”
Article 6 states that
[e]very public official who solicits for himself or a third party, or accepts or receives gift,
on account of his position, to follow up a formality in a Government authority (service),
if the other provisions set down herein do not apply with respect to him, shall be
punished with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding 50,000
Riyals [equivalent to $13,335] or both; the same penalty shall be imposed on such a
person who has given, offered or promised to make a gift for the aforementioned
purpose; the intermediary shall also be liable to the aforementioned penalty, in any of
these cases.952
This mainly aims at extending the application of the Law to cover an area uncovered by
Article 5, which deals with the trade of influence, since it is not always the case that the public
official has a real or even a supposed influence to obtain a certain advantage, and consequently
the provision of Article 5 does not apply to him.953 For instance, an official may follow up on a
case moving through the Department of Immigration and Homeland Security either to expedite a
process or to obtain an undue advantage. In such a situation, this official does not have influence

951

Royal Decree No. 43, supra note 806, art. 2(A) (Article 2(A) states that “any public official
and any individual aids and abets, whether a public official or not, commits one the following
offenses shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine not
exceeding twenty thousand Riyals [equivalent to $ 5,332]:
“A. Abuse of power for private interest.”).
952
Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 6.
953
MAREI, supra note 850, at 276.
203

over this Department, but rather he jeopardizes his fiduciary duty by creating a potential for a
future exchange of benefits between himself and an official in the Department of Immigration
and Homeland Security.
In this offense, like the majority of the offenses included in the Law, the requirement of a
public official character is required, but it is not required to have an authority over the formality;
otherwise the practice would be covered by Article 1, 2, or 3. It is also required that a
governmental entity or multiple entities have authority over case the public official is following
up on.954 It does not also negate this element if the same entity in which the public official works
has authority over the case, so long as he has no actual authority or ostensible authority over it.955
However, Article 5 does not cover a situation where a corporation or other private entity has
authority over the case being processed.
This offense shares the same elements of the bribery offense, including the actus reus,
representing the solicitation, receiving, or requesting of a benefit of any kind. This offense is also
considered an intentional offense which requires proving that the public official intentionally
solicited, received, or requested a benefit knowing the purpose of it, i.e., that the purpose of the
benefit was to follow up on a case being processed by in another government entity.956
Finally, the scope of this offense includes official who follow up on a case being
processed by another government agency, the person who offered a benefit, and the intermediary
in such offense.957 Thus, those individuals, when convicted, are punished by “imprisonment not
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exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding 50,000 Riyals [equivalent to $13,335] or both.”958
The other penalties noted above, including confiscation, dismissal, and the aggravating of
punishments when committed by repeat offenders, are also imposed.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to provide an explanation of the Saudi anti-corruption legal
framework in general and of the Anti-Bribery Law in particular. The Law in general went
through different stages before it arrived at its current form, which can be considered as
developed as other regulations enacted before it. In addition to the offense of bribery, the Law in
general criminalizes a number of offenses. The Law restricts its application, however, to a
certain group of individuals. The Law also highlights effective regret as a defense and the
rewards of whistleblowers.
Though the Law represents an advance in a number of respects, it possesses certain
loopholes and weaknesses. The weaknesses cannot be attributed solely to the Law; instead there
are other related aspects within the general legal framework that may hinder the effectiveness of
the Law. The next chapter will explore these strengths and weaknesses in light of the explanation
provided in this chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK OF ANTI-BRIBERY LAW
INTRODUCTION
Because other regulations intersect with the Anti-Bribery Law, the evaluation of some
aspects of the Law may require researching these provisions in order to provide a comprehensive
evaluation. Thus, in this chapter, certain issues will be evaluated based on the Anti-Bribery Law
and on other aspects of the Saudi legal framework. Such an evaluation will be conducted in light
of general anti-corruption standards and other countries’ legal apparatus to combat corruption.
This evaluation will shed light on the advantages of the Saudi legal system as well as its
disadvantages, specifically in regard to six aspects. These aspects include the liability of legal
persons, the wasta provision, immunity, penalties and rewards, the protection of whistleblowers
and witnesses, and the jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. For each aspect, the examination
will be based primarily on the provisions of the Anti-Bribery Law and secondarily on the
provisions related to them.
A. The Liability of Legal Persons
The liability of legal persons for the offenses of corruption is enforced and included in
number of international conventions against corruption.959 Opponents of this notion remain
skeptical about its rationality since it is not practical to impose a liability on corporation “as if it
has a blameworthy state of mind.”960 Further, it is sufficient to impose civil liability, which
makes criminal liability unnecessary.961 Nevertheless, the advocates of this notion emphasize the
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heavy impact of corporations on the economy, which makes them capable of inflicting serious
harm.962 Thus, the imposing of criminal liability is necessary to prevent such harm.
The Anti-Bribery Law made an advance in establishing the liability legal persons in
Article 19 as follows:
The authority having power to adjudge the offences of bribery must impose a fine not
exceeding tenfold the value of the bribe, or banning from concluding contracts with
ministries, Government services or public juristic persons, for providing purchases or
execution of their projects and works, or both penalties; this penalty is imposable on any
company or private firm national or foreign- whose manager or any personnel thereof has
been found guilty of committing any offences provided for herein, if the said offence has
been committed to serve the interest of such company or firm; the Council of Ministers
may reconsider the banning penalty aforementioned after the lapse of at least five years
from the date of passing judgement.963
Further, Articles 69964 and 147965 of the Criminal Procedures Law impose civil liability
on legal persons, which does not eliminate the criminal liability established by the Law. In
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addition to establishing the liability, the Law expands its application to foreign firms. That is, the
Law does not distinguish between national and foreign entities in imposing criminal liability on
legal persons.966
Though the Law includes and establishes the criminal liability of legal persons, a
loophole still exists that may allow for the evasion of such liability. In the provision of Article
19, the phrase “whose manager or any personnel thereof has been found guilty of committing
any offences provided for herein” (emphasis added) 967 may raise a serious issue. Such a phrase
may restrict the application of the Law.968 Depending on how the phrase is interpreted, this may
mean that if an outside intermediary was utilized by the firm, this may negate the imposition of
criminal liability on the firm.969
Nevertheless, provisions in the Law of Government Tenders and Procurement address
this issue. Though it is discretionary, Article 53 provides that
a government authority may withdraw the work from a contractor and rescind the
contract or execute it at his expense without prejudice to the right of the government
authority to claim compensation for damage sustained as a result, in any of the following
cases:
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(a) If it is proven that a contractor attempts by himself or through others, directly or
indirectly, to bribe an employee of an authority subject to the provisions of this Law or
has procured the contract by way of bribery.970
These provisions lead to the second point that deserves to be highlighted, which is the
debarment. Generally, countries differ as to which debarment approach they have adopted—
either the automatic debarment approach or the discretionary debarment approach.971 Although
the Law has taken a significant step in prohibiting the convicted entities from making future
contracts with the government, future amendments may take into consideration that the ban from
entering into any contract with the government’s agencies and entities should be a collateral
penalty, rather than an original penalty. The recent provision leaves the ban as a judicial
discretionary penalty in Article 19 by leaving it to the judge’s discretion to impose the monetary
penalty and/or future ban from entering into contracts with the government’s agencies or
entities.972 This also requires a further step to be taken in establishing a register of criminal
convictions.973
The argument for adopting an automatic debarment approach is based on two lines of
reasoning. First, the automatic debarment approach increases the cost of a corruption offense
when an offender is performing a cost-benefit analysis.974 Second, the default options are more
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likely to be adopted in the decision-making process.975 That is, when the judge is faced with a
provision imposing automatic debarment, she is more likely to impose the debarment. With the
existing provision (i.e., a discretionary debarment approach), judges might find it more difficult
to opt-out. It is worth noting that this argument and the tendency to adopt the automatic
debarment approach is valid unless the government adopts a voluntary disclosure mechanism. In
that case, the automatic debarment approach may backfire and decrease the effectiveness of the
voluntary disclosure mechanism.976
B. The Wasta Provision
Credit must be given to the drafters of the Law for the inclusion of Article 4 in its
provisions, even though the Article is not comprehensive. In fact, the text of the Article seems to
reflect the legislators’ attempt to avoid making the provisions overly broad. Nevertheless, the
failure to combat wasta may be attributed to the legal system in general rather than to the Law
itself. Wasta in its essence is an act of favoritism and discrimination, and to effectively combat it
requires a comprehensive legal apparatus. Thus, a single provision in one law cannot achieve the
intended result.
In the Arab world, similar provisions have been enacted in number of countries.977 These
provisions share similarities with Article 4 of the Saudi Anti-Bribery Law. However, the
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Jordanian provision in this matter is slightly different from the Saudi provisions, stating in
Article 5 (i) that “[f]or the purposes of this Law, the following shall be deemed as corruption: (i)
The acceptance of nepotism and favoritism, which revokes a right or validates what is void.”978
The standard in the Jordanian provision is the individual’s right, rather than the public official’s
duties. The standard shifts from public official’s duty to the individual’s right, which expands the
scope of the application of the provision in fighting wasta.979
More importantly, such a shift in the Jordanian provision leads to a significant inference.
The Saudi provision on wasta, similar to its Egyptian and Iraqi counterparts, weights the
integrity of the public office more than other concerns. Thus, such provisions are instituted
within the framework of the protection of public office, which explains why there is a
requirement that the public official violate his duty in order for these provisions to apply.980
Nonetheless, these advantages of the Jordanian provision have not immunized it from
criticism. Some scholars argue that the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission Law refrains
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from defining the rights it intends to protect.981 Further, the phrase “revokes a right” invites some
criticism, since only legal rules define what revokes a right and nepotism and favoritism (wasta)
does not revoke a right; rather, wasta is an infringement of rights.982
Moreover, the previously mentioned provisions, including the Jordanian provision, share
the same disadvantage that these provisions do not apply unless the wasta is accepted. Thus, if
the wasta was rejected, such provisions cannot be applied.983 This can be attributed to the focus
of these provisions on the acts of public officials rather than on the acts of the individuals
initiating the corrupt practice. Consequently, these laws refrain from criminalizing the act of
offering or using wasta per se, if it is not accepted.984
In addition to the specific provision on wasta, the absence of certain provisions
contributes to the difficulties of fighting wasta. One of the issues most closely related to wasta is
conflict of interest. The Saudi legal system in a limited number of provisions prohibits certain
practices that may involve a conflict of interest. Indirectly, the Civil Service Law prohibits public
officials from engaging in commerce, which constitutes a preventive measure against the conflict
of interest.985 Such prohibition is affirmed by the Royal Decree No. 43 in Article 1, which states
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that “a fine [of] not less than one thousand Riyal, and not exceeding ten thousands Riyal, shall be
inflicted on:
(a) public officials who are engaging in commerce.…”986
The other provision that directly targets the conflict of interest is in the Law of Procedure
before Sharia Courts. Article 94 of that law prohibits a judge from hearing a case in the
following circumstances:
(a) If he is the spouse, relative, or in-law up to the fourth degree of a litigant.
(b) If he, or his wife, has an existing dispute with a litigant in the case or with his wife.
(c) If he is an attorney-in-fact, guardian, trustee, or presumptive heir of a litigant or if he
is the spouse of the guardian or trustee of a litigant or if he is a relative or an in-law
up to the fourth degree of such guardian or trustee.
(d) If he, his wife, a relative, or an in-law in the ancestral line, or a person for whom he is
trustee or guardian, has an interest in the existing case.
(e) If he had issued a fatwa [religious legal opinion], litigated for one of the litigants in
the case, or written about it, even if it were before he joined the judiciary, or if he had
earlier considered the case as a judge, expert, or arbitrator, or had been a witness in
the case or had engaged in any investigative action therein.987

see also Officers Service Law, supra note 824 (prohibiting the same acts in Article 17); see also
the Law of Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution Royal Decree No. M/56 of 1409H
(corresponding to 1989), art. 7 (SA) (“A member of the Bureau may not combine his job with
commercial activities or any other profession or work inconsistent with the independence of the
Bureau’s work and its dignity.”). See also Law of the Judiciary, supra note 309, art. 51.
986
Royal Decree No. 43, supra note 806.
987
Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts, supra note 308, art. 94 (Article 96 includes the
circumstances under which the parties are permitted, but not obligated, to file a motion to
disqualify the judge, stating that
“[a] judge may be disqualified for any of the following reasons:
(a) If either he or his wife has a case similar to the case before him.
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However, this provision does not inflict a penalty; rather, as stated in Article 95,
An action or decision by a judge in any of the foregoing circumstances set forth in Article
94 shall be null and void even if it were with the agreement of the litigants. If such
nullification occurs with respect to a judgment upheld by the Appellate Court, a litigant
may request said court to nullify the decision and assign another judge to reconsider the
appeal.988
A clear-cut provision similar to 18 U.S. Code § 208 does not exist in the Saudi legal
system.989 The lack of a direct conflict of interest provision may decrease the public awareness of
the illegitimacy of such practices, leading ultimately to a reduction of culpability.990

(b) If he, or his wife, has a dispute with a litigant or his wife after the lawsuit was filed and
pending with the judge, unless that [latter] lawsuit was filed with the intention of
disqualifying him from considering the case before him.
(c) If his divorcee with whom he has a child or one of his relatives or in-laws up to the fourth
degree has a dispute before the judiciary with a litigant in the case, or with his wife,
unless the case was brought with the intention of disqualifying him.
(d) If a litigant is his servant or the judge had habitually dined or lived with him, or if he had
received a gift from him shortly before the lawsuit was filed or thereafter.
(e) If enmity or friendship exists between him and a litigant such that it is likely he would
not be able to judge impartially.”);
see also Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, art 21 (This Article forbids the members
of Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution from investigating or involving in the
following cases:
(a) If he is a victim of the investigated crime, or is the spouse, relative, or in-law up to the
fourth degree of a litigant.
(b) If enmity or friendship exists between him and a litigant such that it is likely he would
not be able to judge impartially.
(c) If he had already involved in a case: as an expert, arbitrator, an agent, a witness, and so
on.).
988
Law on Procedures before Shari'a Courts, supra note 308, art 95.
989
Business Corruption in Saudi Arabia, supra note 399.
990
See, e.g., MAMDOOH M. AL-RADADI, BANKS, SNAKES & LADDERS: ARAB BANKING &
CORPORATE SUCCESS 196 (2011) (“I had a manager who had three relatives working under his
supervision, I mean dude! Give me a break! Ever heard of conflict of interest?”).
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Consequently, the absence of such a provision in the Saudi legal system not only contributes to
the difficulties of prosecuting wasta, but also provides fertile ground for wasta to thrive in.991
Additionally, rules directly targeting nepotism and discrimination are absent from the
Saudi legal apparatus. The Shoura Council just recently deliberated a bill for an AntiDiscrimination Law.992 This law, if issued, would be more comprehensive than the U.A.E.’s
Anti-Discrimination Law,993 which only prohibits discrimination for religious reasons.994 The
Saudi bill criminalizes the discrimination on nearly on any basis, including race, region, religion,
or ideology.995
What can be more difficult to implement is provisions aiming at the prohibition of
nepotism. Rules similar to 5 U.S.C. 3110 and 5 U.S.C. 2302 have not been instituted in the Saudi
framework. In addition to the difficulties in the application of these rules, they may raise
skepticism about the effectiveness and practicality of anti-nepotism provisions, since nepotism is
part of the socio-cultural, economic, and political structure.996 Despite such skepticism and
difficulties, the issuance of these rules would raise public awareness about nepotism, which
would eventually decrease the prevalence of nepotistic practices.

991

See OECD JOINT LEARNING STUDY, IMPLEMENTING A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PUBLIC
SECTOR IN JORDAN, 20 (2010) (OECD report on Jordan recommends that “[t]he Government of
Jordan may consider the following means to control wasta:
1. Adopt and enforce clear conflict-of-interest provisions”).
992
Law to criminalize all discrimination, ARAB NEWS, Aug. 22, 2016,
http://www.arabnews.com/node/958811/saudi-arabia.
993
Anti-Discrimination Law No. 2 of 2015 (U.A.E.).
994
See generally U.A.E. Anti-Discrimination Law No. 2 of 2015, art. 4.
995
Law to criminalize all discrimination, supra note 992 (“Article 12 of the law says that those
who raise tribal slogans will be fined no less than SR 50,000 or will be jailed for at least six
months, or both. Article 16 says that those who support the publication, recording, filming,
taping, computer programs, applications or data in electronic format of any such material that
ridicule religion, discriminates or foments hatred will face at least one year in jail and a fine of a
minimum SR 50,000 and a maximum of SR 200,000.”).
996
See generally Hayajenh et al., supra note 731, at 60-67.
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C. Immunity
In essence, countries grant immunity to a certain group of officials to serve a dual
purpose: to safeguard their independence and to protect them from malicious prosecution.997
Nevertheless, such immunity may constitute an obstacle to investigating or prosecuting corrupt
practices committed by these officials. From the public perspective, immunity is one of those
factors that increases corruption, leading the public to lose their confidence in the rule of law.998
Thus, immunity is a sensitive issue, especially when it is associated with corruption,
requiring a balance between the need for immunity and the need for “effective investigation,
prosecution and adjudication of corruption offences.”999 Accordingly, the UNCAC requires the
parties of the convention to
take such measures as may be necessary to establish or maintain, in accordance with its
legal system and constitutional principles, an appropriate balance between any
immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public officials for the performance
of their functions and the possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating,
prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in accordance with this Convention.1000
To meet such a balance, countries should not adopt a notion of absolute immunity;
instead the notion of immunity adopted should functional in nature, limiting the immunity to
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THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at

51.
998

Id; see also Tilman Hoppe, Public corruption: limiting criminal immunity of legislative,
executive and judicial officials in Europe, 5 VIENNA J. ON INT'L CONST. L. 538, 538 (2011)
(“63% of respondents to a survey by Gallup International see 'public official's immunity' as one
of the ‘main factors that have contributed to an increase in corruption’, ranking it the 2nd most
important factor”).
999
THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at
51.
1000
UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 30.2.
216

only those acts performed within the framework of official duties.1001 The immunity should only
cover the period when the official actually held office, rather than being open-ended.1002 In
addition, suspending the statute of limitations, if there is such, during the time officials enjoy
immunity must be taken into consideration to ensure that prosecution is not barred by the statute
of limitations.1003
This subject deserves some attention. At the outset, the Saudi legal system grants
immunity to ministers, judges, and members of the Bureau of Investigation and Public
Prosecution (BIP). The source of this immunity is derived from variety of provisions. The
immunity of officials previously in office can be revoked via various procedures, depending on
the position they held.
Judges enjoy immunity from prosecution based on Article 68, which states, “Except in
the foregoing cases [flagrante delicto], the judge may not be arrested, be subject to investigation
proceedings, or be prosecuted without the permission of the Supreme Judicial Council. Detention
of judges and execution of punishments restraining their freedom shall be implemented in
separate facility.” A similar provision has been included in Article 19 of the Law of the Bureau
of Investigation and Public Prosecution, but the permission to prosecute must be provided by the
Bureau Administration Committee.1004
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THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at

51.
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Id.
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Law of Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution, supra note 992, art. 19 (“Except in
the foregoing cases [flagrante delicto], Members of BIP may not be arrested, be subject to
investigation proceedings, or be prosecuted without the permission of the Bureau Administration
Committee. Detention of Members and execution of punishments restraining their freedom shall
be implemented in separate facility.”).
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The immunity of ministers deserves more elaboration since there are two different sets of
rules governing it. Generally, the Law of Criminal Procedures requires a prior revocation of
immunity issued by the King to prosecute ministers and those who hold the rank of minister or
have previously been appointed minister or held the rank of minister.1005 With respect to certain
corrupt practices, as noted above in Chapter 3, officials are subject to impeachment rather than
public prosecution.1006
Drawing on this brief explanation, advantages and disadvantages of the Saudi anticorruption measures can be noted. The Saudi legal system did not adopt a statute of limitations
for the corrupt offenses which would allow the prosecution of officials after they leave office.
Further, immunity can be revoked with the permission of the authorized authorities. Yet the
procedures need to be more transparent to ensure effective procedures for revoking immunity.1007
Further, immunity for ministers or those who hold the rank of ministers raises a twofold issue.
On the one hand, immunity extends even after an official leaves office, which contradicts the
1005

Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, Para. 4 of preamble.
Impeachment of Ministers Law, supra note 842, art. 5. (criminalizes the following acts:
A. Behaviors and actions that would impact the increase or decrease in the price of goods,
real estate, currency, or stock, to obtain personal benefit to him or to others.
B. Acceptance of a benefit — of any kind — to himself or others, to perform official act or
refrain from formal work.
C. Influence peddling, whether the fraud is for the benefit or advantage of himself or of any
other body or company, or organization.
D. Deliberate violations of laws, regulations and orders that result in financial loss of the
state’s rights, or the rights of individuals.
E. The disclosure of cabinet decisions and deliberations relating to national security, state’s
foreign affairs, financial and economic affairs, and the trial of ministers.
F. Personal intervention in the affairs of the judiciary and other government bodies and
departments.).
1007
THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ANTI-CORRUPTION
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES, 2009-2013,
FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 75 (2013) (“A number of
standards can be formulated with regard to immunity which should … provide for swift and
effective procedures for lifting immunity, clear criteria for lifting of immunity which are the
based on merits of the request to lift immunity.”).
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principle of limiting the duration of immunity.1008 On the other hand, immunity extends to an
unnecessarily large number of officials. Finally, it would be more effective to restrict the
immunity so that it is clearly functional in nature, a concept which cannot be garnered from the
broad language of the previous provision.1009
D. Penalties and Rewards
Penalties play a significant role in preventing crimes, at least based on the classic
analysis. Theoretically, the increase of penalties would reduce the number of corrupt practices,
but also may increase the amount of bribes. In reality, however, the number of perpetrators who
are punished for such practices is low, not to mention the gap between the penalties stated in the
law and those actually imposed. It is also worth noting that the preventative roles of penalties
decrease significantly if the penalty is not associated with a loss of social capital, which is the
state of things where corruption is prevalent.1010
At the core of this issue is the anti-corruption provisions and laws. To succeed, such laws
must adopt the “right mix of penalties, rewards, and undercover law enforcement.”1011 Anticorruption laws achieve more by compromising between deterrent impact and rewarding
“whistleblowers.” The probability of detection and the imposed penalties, including those
imposed by societies, influence the deterrence to engaging in criminal behavior.1012 Thus, while
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Law of Criminal Procedures, supra note 308, Para. 4 of preamble.
THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at
52 (“[E]ven officials who were involved in car accidents because of speeding have escaped
prosecution, even though driving is not part of their official duties.”).
1010
Tanzi, supra note 1, at 574 (citing Gary Becker, Crime and punishment: An economic
approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 169-217 (1968)).
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ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 68.
1012
Id. at 55.
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high fixed penalties lower the number of corrupt acts, they increase the sum of payoffs.1013 That
is, officials will demand a high payment to engage in bribery when the penalty is high.1014
Bases on a cost–benefit analysis, then, the probability of being apprehended and the
penalties inflicted, which include those inflicted legally and socially, shape the deterrence of
criminal behaviors.1015 Another point that must be taken into account is that the benefits for the
bribe payers and bribe recipients are not symmetric. Such an asymmetry can be seen, for
instance, when a briber pays a $1,000 to a bribee to get a benefit of $2,000 from a contract.
In an assessment of the effectiveness of monetary penalties, OECD concluded that “23
countries' maximum fines were not high enough to offset the financial return on investments in
which bribery is involved.”1016 The low monetary penalty has provoked a number of
commentators, among them OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria, who stated that
“[s]ometimes sanctions are so light that even if people have a 100 percent chance of getting
caught they would still choose to pay the fine and get the benefit of the act of bribery.”1017
Despite these considerations, conventions against corruption tend to avoid providing
detailed guidance for sentencing in corruption offenses. The UNCAC, refraining from providing
a minimum or a maximum for penalties, states that “each State Party shall take measures … to
provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties”1018
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Id. at 54.
Id.
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Id. at 52.
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Disparate Laws, Low Fines Mean Corporate Bribery Often Pays: OECD, REUTERS, Jun. 9,
2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oecd-corruption-idUSKCN0YV1BR. See also OECD, Is
foreign bribery an attractive investment in some countries? in OECD BUSINESS AND FINANCE
OUTLOOK 2016 207-22 (OECD ed., 2016).
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Id.
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UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 12 (1); see also OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 3 Para. 1
(states that bribery of foreign officials “shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties comparable to the penalties for corruption of domestic officials.”).
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Additional recommendations are provided by the UNCAS and the OECD, including the
disqualification of convicted individuals from holding public offices,1019 the recognition of “legal
persons’ criminal liability,”1020 and confiscation of the benefit.1021
Accordingly, countries around the globe vary in the penalties they inflict on corruption
offenses. In terms of penalties, countries generally impose a fixed imprisonment penalty, yet they
vary in the assignment of monetary penalties. A number of countries impose a fixed monetary
penalty for bribery,1022 while others take into consideration the value of bribe.1023 Notably, some
countries, including Saudi Arabia, have adopted a mix of the two systems, where they apply the
former to individuals and the latter on legal persons.1024 It is also worth noting that a number of
countries, including United Kingdom, do not set a maximum limit for a monetary penalty.1025
In the Saudi context, the Saudi legal system assigns asymmetric penalties depending on
the offenses ranging from 2 to 10 years of imprisonment and a monetary penalty ranging from
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UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 30 (7).
OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 3 Para. 2; see also UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 26.
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OECD Convention, supra note 29, art. 3 Para. 3; see also UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 31.
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See, e.g., CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 435-1, 435-2, 435-3 435-4 (Fr.) (Bribery is generally
punished by “ten years' imprisonment and a fine of €150,000.” Article 131-38 for legal persons
“The maximum amount of a fine applicable to legal persons is five times that which is applicable
to natural persons by the law sanctioning the offence.”); see also OECD, supra note 1016, at 210
(“Some countries impose simple maximum thresholds for monetary fines. These vary greatly in
size from about USD 580 000 in the country with the lowest threshold to over USD 10 million in
the highest threshold.”).
1023
See, e.g., Act No. 16 of 1960, art. 114 (Kuwaiti Penal Code of 1960), Official Gazette
(Kuwait); Criminal Code No. 15 of 1976, art. 191 (Bahr.); Criminal Code No. 11 of 2004, art.
140 (Qatar); Criminal Code No. 3 of 1987, art. 238 (U.A.E.); 18 U.S. Code § 201 (West).
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Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) divs 141.1 (5)(6) (Austl.) (Australia adopts a mix of the two
systems. See Division 141.1 (5) penalty for individuals is a fix amount of monetary penalty.
Division 141.1 (6) also adopts a similar system for legal persons, allowing the judge to impose a
fine of 100.000 penalty units, or a maximum that does not exceed threefold the value of the
benefit.).
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Gerry Ferguson, Criminal Sentences and civil sanctions for corruption, in GLOBAL
CORRUPTION: LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (2015); see also OECD, supra note 1016, at 210
(indicating that “eight countries do not set ‘maximum’ thresholds for fines.”).
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twenty thousand to a million Saudi Riyal. Additionally, the Anti-Bribery Law achieved certain
advances in imposing collateral penalties, which includes dismissal from public office,
confiscation, and promulgation of convictions.1026 The Law also made an advance by
recognizing aggravated penalties for repeated offenders1027 and the criminal liability of legal
persons, imposing a monetary penalty of tenfold the value of the bribe.1028
Although the Saudi legal system has achieved a number of significant advances, certain
points deserve to be highlighted. The absence of sentencing guidelines and the penal code have
contributed to the issue of an inconsistency between penalties. With regard to bribery, while the
monetary penalty is assigned in the Anti-Bribery Law, the Impeachment of Ministers Law
refrains from imposing monetary fines.1029 Even if a fixed monetary penalty were imposed,
which is the situation in the current Anti-Bribery Law, which imposes a penalty of a million
Saudi Riyal (equivalent to 270,000 USD), the Saudi legal system might be falling into the trap of
a low monetary penalty. Consequently, the shift from a fixed amount of monetary penalty to a
monetary penalty based on the value of the bribe would provide more consistency and be more
effective.
Finally, since the success of any anti-corruption system partly depends on whistleblowers
and uncovering these offenses, a process which is always characterized by secrecy, rewards play
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See Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, arts. 13, 15, & 21.
Id. art. 18.
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Id. art. 19; see, e.g., THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 960, at 58 (Note that there are number of countries that do not adopt the criminal
liability of legal persons, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Egypt and
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See Impeachment of Ministers Law, supra note 842, art. 5 (States that “a penalty of
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significant role in such a system. Similar to the laws in a number of countries,1030 the AntiBribery Law grants relatively generous rewards to encourage whistleblowers to report crimes.
The rewards range from 5,000 Saudi Riyal (equivalent to 1,333 USD) to the half of the value of
the confiscated benefits.1031
E. Protection of Whistleblowers and Witnesses
In addition to penalties and rewards, the success of anti-corruption laws requires a
mechanism to uncover corrupt practices. Since it is mainly characterized by hidden acts, to
uncover these acts may require motivating whistleblowers to report. This can be done either by
the reward mechanism, as noted, or by protection, or both. In addition to its significant role in
detecting corrupt practices by providing unaccusable information facilitating the investigation,
reporting may play a similar role in preventing corrupt practices by increasing mistrust between
bribers and bribees.1032 In social terms, reporting enhances trust in law enforcement and the rule
of law on one hand, and a decreased perception of corrupt practices as normal practices on the
other.1033
Confusion arises, mainly in countries where laws and rules regarding the protection of
whistleblowers and witnesses are not common,1034 between the protection of whistleblowers and
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OECD, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: ENCOURAGING REPORTING 10 (2012) (“The [Korean]
Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission may provide whistleblowers with rewards of up to
USD 2 million if their report has contributed directly to recovering or increasing revenues or
reducing expenditures for public agencies.” “The Dodd-Frank Act also authorizes the SEC to pay
rewards to individuals who provide the Commission with original information that leads to
successful SEC enforcement actions (and certain related actions). Rewards may range from 10
percent to 30 percent of the funds recovered.”).
1031
See Anti-Bribery Law, supra note 796, art. 17.
1032
THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 960, at
71.
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Id.
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Id (“not a single country in the region [Eastern Europe and Central Asia] has effective legal
provisions to protect whistleblowers in either the private or public sectors.”).
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the protection of witnesses and individuals cooperating with the investigatory authorities. The
difference between these two groups lies mainly in the procedures they are involved in:
whistleblowers are not normally part of a criminal procedure, either because the private company
or government agency deals with the issue internally, or because law enforcement has adequate
evidence and does not need the whistleblower’s testimony. Witnesses, on the other hand, are
directly involved in the criminal procedure.1035 The source and the purpose of the protection
differs accordingly. Since whistleblowers will not take part in criminal procedures in most cases,
provisions are derived from administrative regulations, labor laws, or specific laws on the
protection of whistleblowers aiming at protecting them against retaliation, mobbing, dismissal,
etc., in the workplace.1036 In contrast, the protection of witnesses and individuals cooperating
with the authorities aims at protecting their physical integrity.1037
Based on this distinction, anti-bribery rules generally tend to focus on the protection of
witnesses and individuals cooperating with the authorities due to the fact that these cases are
criminal cases in nature. In this matter, the UNCAC provides that “[e]ach State Party shall
consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic
law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in
the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this
Convention.”1038
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Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72 (“whistleblower protection rules for the private sector are provided in labour code
(Slovak Republic, Sweden [France and Norway]) or in specific laws on protection of
whistleblowers (Japan, United Kingdom, [New Zealand and Canada]). Whistleblower protection
in the public sector is usually provided in administrative laws or regulations (Mexico).”).
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UNCAC, supra note 29, art. 37(3); see also Article 22 of Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption, January, 27, 1999, Eur. T.S. No. 173 (Similarly states that “[e]ach Party shall adopt
such measures as may be necessary to provide effective and appropriate protection for:
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A distinction between the defense of effective regret and the immunity or leniency
granted to individuals cooperating with the authorities deserves to be highlighted. Despite the
great similarities between them, “[i]n most countries, the effective regret [defense] applies only
when an offender reports the crime shortly after its commission, which is not required in the case
of immunity.”1039 However, this requirement, i.e., reporting the offense shortly after the
commission, is not always adopted by countries, since some countries allow more time so long
as the offense was not uncovered by the authorities, and thus an offender may benefit from such
a defense.1040 Thus, countries take different positions on effective regret; while some countries
provide such a defense, others do not.1041
Nevertheless, a concern about the “effective regret” defense arises in the case of the
bribery of foreign officials. Generally, the effective regret defense benefits the briber who reports
the bribery to avoid the criminal liability, which eventually also assists the authorities by
providing essential information to prosecute corrupt officials.1042 Such a purpose may not be

a) those who report the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2
to 14 or otherwise co-operate with the investigating or prosecuting authorities;
b) witnesses who give testimony concerning these offences….”).
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THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 871, at
53.
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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK & ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, THE CRIMINALISATION OF BRIBERY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 35 (2011).
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Id. at 251, 284, & 458 (Within the Japanese Penal Code, “domestic bribery offences do not
contain some defenses to bribery that are commonly found in other jurisdictions. According to
the Japanese authorities, there are no defenses of small facilitation payments, solicitation or
‘effective regret’.” A similar position has been taken by Korea and Singapore.); see also
RODERICK MACAULEY, FIGHTING CORRUPTION: INCRIMINATIONS 54 (2011) (“[The effective
regret defense] is not known at all in the more western European nations.”).
1042
OECD, FOREIGN BRIBERY OFFENCE AND ITS ENFORCEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA 53 (2016).
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achieved in bribery involving foreign officials since “there is no guarantee that the foreign
official who was given a bribe will be prosecuted if the bribe giver comes forward.”1043
Within the Saudi legal system, the Anti-Bribery Law, as noted in the previous chapter,
adopts the effective regret defense for the briber and the middleman who cooperates with
authorities, but this does not extend to the recipient of bribe.1044 Though the Law does not require
that the information provided to be fundamental in building and proving the case,1045 scholars
have argued that such a requirement must be met.1046 However, the Law allows for a delay in
reporting the offense so long as the offense is not uncovered or investigated by the authority.1047
In terms of witness protection, the Executive Regulation of Criminal Procedure Law allows the
investigator to conceal the identity of witnesses.1048
Nevertheless, the Saudi legal system lacks a comprehensive legal apparatus to protect
witnesses or individuals reporting offenses, their relatives, and other close individuals.
According to the U.N. Executive summary, “Saudi Arabia has not taken appropriate measures to
provide effective protection against potential retaliation or intimidation for persons who
cooperate with the justice authorities or for their relatives and other persons close to them.”1049
Notably, anonymous reports are not always preferred nor protected, especially in regard to
corrupt offenses.1050 In terms of protection of whistleblowers, such provisions do not exist in
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Saudi Arabia, thus allowing retaliation against whistleblowers.1051 In view of the absence of such
provisions, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development and the Ministry of Commerce and
Investment recently took steps to issue new regulations aiming at encouraging and protecting
whistleblowers.1052
F. The Jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law
Historically, anti-bribery provisions began by targeting the offenses within the
framework of public offices due to the fact that public offices were controlling and responsible
for significant resources, and those offenses would jeopardize the social and economic structure,
leaving the bribery in the private sector to be governed by “civil (e.g. competition) or [labor]
laws or general criminal law provisions.”1053
With the emergence of mega corporations and enterprises, societies, and more
importantly, economies, were restructured. These corporations and enterprises have gained the
same significance and effects on societies and economies as governments once had. Soon, their
business activities expanded from the local domain to become global, which then added more
difficulties to combating bribery, since countries are restricted in their jurisdiction to certain
geographical and personal scopes. Thus, certain countries realized such an effect and acted to
face corrupt offences occurring within that scope. Regrettably, however, a number of countries
518365.html#.V8TiumUi6f5 (Ministry of Labour spokesman Hattab Al Enezy indicates that
“disclosure of informers’ identities was essential to take legal action against corrupt officials.”);
see also SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF
WHISTLEBLOWER & JOURNALIST PROTECTIONS GLOBALLY: A CUSTOMARY LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
REPRESENTATIVE CASE, 81 (2015) (“whistleblowers are put in even more potential danger, since
the state will not allow anonymous reporting. The law states that the identity of the
whistleblower is necessary in order to investigate the claims.”).
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did not extend the application of anti-bribery provisions to reach the private sector’s corrupt
practices.
In addition to the traditional form of bribery where a bribe is paid to a local official,
countries have become subject to two additional forms of bribery. The first is bribery within the
private sector, which may take the form of private to private bribery or individual to private
bribery. The second form is bribery paid by a private sector company or private individuals to a
foreign official. This is not, however, limited to bribery offenses, but may also extend to other
offenses such as trade in influence or abuse of power.
Accordingly, a number of contemporary conventions against corrupt practices include the
private sector (commercial bribery) and the bribery of foreign officials within their provisions.
The UNCAC urges, rather than requires, its state parties to adopt “legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the
course of economic, financial or commercial activities.”1054 Further, conventions have advanced
to cover bribes paid by private entities and individuals to foreign officials, expanding the
jurisdiction of countries to prosecute those entities and individuals.1055
The U.S. took the initiative to fight the bribery of foreign officials as early as 1977 when
it enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).1056 The FCPA prohibits individuals and
entities within the FCPA’s jurisdiction from committing “any acts in furtherance of bribery
aimed at influencing the business decisions of foreign government officials or foreign political
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candidates or parties.”1057 The purpose of the FCPA clearly aims at protecting fair competition
among American businesses and individuals carrying out international business activities.1058
Since the domain of international business is shared and includes other international entities
whose countries do not adopt similar acts restricting the bribery of foreign public officials, the
American entities were disadvantaged when competing with other countries’ entities.1059
Thus, the Americans took another step, but this time globally. Their efforts aimed at the
adoption of harmonized provisions criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials.1060 These efforts
result in the implementation of such provisions in other conventions, as noted above.1061 At the
beginning of this century, such efforts culminated in the adoption of similar provisions targeting
the bribery of foreign officials in more countries and placing the same restrictions on more
international corporations.1062
Within the scope of private sector, bribery offenses became more common, leading
national legislatures to react by improving and amending their criminal law, yet different
countries have adopted different techniques.1063 Countries such as Germany, Korea, the
Netherlands, and Sweden, for instance, have adopted criminal provisions directly targeting
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commercial bribery in their criminal codes.1064 Others have opted to follow another technique by
adopting criminal provisions in different special laws such as commercial laws or anti-trust
provisions.1065 Notably, some countries remain reliant on classical crimes such as “fraud
management, misappropriation, fraudulent administration, or forgery of documents.”1066
The Saudi Anti-Bribery Law defines specifically the scope of its application in Article 8.
The law, as explained in the previous chapter, covers bribery in the private sector, as well as
bribery of public officials. While the law covers persons employed in joint stock corporations
and corporations carrying out banking operations with no conditions, a condition of performance
of public service or managing, running, or maintaining a public facility is a condition to applying
the provisions of the Law to persons employed in entities other than these kinds of corporations.
That is, an entity other than a joint stock corporation, whether it is a holding company, a sole
corporation, a limited liability corporation, or a non-profit organization, has to meet the previous
requirement to be included within the scope of Article 8. Finally, all others can be prosecuted
and punished under the ta’azir crimes.
To understand the jurisdiction of the Law, three scenarios must be provided. The first is
one where the giver of a bribe is a Saudi corporation, of any kind, and the recipient is foreign
official in a foreign embassy in Saudi Arabia or abroad. This is definitely outside the jurisdiction
of the Anti-Bribery Law since the Law and “Saudi legislation does not criminalize bribery
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committed by foreign public officials or officials of international public institutions, nor does it
criminalize the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe by any such official.”1067
The second scenario can be more complex and challenging to the Law specifically and to
the legal system generally. Consider the situation where the giver of bribe is within the
jurisdiction of the Law, yet the recipient is not. In such a scenario, none of the parties falls within
the jurisdiction of the Law since the Law only criminalizes the solicitation or acceptance of a
bribe if that is committed by persons within the jurisdiction of the Law.1068 Aside from ta’azir,
provisions criminalizing certain practices in different laws might be applied to such a situation.
One such provision is found in the recently enacted Companies Law, which criminalizes the
misuse of power or votes knowingly when such an act is against the interests of the company and
seeks to directly or indirectly obtain personal advantages for oneself or other individuals or
another company.1069 The other provision is in the Competition Law; it is rather indirect and
targets legal persons, stating that
[p]ractices, agreements or contracts among current or potential competing firms … shall
be prohibited, if the objective of such practices, agreements or contracts, or consequent
impact thereof is the restriction of commerce or violation of competition among firms. A
firm or firms enjoying a dominant position shall also be banned from carrying out any
practice which restricts competition among firms.…1070
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The final scenario can be more specific to the trade in influence offenses, but is intended
to highlight the jurisdiction of the Law over former officials. Suppose a payment was provided to
a former official to use his influence in an agency, organization, or other entity in which he has
been holding a high rank. Such a situation would challenge the jurisdiction of the Law since the
Law’s jurisdiction is limited to current public officials or those who are deemed as such by
Article 8. That is, if an individual does not hold a position that falls within the scope of Article 8
at the time he agrees to use his influence, he may not fall within the jurisdiction of the Law.1071
To sum up, offenses committed by certain individuals may fall outside the jurisdiction of
the Anti-Bribery Law. This includes foreign public officials, former officials, and employees in
the private sector other than joint stock corporations, corporations carrying out banking
operations, or corporations performing public services or managing, running, or maintaining a
public facility. It is also important to emphasize that the Law focuses on the recipient’s soliciting
or accepting a bribe; this means that if the recipient of the payment is not covered by the scope of
Article 8, the jurisdiction of the law is limited, even if the giver of bribe falls within the scope of
Article 8.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined six aspects of the Saudi Anti-Corruption Law. Those aspects
were selected to focus on the most significant legal issues when discussing bribery or similar
corrupt practices. These aspects include the liability of legal persons, the wasta provision,
immunity, penalties and rewards, the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses, and the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law.
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As noted above, the Saudi legal system possesses a number of advantages that other
countries lack. However, such advantages may not be fully functional since they are either
incomplete or there are other provisions within the general legal framework that may hinder their
effectiveness. Finally, this chapter sought to provide an examination and evaluation of the issues,
rather than recommending solutions, which will be provided in the next chapter with respect to
certain issues.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FIGHTING CORRUPTION A DIFFERENT WAY
INTRODUCTION
Having highlighted the main issues behind corruption in Saudi Arabia, this chapter aims
at providing legal and procedural suggestions that can directly or indirectly reduce the practice of
wasta and other corrupt practices. Since a number of corrupt practices are socially and legally
influenced, these suggestions bear such factors in mind in order to provide applicable solutions
to fight corruption in Saudi Arabia. It is also important to note that though a number of
weaknesses have been highlighted in the previous chapter, this chapter does not provide
additional recommendations on topics where they have been provided previously. The exception
is the jurisdiction of Anti-Bribery Law, which will be discussed in this chapter.
In addition to suggestions about reforming the jurisdiction of Anti-Bribery Law to cover
private-to-private bribery on the one hand and the bribery of foreign public officials on the other,
this chapter also urges the simplification of procedures by proposing a number of changes in the
existing e-government program. The development of such programs serves a dual purpose: that
of simplification and of adding anti-corruption mechanisms. In this chapter, a number of nudges
are recommended to fight wasta in particular and generally other corrupt practices. Finally, this
chapter explores the role of criminal law in fighting corruption.
A. Nudges
Since wasta is deeply rooted in Saudi society, the solution may be to combat such
practices indirectly. Laws and regulations are more likely to fail and prove to be ineffective when
they are too far ahead of the culture in which they are enacted. In line with that, mechanism
combating wasta in the recent time should adopts a gradual and indirect approach to facilitate
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and minimize the shock of introducing legal provisions that directly target such practices.
Accordingly, gentle nudges may play a useful role.
Generally, policies may take different forms among which are a form of ‘do and do not,’
a form of economic incentives, and a form of nudges. A nudge is defined as “any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any
options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the
intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.”1072 Recently, this approach has been utilized in
various areas such as, for instance, environmental and health issues. The nudge approach is
based on the idea of libertarian paternalism, which on the one hand seeks to “steer people’s
choice in directions that will benefit them” while maintaining or increasing their freedom of
choice on the other.1073 Further, a nudge can take various forms, among which are the
simplification of rules and procedures, the use of social norms, an increase in ease and
convenience, graphic warnings, reminders, eliciting implementation intentions, and informing
individuals about the consequences of their past decisions.1074
Various nudge practices have been used or suggested as means of fighting corruption.
One example is the use of architecture and design to fight corruption; one writer has suggested
that offices should be designed to be transparent (i.e., glass offices) to promote more
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transparency in the activities that go on within them.1075 To illustrate the importance of
architecture and design; another study sheds light on the development of the architecture and
design of courthouses throughout history and how that development shapes people’s notions of
justice.1076
Yet another study supports the idea that simple and inexpensive initiatives (nudges) may
reduce corrupt practices by officials. The study, which examined five laboratory experiments and
another organizational survey study, found “that exposure to moral symbols displayed by the
subordinates dissuades superiors from both engaging in unethical behaviors themselves and
asking their subordinates to engage in unethical behavior.”1077 What these moral symbols do is to
nudge individuals by reminding them to maintain their integrity and refrain from acting
unethically. Another interpretation is that such symbols create a social norm of rejecting
unethical behavior. Once such a social norm is perceived by superiors, then they are dissuaded
from violating the norm by acting or asking others to act unethically.
In practice and reality, a brilliant initiative was undertaken by an Indian NGO named
Fifth Pillar to fight petty corruption (bribery of lower level officials). They printed and
distributed zero rupee notes to the citizens so that they could hand these valueless notes to
officials who were demanding bribery.1078 The goal was to show a rejection of the demand of
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bribery and “to get people to show their disapproval of public service delivery dependent on
bribes.”1079 The zero Rupee served as a nudge since it enhanced individuals’ commitment to
reject petty corruption and paying a bribe.
Scholar Dieter Zinnbauer has introduced a notion he calls “ambient accountability,”
which “can be broadly described as all efforts that seek to shape, use and engage systematically
with the built environment and public places and the ways people experience and interact in
them, in order to further transparency, accountability and integrity of public authorities and
services.”1080 Since it eventually aims at “steer[ing] people’s choice in directions that will benefit
them,”1081 the notion of ambient accountability can be considered as a nudge approach in a broad
sense. Zinnbauer’s examples of such initiatives include the idea of graphic warnings, informing
individuals about their rights (reminders and disclosure), and enabling them to provide feedback
(simplification and increases in ease and convenience).1082
Consequently, the initiatives introduced by Zinnbauer focus on informing individuals of
their rights and allowing them to provide an evaluation at the very place where the service is
provided, which then enhances accountability. One of the interesting ideas Zinnbauer presents is
that of Twitter walls which provide immediate feedback from citizens about the service they
have just received and the performance of officials and employees. These Twitter walls were
placed in front of the place providing a service, allowing immediate feedback and accountability.
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In terms of nudges that have already been employed in Saudi Arabia, a number of
initiatives have been seen on the ground, some of which are initiated by individuals and others
by the government. In terms of those initiated by individuals, some officers and law enforcement
personnel have started taking off their name tags to avoid pressure from others that would affect
the performance of their duty. As explained above in Chapter 5, the name of the family can
provide demographic information about the individual, and law enforcement personnel who have
a name tag presenting their family or tribal name can invite pressure from others belonging to the
same region, tribe, or family. Such pressure then inhibits law enforcement officials from
performing their legal duties ethically and impartially. As an example of initiatives implemented
by governmental agencies and organizations, detailed information about projects highlighting the
timeline of the project, the contractors, and the cost of the project has been presented on signs at
the place of the proposed projects. Such initiatives are aimed at promoting the transparency of
government projects and contracts.
These initiatives and nudges can be also developed and enhanced to be more effective.
Not wearing the name tag is a way to avoid the pressure and protect the impartiality of officers
and personnel, yet it may not be the most appropriate practice from a legal point of view. What
can be done instead is to provide personnel with the option of wearing a name tag that shows
only their first name and an officer identification number. The practice can be also expanded to
be applied to individuals in other governmental agencies and organizations whose duties involve
dealing with the public. On the other hand, informational signs are great in terms of promoting
transparency, yet they do not invite feedback. To improve the sufficiency and effectiveness of

238

these signs, the utilization of social media, mainly Twitter,1083 and the creation of an active
channel to allow immediate feedback can yield more benefits from such an initiative and
promote accountability in addition to transparency.
With that being said, there are still other nudges that can be suggested to fight corruption
generally and wasta particularly. In terms of corruption in general, it has been argued that one of
the obstacles facing efforts to fight corruption is the “denial of victim” justification—that is,
“most corrupt activities are clandestine and go unreported because they lack an immediate
victim.”1084 To nudge the system, therefore, a solution that can be suggested is to visualize the
victims, which would help in bridging the gap. Thus, it can be suggested that the Saudi
government use a graphic warning showing the victims of corruption—for instance, a graphic
warning about the consequences of corruption in which victims of the Jeddah floods appear. This
step would serve a purpose in informing individuals about the consequences of their past
decisions. Such a nudge can be more effective than graphics that merely warn against accepting
or paying a bribe.
With respect to wasta, in addition to graphic warnings showing the victims of wasta,
other graphic warnings showing how other individuals negatively perceive individuals using
wasta can help in reducing the practice. For instance, data have been provided in Chapter 5
showing that individuals using wasta are perceived as less competent; or a visual image
representing the perception of wasta as a form of corruption and an unfair practice can be shown
to people to nudge them to refrain from engaging in the practice of wasta. Another nudge that
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can be suggested is to have a “whitelist” which rewards the agencies and organizations that
reduce the practice of wasta, which can enhance the commitment to fighting wasta. To
implement this nudge, another nudge may be suggested—push-button boxes linked to the
National Authority for Combating Corruption (Nazaha) through which individuals can report the
practice of wasta directly. An award then can be based on the number of reports, which can then
enhance the commitment of both citizens and officials to refrain from engaging in the practice of
wasta.
Finally, since Saudi society is a largely Muslim society, nudges should be utilized to
increase individuals’ self-awareness. These nudges should focus on and highlight the dissonance
between Islamic principles (which, as has been shown in the second chapter, firmly reject
corruption) and the existing corrupt practices. Consider, for instance, an experiment aimed at
examining self-awareness of cheating as a dishonest behavior which proved that the number of
people cheating decreased when participants merely signed an honor code.1085 Such a procedure
apparently increased the participants’ self-awareness, which by itself controlled their dishonest
behavior. Similar steps can be adopted simply by using a verse of the Qur’an or other phrases on
official documents to increase the self-awareness of those who use them. Even more practically,
official documents should contain a line that states, for instance, that this document has been
processed in agreement with regulations signed by public officials.
B. Simplification of the Procedures and the Implementation of E-Government
In this section, the discussion will focus on approaches to fighting wasta primarily,
although some of the points discussed will be applicable to other corrupt practices as well. To
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understand why wasta is difficult to dictate or reduce, one must examine the role of the
institutional structures. As noted above in Chapter 5, wasta seems to provide an alternative to
weak institutional structures. The same also applies to other indigenous forms of informal
influence such as guanxi. As has been suggested in the Chinese context, “the absence of official
rules permits guanxi relations to drive official decision-making.”1086
Thus, weak institutional structures and official rules lower the level of
professionalism.1087 This can be seen in the weak role of codes of conduct in both the public and
the private sector in Saudi Arabia. In 2013, however, Nazaha drafted a code of conduct in
conjunction with the Ministry of Civil Service which aims at inter alia protecting public money
and imposing mandatory financial disclosure for public officials.1088 The Nazaha also drafted and
adopted a code of conduct and urged the private sector to follow their lead.1089
The issues raised by the foregoing are twofold: first, a weak institutional structure leads
to vague procedures. The second issue that stems from the weak institutional structure is
undefined discretionary power. The unrestricted discretionary power by itself, as discussed in the
first chapter, creates a fertile ground for corruption to thrive in. Thus, those two factors when
coupled together lead to the thriving of wasta and drive individuals to rely on wasta to advance
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their businesses, to say nothing of the thriving of corrupt practices in general. This suggests that
the clarification and simplification of procedures on the one hand, and the defining of
discretionary powers on the other, would limit the pervasive practice of wasta.1090
Related to these issues, a number of studies have suggested that the use of e-government
reduces the level of corruption in general and of wasta specifically.1091 When implemented
effectively, e-government can curb corruption, at least partly, since it reduces discretionary
power, which then closes the door to opportunities to act arbitrarily; from the other side, the fact
that e-government secures and maintains detailed information about each transaction facilitates
the investigation and the tracking of corrupt practices, which then increases the odds of their
being detected.1092 In general, “[b]y making rules simpler and more transparent, e-government
emboldens citizens and businesses to question unreasonable procedures and their arbitrary
application.”1093
In Saudi Arabia, e-government has been already implemented by a number of
governmental agencies. Early in 2003, the Saudi government issued a Royal Decree ordering the

1090

See, e.g., Irène Hors, Fighting Corruption in Customs Administration: What Can We Learn
From Recent Experiences? 21 (OECD Research, Working Paper No. 175, 2001) (arguing that
“[t]his radical simplification of tax structure greatly reduced abusive exercise of discretion by
customs officers.”).
1091
See, e.g., Thomas B. Andersen, E-Government as an Anti-Corruption Strategy, 21 INFO.
ECON. & POL. 201, 209 (2009) (“[t]his paper documents that increases in the use of egovernment have led to reductions in corruption over the decade 1996–2006 in non-OECD
countries.”); see, e.g., Cassandra E. Di Rienzo et al., Corruption and the Role of Information, 38
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 320, 320-32 (2007).
1092
Subhash Bhatnagar, E-government and Access to Information, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION
REPORT 2003: ACCESS TO INFORMATION 24, 30 (Transparency Int’l 2003).
1093
Id; see also Subhajit Basu, E-Government and Developing Countries: An Overview, 18 INT’L
REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 109, 110 (2004) (arguing that “[t]he strategic objective of egovernance is to support and simplify governance for all parties; government, citizens and
businesses.”).
242

Ministry of Finance to establish an e-government program.1094 In the same year, another Royal
Decree was issued to assign the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to be
responsible for managing, planning, and developing of the communications and information
technology sector.1095 Later in that year, the Ministry of Communication and Information
Technology was ordered to institute a plan to provide e-government services to individuals and
was authorized to provide the necessary resources through government procurement.1096 In 2005,
the E-Government Program (YESSER) was established in a partnership between the Ministry of
Communication and Information Technology and the Ministry of Finance.1097
To succeed, or at least increase the benefits of this strategy, certain points have to be
taken into consideration to enhance and support fighting corruption. When discussing the egovernment initiatives, the experience of the Seoul e-government system for anti-corruption,
known as OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for civil application), offers useful lessons.
Inter alia, OPEN implemented prevention and enforcement strategies aimed at curbing
corruption. The prevention strategy involved a reform of administrative procedures and practice
“by clarifying the procedures and designing systems that ‘simplify, standardize, and depersonalize the delivery of services.’”1098 The enforcement strategy aims at achieving a high
level of accountability and transparency.1099 Further, the Seoul Metropolitan Government
strengthened its enforcement strategy by inviting the Audit and Inspection Bureau to be part of
the enforcement mechanism. The transparency aspect of the OPEN system can be seen in a
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feature that provides an applicant with the ability to know the status of the transaction in real
time, the official in charge, and the time frame in the transaction is to be handled.1100 This feature
enhances the accountability aspect since applicants can submit a complaint to the audit
department—“they may even contact the Mayor through an e-mail or online bulletin board”—
when any misconduct or delay is observed.1101
In addition, social media applications play an important role in fostering the process and
utility of e-government systems, which is especially significant in those cultures that value faceto-face interactions.1102 In general, social media can serve the dual purpose of accountability on
one hand and of clarifying and simplifying administrative procedures on the other. A study based
on the concept of psychological distance found that “forms of e-government conducive to the
transmission of less detailed information (social media) may be more effective at improving
relationships between citizens and their government than forms of e-government that are more
commonly used to transmit detailed information (e-government websites).”1103
This suggests that Saudi Arabia can improve its e-government by considering these
points. The involvement of an independent audit body, the Nazaha for instance, in addition to the
audit departments of the agencies and organizations, will contribute significantly to
accountability and eventually enhance the strategy of anti-corruption. Further, the adoption of a
hybrid system through which the governmental websites provide concise information while
social media channels provide more information through active interactions with individuals
would maximize the utility of the e-government system.
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Broadly speaking, the divisive effect of wasta specifically and of corruption generally
can be eradicated by implementing fair procedures. Thus, “[p]rocedures and practices that all
parties regard as ‘fair’ facilitate positive relations among group members and preserve the fabric
of society even in the face of conflicts of interest that exist in any group whose members have
different preferences and different beliefs concerning how the group should manage its
affairs.”1104
To summarize, the existence of e-government per se does not limit or reduce corrupt
practices and behaviors. Instead, legal regulations are needed that define procedures and impose
civil and criminal liability for violations. Such violations may take the form of the alteration of
confidential or legal documents. The culpability is greater when the distance between the act and
the result is close, which is not always the case with corrupt behaviors and acts. Thus, violations
of the rules regulating e-government has the effect of decreasing the distance between the act and
the result, and thus increase the perception of culpability. The existence of e-government should
also aim at providing legitimate procedures that apply equally and fairly.
In essence, this solution can be characterized as an indirect approach to targeting wasta
by incorporating nudges into the system. That is, instead of outlawing wasta directly, this
approach minimizes the cultural clash and confrontation by shifting the focus to restricting the
practice through reforming procedures. The reform of procedures then decreases the reliance on
wasta, which eventually decreases the prevalence of the practice and intensity of the cultural
confrontation.
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C. The Reform of Anti-Bribery Jurisdiction
The most recent waves of anti-corruption regulation have aimed at fighting the bribery of
foreign officials and private-to-private bribery. Rules targeting the bribery of foreign public
officials have been adopted by a growing number of countries as a result of American efforts, as
noted in the previous chapter, to protect fair competition between corporations conducting
business activities abroad.1105 Above all, these provisions close the loopholes resulting from the
limited jurisdictions of anti-bribery provisions, allowing corporations to escape from prosecution
and criminal liability for their conduct abroad.
1. General View of the Jurisdiction of Anti-Bribery Law
Building on the all the illustrations offered in previous chapters and the social structure of
Saudi Arabia, where the power and resources may not always be associated with public office,
the only suggestion that can be made is to abandon the “protection of the integrity of public
offices” notion and shift to a “protection of national integrity” notion. Such a task is definitely
not an easy one since it requires a comprehensive reconsideration of the recent provisions
enacted to combat corruption practices.
From a broader perspective, the problem of the Anti-Bribery Law’s jurisdiction is not
limited to the offenses of bribery. In fact, the other offenses namely, trade-in-influence,
accepting of wasta, or the following up of a case being processed outside the public official’s
authority, may invite more difficulties and more easily evade the short reach of the provisions of
the Law. These offenses share one characteristic in that they all require that an individual must
have power and influence to be able to commit any of these offenses. Thus, since power may not
always derive from one source, i.e., public office or position, which is especially true in the
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Saudi context, the individual committing the offense may not always be a public official or hold
a public office at the time of committing such an offense.
Thus, in addition to failing to extend the jurisdiction of the Law to the private sector
completely, the Law fails to include former public officials, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, within its jurisdiction. The question is raised as to whether the inclusion of them would
be sufficient. The accurate answer is that it would allow the prosecution of more cases and
consequently eliminate, to some extent, the commission of such offenses.
The dilemma may be seen in whether to widen the jurisdiction of the Law and provide a
broad jurisdiction to the application of the Law on the one hand, or to limit the jurisdiction of the
Law and avoid creating catch-all provisions on the other. Thus, it seems that expanding the
jurisdiction of the Law to apply to all the aforementioned offenses is not practical. From a
practical prospective, the suggestion that can be offered to overcome such a dilemma is that
instead of adopting a general jurisdiction of the Law applying to all of the offenses within the
Law, the jurisdiction should be defined on the basis of the offense. For instance, the jurisdiction
of the trade-in-influence offense should be defined distinguishably from the offense of following
up on a case being processed outside a public official’s authority. That is, the jurisdiction of the
Law can be defined on an offense-by-offense basis, rather than creating one jurisdiction for all
offenses, which is the current situation of the Law.
2. Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
In the Saudi legal system, the lack of provisions targeting the bribery of foreign public
officials may not only negatively impact fair competition, but also the human rights of
individuals. For instance, a number of foreign workers have accused their countries’ embassies
of receiving bribes from their Saudi employers in order to turn a blind eye to the violations of
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contracts committed by the employers.1106 In a larger context, recruitment companies and
agencies, for instance, may engage in similar activities.1107
The bribery of foreign public officials also may be committed by other Saudi companies
engaging in international business activities, especially considering the growing size and number
of Saudi companies.1108 As an example of the impact of the Saudi private sector, five out of the
ten largest joint stock corporations in Arab world are Saudi corporations.1109
As with American corporations, such an initiative would definitely provoke many
complaints from Saudi companies since these provisions may put them at a disadvantage when
competing with other international corporations whose countries have not adopted similar
provisions. Nevertheless, this does not eliminate the need for enacting provisions to combat the
bribery of foreign public officials.
In order to enact comprehensive provisions combating the bribery of public officials,
specific elements have to be taken into consideration; namely, the definition of a public official
and the affirmative defense. Thus, to enact optimal provisions, both international and national
experience needs to be utilized. At the international level, the UNCAC and the OECD provide a
basic framework for the bribery of public officials while the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act of
2010 (hereafter the Bribery Act of 2010) offer examples of efforts at the national level.
1106

VLIEGER, supra note 340, at 198.
See, e.g., id.
1108
See, e.g., Forbes global 2000: Saudi Arabia's largest companies, ECONOMY WATCH, July. 7,
2013, http://www.economywatch.com/companies/forbes-list/saudi-arabia.html (“In total, there
were 17 Saudi companies on the 2013 Forbes Global 2000 list. Collectively, the companies had a
combined market value of $256.8 billion, with $567.8 billion in assets; generating $122.5 billion
in revenues and $20.1 billion in profits.”).
1109
See, e.g., Top 100 companies in the Arab World 2016, FORBES MIDDLE EAST, (last visited
Dec. 31, 2016). http://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/en/lists/read/2016/top-100-companies-in-thearab-world-2016/listid/281; see also Top 100 companies in Arab world revealed, Gulf News,
June. 1, 2016, http://gulfnews.com/business/economy/top-100-companies-in-arab-worldrevealed-1.1838772.
1107

248

At the outset, the provisions of the aforementioned laws seem to agree on the definition
of a foreign public official, though they may differ structurally. Generally, these rules cover two
distinct kinds of officials: public officials of international organization and foreign public
officials. For instance, the OECD defines a foreign public official as “any person holding a
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected;
any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or
public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international [organization].”1110 The
U.K.’s recently enacted Bribery Act of 2010 goes a step further in defining a public international
organization to include any organization “whose members are any of the following:
(a) countries or territories,
(b) governments of countries or territories,
(c) other public international organisations,
(d) a mixture of any of the above.”1111
The difference between the provisions of the aforesaid laws and conventions lies in their
position on the affirmative defense and how it is adopted. Neither the UNCAC nor the OECD
included in their provisions an affirmative defense to the bribery of foreign public officials.1112
On the national level, the FCPA highlighted mainly two affirmative defenses and one exception
introduced by the 1988 amendment of the FCPA establishing the “local law defense” and the
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“reasonable and bona fide promotional expense defense,” in addition to the exception for
“‘facilitating or expediting payments made in furtherance of routine governmental action.”1113
The Bribery Act of 2010 adopted another position by narrowing the defenses and the
exceptions in its provisions and providing more discretionary power to the U.K. authorities. The
Bribery Act of 2010 restricts the defense to those payments expressly permitted by local written
law. Consequently, whether the payment is a facilitating payment or another type of payment,
“section 6 explicitly provides that no violation occurs if the written law governing the official’s
conduct requires or permits him or her to be influenced by the offer, promise, or gift.”1114
Nevertheless, concerns have been raised about the criminalization of “the sorts of common
payments [such as] payments for obtaining permits or licenses, processing government papers, or
scheduling inspections.”1115 Practically, the Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill has
indicated that authorities would not use their discretionary powers to prosecute an offence
involving “such small amounts of money.”1116 Further, the Bribery Act of 2010 does not indicate
promotional expense as a defense, which creates an unclear situation raised mainly in cases of
routine inexpensive hospitality.1117 Again, this is largely left to the discretion of the authorities,
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who will be unlikely to prosecute an offense in such a case.1118 Finally, the Bribery Act of 2010
provides a defense “for corporations who have adequate procedures, programs, and practices in
place to monitor and prevent bribery by associated persons.”1119
In light of the brief illustrations above, Saudi legislators may adopt a similar provision to
that provided by the OECD convention in defining a foreign public official. In the context of the
affirmative defense, Saudi legislators could benefit from the examples provided by the FCPA
and the Bribery Act of 2010. However, the FCPA might be an optimal model, if they intend to
adopt affirmative defense provisions, since it is more clear and consistent as a matter of practice
and in its legal provisions.
In terms of how to implement these provisions in the Law, Saudi legislators may do so in
two forms. The first is to amend the scope of Article 8 by including foreign public officials
within its provisions. However, this may result in more confusion due to the issue of affirmative
defense associated with the bribery of public officials. The second form is to implement a new
section into the Anti-Bribery Law specifying the definition of a foreign public official, who is
covered, specific offenses, and affirmative defenses, if adopted. As an initial step, the second
form would also allow further steps and provides more flexibility for further amendments such as
the accounting rules.
3. Private-to-Private Bribery
Private-to-private bribery cannot be underestimated, especially when the role and the size
of the private sector is taken into consideration. Though some countries adopt provisions
criminalizing such bribery, a great number of others lack such provisions. Instead, they rely on
1118
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other provisions to prosecute these offenses.1120 Thus, sometimes bribery per se is not against the
law unless it involves another offense.1121
In Saudi Arabia, the seriousness of the issue can be shown by the fact that, according to
strategic management professor Abdulwahab Al-Gahtani, “bribes incurred in the Saudi private
sector total $15 billion annually,” which eventually harms society.1122 This number is only likely
to increase with the growing size of the private sector on the one hand and the national
transformation program “Vision 2030” moving toward the privatization of services on the
other.1123
In the previous chapter, the problem of the jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law has been
highlighted. As has been mentioned, in certain scenarios the Law’s jurisdiction appears to have a
short reach. Though the Law made an advance in including certain corporations within its
jurisdiction, other potentially problematic issues have emerged, which can be summarized as
follows: generally, a number of companies, as illustrated in the previous chapter, may not fall
under the jurisdiction of the Law; specifically, the provisions of the Law only apply in cases
where the recipient is within the scope of Article 8, rather than vice versa.
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Though the Law represented an advance at the time of its enactment by partly including
the private sector under its jurisdiction, this now appears insufficient due to the fact that a
number of companies are neither joint-stock corporations nor performing a public service nor
managing, running, or maintaining a public facility. Apparently, what was not taken into
consideration is the social tendency toward forming family companies. “[A]ccording to the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), … family companies constitute 95% of the total number of
companies. While the majority of these companies are considered to be small and medium
enterprises, 45 of the 100 largest companies are family business.”1124 This issue would be
unimportant if these companies met the other conditions of Article 8, i.e., carrying out banking
operations, performing a public service, or managing, running, or maintaining a public facility,
yet in reality this is not always the case.
Even if a company meets the requirement of carrying out banking operations, performing
a public service, or managing, running, or maintaining a public facility, this only provides a
limited jurisdiction for the application of the Law on only the offenses committed within that
scope.1125 In other words, if a company had a contract to run a public facility, the jurisdiction of
the Law would be limited to the offense of bribery committed within the scope of running a
public facility. Thus, if an employee of such a company received a bribe in a matter not related to
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the scope of the contract to run a public facility, then such an offense may not necessarily fall
within the jurisdiction of the Law.1126
The issue is aggravated when the legal system is viewed as a whole. Unlike those
countries opting to prosecute commercial bribery under provisions other than direct bribery
provisions, the Saudi legal system may lack such an option because the number of codified
offenses is significantly lower than the number of offenses existing in other countries. As shown
in the previous chapter, two of the provisions under which commercial bribery can be prosecuted
complicate the prosecution of such offenses.1127 Such difficulties can be shown clearly by a
comparison between the Saudi legal system and the U.S. Federal armory of laws.
Even if an offense can be successfully prosecuted under the previously highlighted
provisions, namely Article 211(c) of the Law of Companies and Article 4 of the Competition
Law, further issues appear to challenge the success of such a prosecution. Violation of the
provision of the Competition Law may not result in the imprisonment of the offender; rather a
monetary fine is imposed.1128 With respect to the violation of Article 211(c) of the Companies
Law, the liability is not extended to the legal person; rather, there is only an individual criminal
liability.1129 All of these provisions may fall into the trap of ineffective penalties, explained in the
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previous chapter, since they only impose a fixed monetary penalty, which may be insignificant
when compared to the undue advantage gained by the bribery.1130
The potential solution, then, has to meet two requirements: (1) it needs to have direct
provisions targeting private commercial bribery, and (2) it needs to establish the liability of legal
persons, which can be achieved via a number of approaches. The semi-direct approach would be
through amending the Companies Law to explicitly criminalize commercial bribery, both active
bribery and passive bribery, and then establishing the criminal liability of legal persons within
the provisions of the Companies Law, which would eventually kill two birds with one stone and
serve the dual propose of criminalizing bribery offenses in the private sector and establishing
criminal liability for legal persons, not only for bribery offenses, but also for other potential
offenses. The second approach would be to amend the jurisdiction of Article 8 by omitting the
conditions of carrying out banking operations, performing a public service, or managing,
running, or maintaining a public facility for a company to be held liable.
Another approach that deserves mention was adopted by the Bribery Act of 2010, which,
if adopted by Saudi legislators, would involve more complication and additional amendments to
the elements of the bribery offenses and the structure of the Anti-Bribery Law. After defining
offenses of bribing another person in section 1 and offenses relating to being bribed in section 2,
the Act of 2010 specifies the area “within which bribery can take place.”1131 The Act defines the
“‘relevant function or activity’ that can be improperly performed for the purposes of sections 1
and 2 [as]:
(a) any function of a public nature,
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(b) any activity connected with a business,
(c) any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment, [or]
(d) any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or
unincorporate).”1132
In addition to the requirement of relevant function or activity, the person performing such
function or activity must be expected to (A) perform it in good faith,1133 (B) perform it
impartially,1134 or (C) be “in position of trust by virtue of performing it.”1135
D. The Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corruption
The importance of criminal law in anti-corruption policy is manifest in three objections
that are related to each other. At the first level, criminal anti-corruption policies and provisions
project externally that the issue of corruption is taken seriously, which by itself helps to build the
external reputation of the country and give evidence of a serious commitment to fight corruption.
Internally, the message delivered to the public is that such corrupt practices are not accepted. At
the third stage, then, these policies and criminal provisions are ready to step in to be enforced
against extreme and obvious corrupt practices cases.
This is reflected in the practices of a number of countries, among which are the United
Kingdom and, more recently, China. The United Kingdom ratified the OECD’s Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 1998,
and since then U.K. anti-bribery laws have received a series of criticism by numerous OECD
Working Groups.1136 “Although the U.K. Government never conceded that its criminal laws fell
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short of its obligations under the Convention, it acknowledged that failure to implement legal
reform could call into question the United Kingdom’s commitment to it.”1137
Mainly, the criticism was premised on “the United Kingdom’s ‘continued failure’ to
address its unsatisfactory anti-bribery and anticorruption laws,”1138 and more specifically on the
premise of its inadequate criminal provisions to fight corruption. To put it differently, the
assessment of the commitment of the U.K. Government and its anti-corruption framework and
policy have revolved primarily around the role of criminal law and provisions in fighting
corruption.
China, on the other hand, ratified the UNCAC in 2006 and has followed a similar pattern
to that of the U.K. Government. China has for a lengthy period of time been subject to many
criticisms and much skepticism about its efforts to fight corruption. At the outset, the eighth
amendment of the PRC Criminal Law in 2011 was enacted, which introduced the crime of
bribery of foreign public officials.1139 In 2015, wider coverage was introduced by the ninth
amendment of the Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption (ABAC) Act.1140
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The ninth amendment includes inter alia (1) criminalizing the bribery of “the immediate
relatives” of current or former government workers or “individuals who have close
relationship[s]” with government workers,1141 (2) imposition of monetary penalties on individual
bribers regardless of the circumstances,1142 (3) raising the threshold of the exemption from the
penalties,1143 and (4) replacing the criteria of the punishments for embezzlement and accepting
bribery offenses to general standards instead of fixed and specified monetary figures.1144
More precisely, China’s anti-corruption campaign was fundamentally based on the
criminal law approach, which can be grasped clearly in the strategy of targeting and pursuing
“tigers and flies.”1145 Since the launch of the campaign around five years ago, more than 100,000
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individuals have been prosecuted and indicted for various corruption offenses,1146 among which
are more than 120 high-ranking officials.1147 Another indication of the heavy reliance of the
government on criminal law comes from the amendment of the criminal law, which tightened its
grip on these offenses. The ninth amendment, in addition to the raising the threshold of the
exemption from the penalties mentioned above, not only imposes severe penalties that may
include the imposition of death penalty, but also shows no leniency for individuals who commit
serious corruption offenses.1148
Even at the international level, the reading of various international conventions suggests a
heavy reliance on criminal law. In fact, a number of the criticisms of countries’ anti-bribery
policies and laws revolve around the lack of sufficient criminal provisions and failures to
criminalize and prosecute corrupt practices and offenses, which can be seen in the case of the
evaluation of the U.K.’s efforts to combat corruption for instance.1149 Eventually, the pressure of
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the international community seems to abate when amendments to criminal law provisions takes
place.
At the domestic level, the advantage of the criminal law stems from the direct and
explicit intention of the prohibition. That is, the criminal law is ought to communicate an explicit
message of intolerance of a corrupt behavior, which can be carried out because “[t]he criminal
law defines, or should define, the outer boundaries of the tolerable, and enforces those
boundaries by declaring those who transgress them as outlaws.”1150 Criminal process and law
“serve unique functions in educating the public about basic standards of behavior, stigmatizing
violators, and reinforcing the security, sense of justice, and automatic compliance of the lawabiding nearly as powerfully as criminal punishment.”1151 For a better or worse, countries tend to
enact and enforce provisions of criminal law to deliver the message that “nobody dares to be
corrupt,” which is the notion that China, for example, seems to have adopted.1152
This by no means should be understood as underestimating the role of other laws,
including civil laws and administrative regulation, in fighting corruption. Instead, the
significance of criminal law stems from the existence and readiness of adequate provisions to be
applied in cases of serious and obvious corrupt practices. Thus, anti-corruption policy may fail in
its mission if the goal is completely weed out corruption, since this would eventually “impose
rigid and cumbersome constraints that increase, rather than decrease, corrupt incentives.”1153
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Due to the sensitivity of the role of criminal law interventions, certain points need to be
highlighted. As mentioned in the previous chapter, to succeed, anti-corruption policy must adopt
the “right mix of penalties, rewards, and undercover law enforcement.”1154 Further, the “right
mix” should also mean the adoption of anti-corruption policies and mechanisms in which
criminal law is not the sole device; instead, other provisions from various laws should be
integrated into the criminal law.1155 This leads to a warning against the imposition of criminal
punishment “for technical regulatory violations, or in the absence of moral blameworthiness;
[criminal punishment] should not be a device for collecting revenue in the form of corporate
fines, expediting compensation of victims, or adjusting the marginal costs of corporate activities
that regulators would like to discourage.”1156
In the context of the indigenous forms of informal influence which include inter alia
guanxi and wasta, the intervention of criminal law remains at the minimum level. The difficulty
in drawing a line between the legitimate and illegitimate forms of these practices raises a
challenge for the intervention of criminal law. Around the fine line between legality and
illegality, individuals are moving and dancing and frequently they exceed it, yet the speed of
their movements coupled with the vagueness of the line confuse the perception of those practices
by the individuals themselves and the law. China, for instance, approaches the practice of guanxi
from two different perspectives: the first is that of traditional criminal law provisions covering
corrupt practices.1157 The other approach is the “soft law,” which is derived from ethical rules for
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official behaviors published and enforced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).1158 The
former may not necessarily authorize criminal punishments; rather, it can be more disciplinary in
nature.1159
In the Saudi context, bribery and other corrupt practices may not challenge the role of
criminal law as much as the practice of wasta, which sends a signal of caution when approaching
such a practice. Approaching wasta can be problematic due to the fact that the practice is not
fully blameworthy, at least from the perspective of social norms. Though the Anti-Bribery Law
targets wasta, at least partly, the problem with the wasta provision is not only its short reach, but
also its failure to prevent the practice in the first place. That is, the Law stipulates the
punishment, and defines the violation of the Law, in regard to the response and the action of a
public official. That however cannot be understand as a call for punishing the mere act of
offering or using wasta. Instead, such an act should be targeted indirectly and differently.
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Thus, to succeed, a criminal provision should establish the use of wasta with different
elements. As an indirect and fair approach, the practice and the use of wasta can be illegalized in
the context of the direct or indirect intervention of an unauthorized individual in the legal process
and decision making process, knowing that such an intervention may affect the neutrality of the
legal process and the decision-making process. However, the existence of such a provision is
contingent on a well-established legal and institutional structure.
Another potential approach is to fight wasta through administrative disciplinary rules and
actions, which may include, in addition to the civil penalties, removal from the office, reduction
in grade, debarment from office for a certain period of time, suspension, or dismissal from
office.1160 Since individuals are more inclined to protect their power, administrative penalties that
threaten their power may constitute an effective approach to fighting wasta.1161
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, a number of suggestions have been offered, taking into consideration the
specific social and legal factors relevant to Saudi Arabia. Among the proposed solutions is the
improvement and development of the existing e-government program in order to not only
simplify the procedures, but also to detect corrupt practices. In addition, this chapter has
suggested the use of nudges as a tool to fight wasta in particular and other corrupt practices in
general.
Furthermore, out of the various weaknesses of the Saudi legal framework when it comes
to fighting corruption, this chapter opted to discuss the problem of the limited jurisdiction of the
Anti-Bribery Law. The selection of this particular issue was based on the realization that the
1160
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reform of other weaknesses will be partly or completely built on the reform of the jurisdiction
issues. Moreover, this problem—that of limited jurisdiction—is one of those that receive an
emphasis when anti-corruption regulations are evaluated, especially when taking into
consideration the movement of a number of countries toward criminalizing private-to-private
bribery and the bribery of foreign public officials. Finally, due to the significant role of criminal
law, this chapter has concluded by shedding light on the role of criminal law in fighting
corruption.
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CONCLUSION
Corruption is a concern around the globe, as it impacts the growth and the well-being of
individuals and of nations. The study of corruption is complex, since every single aspect of it,
whether cultural, economic, political, or legal, plays a role in its development and flourishing. It
is not surprising, therefore, that diagnosing the root causes of corruption is a necessary
antecedent to successfully combating it. An accurate diagnosis of its root causes will sketch the
roadmap for fighting corruption and establish the priority of each step to be taken.
Influenced by recent studies and surveys highlighting the issues related to wasta and the
demand for legal reforms, this dissertation has shed light on corruption in Saudi Arabia by
exploring the social and legal factors behind corruption in the Saudi context. As Saudi Arabia is
a country that has established its legal system on the foundation of Shari'a, it was necessary to
examine the Islamic position on corruption. That examination showed that Islamic rules and
principles clearly mandate against traditional corrupt practices, among which are wasta and
bribery. There is no doubt about Shari'a’s prohibition of bribery, nor about its prohibition of the
contemporaneously practiced form of wasta, even if individuals in certain cases confused it with
the concept of permissible shafa’ah, or intercession, to justify the practice.
Wasta is a social factor in corruption, since it is rooted in and influenced by the society
itself, which creates difficulties in fighting it. The negative role of wasta has been
underestimated when compared to that of bribery, yet such assessments do not take into
consideration how widespread and divisive the practice of wasta is, and thus fail to grasp the
total number of people affected and the holistic consequences of it.
Since it is rooted in and influenced by Saudi society, wasta also constitutes a challenge to
the Saudi legal system. In essence, the limitations of each of the Saudi legal provisions that can
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be applied to those practicing wasta create a grey area where it can be practiced legally. The lack
of other provisions discouraging acts of favoritism and discrimination, which are the core of
wasta, aggravates the challenge involved in fighting the practice. Saudi legal and institutional
structures bear responsibility for the prevalence of wasta. The complexity of procedures and the
weaknesses of the legal structures influence individuals’ decisions to rely on wasta to overcome
these challenges and find solutions to their problems.
This dissertation has sought to highlight a number of legal factors considered to be
crucial in fighting corruption by examining the provisions of the Anti-Bribery Law specifically
and related aspects within the Saudi legal system generally. Since the Saudi legal system lacks a
comprehensive penal code, it was necessary to widen the scope of the study to cover the impact
of other legal provisions beyond the Anti-Bribery Law.
Therefore, the dissertation evaluated six aspects which needed to be taken into account.
This evaluation shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of each aspect. In addition to
legal provisions directly related to wasta, the evaluation included the liability of legal persons;
immunity; penalties and rewards; the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses; and the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. No reforms were proposed, except with respect to the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law; instead, the disadvantages associated with each aspect were
pointed out.
Basied on this analysis, it was argued that certain solutions can be suggested to decrease
corrupt practices in general and wasta in particular. Since it is a socially influenced practice,
wasta can be reduced by the implementation of nudges aimed at increasing the condemnation of
wasta practices, which will eventually increase the cognitive dissonance of those involved in
them, and that will, in turn, weaken the self-justification process related to them. This will
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facilitate the passing of legal measures to outlaw wasta, on the one hand, and increase the social
rejection of wasta and of other corrupt practices on the other.
This research further suggests that the improvement and simplification of government
processes would discourage corrupt practices. Among the potential solutions, the improvement
of e-government can be recommended in order to enhance the efficiency of procedures.
Although a number of Saudi governmental agencies and organizations have taken steps in
implementing e-government, certain aspects need to be further developed to serve the purpose of
fighting corrupt practices.
As regards the Anti-Bribery Law, the reform of its jurisdiction is necessary in order to
expand to the application of its provisions. Its limited jurisdiction, aimed at protecting the
integrity of public office, is insufficient, especially when the role of the private sector is taken
into consideration, to say nothing of its inconsistent position on corrupt practices in the public
sector vs. corrupt practices in the private sector.
Finally, this study has argued that the role of criminal law is fundamental in building a
strong mindset against corruption by sending a message internally and externally that corrupt
practices will not be tolerated. The existence of such criminal provisions will also reflect the
readiness to apply them to corrupt practices that pose serious harm to the health and wellbeing of
the society in which they occur.
Chapter five places the practice of wasta under the microscope. The first section
describes the practice of wasta and compares it with similar practices from other cultures that
involve informal influence. The chapter then tracks the evolution and development of wasta in
Saudi Arabia in light of the overview of historical and cultural background provided in chapter
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four. The last section investigates how the public perceives wasta and the legal position of the
practice.
The Anti-Bribery Law is the focus of chapter six. Before analyzing the Anti-Bribery
Law, the first section reviews the Saudi anti-corruption legal system. The second section
explores the definition of bribery as an offense under the Law, the elements of the offense, the
scope of the Law’s application, and the punishments, defenses, and rewards for reporting the
offense under the Law. The third section further examines the corrupt practices included in the
Law and their elements.
Based on chapter six, chapter seven examines the strength and weaknesses of the AntiBribery Law in regard to four aspects: the liability of legal persons; the wasta provision,
immunity; penalties and rewards; the protection of whistleblower and witnesses; and the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law.
The last chapter suggests potential legal, structural, and behavioral solutions to fight
corrupt practices generally and the practice of wasta specifically. The first section proposes
improving institutional structures by the implementation and development of e-government. The
second section suggests using the approach of nudges in order to discourage corrupt practices
generally and wasta specifically. The third section then considers the possibility of expanding the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Bribery Law. Finally, the dissertation concludes by addressing the role of
criminal law in fighting corruption.
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